Joel H.J. Cormier

The defendant subcontractor moved for summary judgment to dismiss a subrogated claim brought by the plaintiffs' insurer for damages to a cooling unit during construction.

The plaintiffs had cancelled the Builder's Risk Policy prior to the loss, arguing the premises were being used or occupied.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, as the evidence established that occupancy was legally impermissible without a permit, which had not been issued at the time of cancellation.

The plaintiffs breached their covenant to insure the defendant, barring the subrogated action.

The motion for summary judgment was granted and the claim dismissed.

The plaintiff, a pizza delivery driver, brought a proposed class action against the franchisor and 141 franchisees alleging misclassification as an independent contractor.

Both the plaintiff and the franchisee defendants appealed the certification judge's decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the plaintiff's appeal, upholding the finding that the franchisees were not 'common employers' under the Employment Standards Act.

The Court granted the franchisees' appeal in part, finding the motion judge erred in certifying a conspiracy claim among all defendants because the pleadings only alleged the franchisor controlled the agreements, not that the franchisees conspired with each other.

The certification of employment status as a common issue and the negligence claim were upheld.

The plaintiff and the franchisee defendants brought motions for leave to appeal the decision of Glustein J. dated December 17, 2024.

The Divisional Court granted both motions for leave to appeal.

Costs of the motions were fixed at $5,000 each and reserved to the panel hearing the appeal.

The moving parties sought an extension of time and leave to appeal two decisions of Stevenson J. The Divisional Court granted the extension of time but dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, awarding costs of $4,350 to the responding party.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario decision that dismissed his eight complaints of discrimination and declared him a vexatious litigant.

The complaints primarily alleged discrimination based on ancestry and place of origin due to poor customer service.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the Tribunal's dismissal of the complaints was reasonable as they were frivolous on their face.

The court also held that the Tribunal's process was procedurally fair and its declaration of the applicant as a vexatious litigant was justified given his history of bringing multiple meritless proceedings.

Following a motor vehicle accident trial where the plaintiffs' claims were effectively dismissed after a threshold motion, the defendants sought costs of $275,259.55 on a partial and substantial indemnity basis.

The court held that Rule 49.10 did not apply since the action was dismissed, and substantial indemnity costs were not warranted as there was no reprehensible conduct by the plaintiffs.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the defendants, reduced by 20 percent to account for the principal plaintiff's financial hardship.

No costs were awarded against the derivative Family Law Act claimant.

The plaintiff sued the tenants and the landlord of a residential property after slipping and falling on an allegedly icy porch.

The tenant defendants brought a motion for partial summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's claim and the landlord's crossclaim against them, arguing the landlord was solely responsible for snow and ice maintenance under the Residential Tenancies Act.

The plaintiff did not participate in the motion.

The court dismissed the motion, finding it was not an appropriate case for partial summary judgment as the plaintiff's allegations went beyond ice and snow, and the moving parties failed to discharge their evidentiary burden to show there was no genuine issue requiring a trial.

The appellant, Sarfraz Malik, appealed a Superior Court decision that denied his motion to amend his statement of claim to add Family Law Act (FLA) s. 61 claims for losses arising from injuries to his children, more than four years after the accident.

The Superior Court judge had reversed a Master's decision, finding that s. 61 FLA claims constitute a distinct statutory cause of action, subject to the Limitations Act, and not merely a claim for additional damages within an existing negligence action.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the Superior Court's decision, holding that a s. 61 FLA claim is a separate statutory cause of action that was statute-barred in this case, thereby dismissing the appeal.

The plaintiffs brought a Rule 21 motion to determine the effect of a Pierringer Agreement and a prior court order on the remaining claims against the non-settling defendant and subsequent third and fourth parties.

The court clarified that the prior order restricted the plaintiffs' claim against the remaining defendant to several liability, but did not affect the remaining defendant's ability to pursue contribution from third parties.

The motion was resolved with all parties ultimately agreeing on this interpretation, and costs were deferred to the pre-trial or trial judge.

The defendant consented to the dismissal of its third party claim against the engineering firm before a summary judgment motion was heard.

The parties could not agree on costs.

The defendant argued the third party's costs should be reduced because the lawyers' time was split between two related actions and the summary judgment motion did not proceed.

The court rejected these arguments, finding the third party's methodology of equally dividing costs between the two actions was acceptable and the time spent on factum preparation was reasonable.

The court awarded the third party costs of $33,984.79 on a partial indemnity scale.

The defendants brought a motion to dismiss the plaintiff's claim for non-pecuniary damages following a jury trial in a personal injury action.

The jury awarded general damages but zero for past income loss, future income loss, future housekeeping, and future healthcare costs.

The motion judge, exercising statutory duty to determine the threshold under s. 267.5(5)(b) of the Insurance Act, found that the plaintiff's impairments were not permanent, important, or serious.

The judge considered the jury's implied findings regarding the plaintiff's credibility and the non-permanence of injuries, preferring the defendants' medical expert evidence.

Consequently, the plaintiff's claim for non-pecuniary loss was dismissed.

The appellants appealed the dismissal of their negligence actions arising from a fire that destroyed an historic mansion shortly after a plumber repaired a leaking pipe using a blowtorch.

At trial, the appellants did not call expert evidence on the standard of care, arguing the plumber's conduct was egregious.

