Joel H.J. Cormier

A plumber used an open flame torch to repair a leaking pipe in the basement of a heritage mansion.

Shortly after the repair was completed, a massive fire broke out, destroying the house.

The property owner and the condominium corporation's insurers brought a subrogated negligence claim against the plumbing company.

The court dismissed the action, finding that the plaintiffs failed to prove causation, as there was no evidence the downward-directed flame ignited combustibles in the adjacent joist space.

Furthermore, the plaintiffs failed to establish a breach of the standard of care because they did not call expert evidence on the standard expected of a reasonably prudent plumber performing soldering work.

The moving party, a third-party property manager, sought summary judgment to dismiss claims for contribution and indemnity brought by the defendant plumbing company.

The defendant had settled property damage claims with the plaintiff tenants following a flooding incident.

The third party sought to amend its pleadings to rely on a limitation of liability clause in the commercial leases, which barred claims against the landlord and persons for whom the landlord is legally responsible.

The court allowed the amendment, finding no non-compensable prejudice.

The court then interpreted the lease and concluded that the third party, as the operator of the building automation system, fell within the category of persons for whom the landlord was legally responsible.

Because the plaintiffs were barred from suing the third party directly, the defendant could not claim contribution and indemnity.

The motion for summary judgment was granted.

During a motor vehicle accident trial, the plaintiffs objected to the admissibility of a defence psychiatrist's evidence, Dr. Robert Hines.

Initially, the objection concerned Rule 53.03, but it was withdrawn based on the *Westerhof* decision.

The court then raised a concern regarding the defence's attempt to both file Dr. Hines' reports under s. 52 of the *Evidence Act* and call him as a witness, which is contrary to established case law (*Ferraro v. Lee*, *Iannarella v. Corbett*).

Despite the defence counsel's prior involvement in *Iannarella* and the court's gatekeeping role, the defence insisted on calling the witness.

The court, exercising its discretion, allowed Dr. Hines to testify but ordered his reports removed from the jury's document brief to mitigate prejudice to the plaintiffs, while reserving the issue of costs for later consideration.

The moving parties, who were added as defendants to a slip and fall action nearly six years after the incident, sought leave to appeal a decision dismissing their motion for summary judgment.

They argued the claim was statute-barred and the plaintiff failed to exercise due diligence in discovering their identity.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no error in principle in the motions judge's decision to leave the limitation period issue for trial, and noting that granting leave would cause unnecessary delay and piecemeal litigation.

The defendants Mosstek Landscaping Inc. and Casey John Moss brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiff's personal injury claim, arguing that the limitation period had expired before they were added to the action.

The plaintiff contended that the discoverability rule applied, as she was unaware of their involvement in snow and ice removal until after the initial limitation period.

The court found that there was a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding whether the plaintiff exercised due diligence in discovering the landscaping defendants' identity.

The motion for summary judgment was dismissed, and costs were awarded to the plaintiff.

The appellant, Century Plumbing and Heating, appealed a summary judgment decision that removed the respondents, ADT Security Services Canada Inc. and Intercon Security Limited, from several actions relating to a flood in a Toronto tower.

The appellant argued the motions judge erred in finding the Building Automation System had frozen, in not considering video evidence, and in relying on inadmissible evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motions judge's conclusions were supported by the evidence, including an admission by the building owner that the system had frozen, and that the appellant failed to establish a genuine issue requiring a trial.

The insurer brought a motion for summary judgment seeking dismissal of an action for indemnity under uninsured and family protection coverage following a motor vehicle accident involving an uninsured driver.

The insurer argued the action was statute‑barred and that the insureds failed to comply with the 30‑day notice requirement under Ontario Regulation 676.

The court held that the two‑year limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002 applied and began when the insured demanded indemnification from the insurer, consistent with appellate authority governing OPCF 44R claims.

The court further found the insureds’ late notice constituted imperfect compliance and granted relief from forfeiture under the Insurance Act and Courts of Justice Act, noting minimal prejudice to the insurer and significant disparity between the breach and the loss of coverage.

The insurer’s summary judgment motion was dismissed.

The defendant insurer sought leave to appeal a motion judge's refusal to grant summary judgment in an action arising from a motor vehicle accident allegedly caused by an unidentified driver.

The motion judge had concluded that credibility issues prevented summary judgment and that a mini-trial was inappropriate.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, finding no error in principle, no conflicting case law, and no reason to doubt the correctness of the motion judge's discretionary decision.

The moving parties sought summary judgment dismissing third party claims and cross‑claims arising from flood damage in a Toronto office tower allegedly caused by a plumbing failure and monitoring issues with a building automation system.

The responding parties alleged that the moving parties, as building owner or property manager, were liable in contribution and indemnity or owed independent duties in tort.

The court found the claims were premised on factual errors regarding corporate roles and ownership, and that the property manager was protected by a limitation of liability clause in the tenants’ leases that barred claims for contribution or indemnity.

The responding parties produced no evidence establishing a genuine issue for trial, and a proposed amendment to plead an independent tort was unsupported and limitation‑barred.

Summary judgment was therefore granted dismissing the claims against the moving parties and the motion to amend was refused.