Joel H.J. Cormier

The appellant, Sarfraz Malik, appealed a Superior Court decision that denied his motion to amend his statement of claim to add Family Law Act (FLA) s. 61 claims for losses arising from injuries to his children, more than four years after the accident.

The Superior Court judge had reversed a Master's decision, finding that s. 61 FLA claims constitute a distinct statutory cause of action, subject to the Limitations Act, and not merely a claim for additional damages within an existing negligence action.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the Superior Court's decision, holding that a s. 61 FLA claim is a separate statutory cause of action that was statute-barred in this case, thereby dismissing the appeal.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for non-pecuniary damages following a jury trial in a personal injury action.

The jury awarded general damages but zero for past income loss, future income loss, future housekeeping, and future healthcare costs.

The motion judge, exercising statutory duty to determine the threshold under s. 267.5(5)(b) of the Insurance Act, found that the plaintiff's impairments were not permanent, important, or serious.

The judge considered the jury's implied findings regarding the plaintiff's credibility and the non-permanence of injuries, preferring the defendants' medical expert evidence.

Consequently, the plaintiff's claim for non-pecuniary loss was dismissed.

The appellant, Amir Nikbakht, appealed an interlocutory order of Master Wiebe that granted the respondent, Sarfraz Malik, leave to amend his statement of claim to add a claim under s. 61 of the Family Law Act (FLA) after the two-year limitation period had expired.

The Master, relying on Bazkur v. Coore, held that the FLA claim was not a new cause of action but an additional remedy.

The Superior Court judge, exercising coordinate jurisdiction, found that Bazkur was "plainly wrong" and that a s. 61 FLA claim constitutes a new statutory cause of action, distinct from a direct negligence claim.

Consequently, the amendment sought after the limitation period was statute-barred.

The appeal was allowed, and the Master's order was set aside.

The defendants, a builder (Park Avenue) and a developer (739), moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' action for declarations, specific performance, and damages related to the termination of pre-construction home agreements.

The plaintiffs, five buyers, alleged breach of good faith, honest performance, and negligence.

The court found that Park Avenue made reasonable efforts and acted in good faith to satisfy an early termination condition (obtaining a Cost Sharing Agreement, CSA) despite delays caused by a third-party developer.

The court also determined that 739, the developer, did not owe a duty of care to the purchasers due to a lack of proximity.

Even if a breach of contract by Park Avenue had occurred, the court concluded that the agreements would have been lawfully terminated anyway, resulting in no damages.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the defendants, dismissing the plaintiffs' action.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict in a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The respondent plaintiff claimed chronic pain, anxiety, and depression resulting from a relatively minor collision.

The appellants raised two grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge erred in refusing to grant a mistrial based on alleged prejudicial evidence regarding the respondent's complaints about defence counsel's conduct, and (2) the trial judge erred in allowing an amendment to the statement of claim following the jury's verdict to reflect the full damages awarded.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds of appeal and upheld the trial judge's discretionary decisions.

The appellant purchased land from the respondents with a vendor take-back mortgage.

The purchase agreement and mortgage provided that if the official plan was not amended to change the zoning designation to "Business Commercial" prior to June 17, 2018, the principal amount would be reduced by $600,000.

The mortgage also contained a standard charge term providing that if the lands were sold without the respondents' consent, all amounts owing plus a three-month interest bonus would immediately become due.

The appellant sold the property in February 2017 without consent and paid $600,000 into court, arguing the price reduction applied.

The application judge dismissed the application, and the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the plain language of the mortgage clearly stipulated the June 17, 2018 deadline and that the appellant's sale triggered the obligation to pay all monies owing including the interest bonus.

A motor vehicle accident occurred at an intersection where a stop sign was positioned between 8.4 and 9.4 metres behind a faded stop line.

The driver of the westbound vehicle failed to see a northbound vehicle and T-boned it, causing serious injury to a passenger.

The trial judge found the driver negligent and also found the municipality breached its duty of repair by failing to repaint the faded stop line, apportioning 50 per cent liability to the city.

The Court of Appeal allowed the city's appeal, finding the trial judge misapplied the ordinary reasonable driver standard by focusing on precise stopping distances rather than considering that reasonable drivers would stop at a point providing sightlines in both directions, as required by the Highway Traffic Act.

This decision addresses a threshold motion brought by the defendants in a motor vehicle accident claim.

The plaintiff, Barry O'Brien, sought damages for injuries sustained, including a pilon fracture of his left ankle, depression, PTSD, and an exacerbation of low back symptoms.

A jury had previously awarded general damages and past loss of income but no future loss of income.

The defendants argued that the plaintiff's injuries did not meet the 'permanent serious impairment' threshold under s. 267.5(5) of the Insurance Act, RSO 1990, c I.8, and Regulation 461/96, thereby barring his claim for non-pecuniary loss.

The court, while considering the jury's verdict, independently assessed the medical and other evidence.

It concluded that the plaintiff's left ankle fracture resulted in a permanent serious impairment of an important physical function related to his employment, substantially interfering with his ability to continue heavy labour, especially considering the future deterioration due to arthritis.

However, the court found that the impairment did not substantially interfere with most of his usual activities of daily living.

Consequently, the defence's threshold motion was dismissed.

The defendant, Mer Mechanical Inc., moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs' subrogated claim was barred by a builder's risk policy with a waiver of subrogation.

The policy covered "occurrence" if the "inception of the event causing the loss" occurred during the coverage period.

The loss resulted from a faucet detachment after the policy expired, which the defendant attributed to "creep/stress relaxation" during installation.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the "inception of the event" (faucet detachment) occurred after the policy expired, distinguishing it from the "cause" (improper installation).

The court emphasized that builder's risk policies primarily cover ongoing construction, and the insurable interest ceases upon project completion.

During a motor vehicle accident trial, the plaintiffs objected to the admissibility of a defence psychiatrist's evidence, Dr. Robert Hines.

Initially, the objection concerned Rule 53.03, but it was withdrawn based on the *Westerhof* decision.

The court then raised a concern regarding the defence's attempt to both file Dr. Hines' reports under s. 52 of the *Evidence Act* and call him as a witness, which is contrary to established case law (*Ferraro v. Lee*, *Iannarella v. Corbett*).

Despite the defence counsel's prior involvement in *Iannarella* and the court's gatekeeping role, the defence insisted on calling the witness.

The court, exercising its discretion, allowed Dr. Hines to testify but ordered his reports removed from the jury's document brief to mitigate prejudice to the plaintiffs, while reserving the issue of costs for later consideration.

The defendants Mosstek Landscaping Inc. and Casey John Moss brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's personal injury claim, arguing that the limitation period had expired before they were added to the action.

The plaintiff contended that the discoverability rule applied, as she was unaware of their involvement in snow and ice removal until after the initial limitation period.

The court found that there was a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding whether the plaintiff exercised due diligence in discovering the landscaping defendants' identity.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the plaintiff.