The trial judge found the plumber's conduct was not egregious and that expert evidence was required to establish the standard of care for soldering.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no error in the conclusion that the appellants failed to discharge their burden of proving a breach of the standard of care without expert evidence.

The appellant, Amir Nikbakht, appealed an interlocutory order of Master Wiebe that granted the respondent, Sarfraz Malik, leave to amend his statement of claim to add a claim under s. 61 of the Family Law Act (FLA) after the two-year limitation period had expired.

The Master, relying on Bazkur v. Coore, held that the FLA claim was not a new cause of action but an additional remedy.

The Superior Court judge, exercising coordinate jurisdiction, found that Bazkur was "plainly wrong" and that a s. 61 FLA claim constitutes a new statutory cause of action, distinct from a direct negligence claim.

Consequently, the amendment sought after the limitation period was statute-barred.

The appeal was allowed, and the Master's order was set aside.

The defendants, a builder (Park Avenue) and a developer (739), moved for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' action for declarations, specific performance, and damages related to the termination of pre-construction home agreements.

The plaintiffs, five buyers, alleged breach of good faith, honest performance, and negligence.

The court found that Park Avenue made reasonable efforts and acted in good faith to satisfy an early termination condition (obtaining a Cost Sharing Agreement, CSA) despite delays caused by a third-party developer.

The court also determined that 739, the developer, did not owe a duty of care to the purchasers due to a lack of proximity.

Even if a breach of contract by Park Avenue had occurred, the court concluded that the agreements would have been lawfully terminated anyway, resulting in no damages.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the defendants, dismissing the plaintiffs' action.

The defendant Mondconsult sought leave to amend its Statement of Defence and Crossclaim to add a breach of contract claim against co-defendant 7 Brighton for failing to obtain wrap-up insurance. 7 Brighton opposed the motion, arguing the amendment introduced a new cause of action outside the limitation period.

The court found the proposed amendment was a new claim and that Mondconsult, with reasonable diligence, ought to have discovered the failure to obtain insurance when served with the Statement of Claim over three years prior.

The motion was dismissed as the claim was statute-barred.

The appellants appealed a jury verdict in a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The respondent plaintiff claimed chronic pain, anxiety, and depression resulting from a relatively minor collision.

The appellants raised two grounds of appeal: (1) the trial judge erred in refusing to grant a mistrial based on alleged prejudicial evidence regarding the respondent's complaints about defence counsel's conduct, and (2) the trial judge erred in allowing an amendment to the statement of claim following the jury's verdict to reflect the full damages awarded.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both grounds of appeal and upheld the trial judge's discretionary decisions.

The appellant purchased land from the respondents with a vendor take-back mortgage.

The purchase agreement and mortgage provided that if the official plan was not amended to change the zoning designation to "Business Commercial" prior to June 17, 2018, the principal amount would be reduced by $600,000.

The mortgage also contained a standard charge term providing that if the lands were sold without the respondents' consent, all amounts owing plus a three-month interest bonus would immediately become due.

The appellant sold the property in February 2017 without consent and paid $600,000 into court, arguing the price reduction applied.

The application judge dismissed the application, and the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding that the plain language of the mortgage clearly stipulated the June 17, 2018 deadline and that the appellant's sale triggered the obligation to pay all monies owing including the interest bonus.

A motor vehicle accident occurred at an intersection where a stop sign was positioned between 8.4 and 9.4 metres behind a faded stop line.

The driver of the westbound vehicle failed to see a northbound vehicle and T-boned it, causing serious injury to a passenger.

The trial judge found the driver negligent and also found the municipality breached its duty of repair by failing to repaint the faded stop line, apportioning 50 per cent liability to the city.

The Court of Appeal allowed the city's appeal, finding the trial judge misapplied the ordinary reasonable driver standard by focusing on precise stopping distances rather than considering that reasonable drivers would stop at a point providing sightlines in both directions, as required by the Highway Traffic Act.

This decision addresses a threshold motion brought by the defendants in a motor vehicle accident claim.

The plaintiff, Barry O'Brien, sought damages for injuries sustained, including a pilon fracture of his left ankle, depression, PTSD, and an exacerbation of low back symptoms.

A jury had previously awarded general damages and past loss of income but no future loss of income.

The defendants argued that the plaintiff's injuries did not meet the 'permanent serious impairment' threshold under s. 267.5(5) of the Insurance Act, RSO 1990, c I.8, and Regulation 461/96, thereby barring his claim for non-pecuniary loss.

The court, while considering the jury's verdict, independently assessed the medical and other evidence.

It concluded that the plaintiff's left ankle fracture resulted in a permanent serious impairment of an important physical function related to his employment, substantially interfering with his ability to continue heavy labour, especially considering the future deterioration due to arthritis.

However, the court found that the impairment did not substantially interfere with most of his usual activities of daily living.

Consequently, the defence's threshold motion was dismissed.

The defendant, Mer Mechanical Inc., moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs' subrogated claim was barred by a builder's risk policy with a waiver of subrogation.

The policy covered "occurrence" if the "inception of the event causing the loss" occurred during the coverage period.

The loss resulted from a faucet detachment after the policy expired, which the defendant attributed to "creep/stress relaxation" during installation.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the "inception of the event" (faucet detachment) occurred after the policy expired, distinguishing it from the "cause" (improper installation).

The court emphasized that builder's risk policies primarily cover ongoing construction, and the insurable interest ceases upon project completion.