Sheldon Ivor Erentzen

The moving party, Watts Water Technologies Inc., brought a motion for leave to appeal the order of Sanderson J. dated March 16, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs to the responding party in the fixed amount of $5,000.

The plaintiff in a simplified procedure product liability action sought further and better affidavits of documents from the defendants regarding a failed flexible water supply connector.

The plaintiff requested 125,000 pages of documents and expert reports that the defendants had previously produced in a related US class action.

The court ordered the production of the 125,000 pages of documents, finding them relevant and necessary for the plaintiff to prove its case, but denied the request for expert reports based on proportionality concerns.

The defendants brought a preliminary motion to strike various paragraphs of the plaintiff's supporting affidavit filed in connection with a motion for answers to discovery refusals.

Applying the principles from Chopik v. Mitsubishi Paper Mills Ltd., the Master struck paragraphs containing the law clerk's opinion and interpretation of evidence, while allowing paragraphs that merely attached or quoted public documents.

Paragraphs containing argument were not struck but were directed to be considered as part of the plaintiff's argument rather than evidence.

The moving party, Toronto Hydro, sought to set aside an ex parte order extending the time for the plaintiffs to serve their statement of claim.

Toronto Hydro argued that the plaintiffs failed to disclose material facts on the ex parte motion, including the expiration of the limitation period and the lack of notice to Toronto Hydro, and failed to address prejudice.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that no material facts were omitted that would have impacted the original decision.

The court also held that the failure to address prejudice in the supporting affidavit was a matter for appeal, not a ground for setting aside the order under Rule 39.01(6), and that Toronto Hydro suffered no material prejudice as it had recycled the evidence itself prior to the deadline for service.

The defendant, Mer Mechanical Inc., moved for summary judgment, arguing that the plaintiffs' subrogated claim was barred by a builder's risk policy with a waiver of subrogation.

The policy covered "occurrence" if the "inception of the event causing the loss" occurred during the coverage period.

The loss resulted from a faucet detachment after the policy expired, which the defendant attributed to "creep/stress relaxation" during installation.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the "inception of the event" (faucet detachment) occurred after the policy expired, distinguishing it from the "cause" (improper installation).

The court emphasized that builder's risk policies primarily cover ongoing construction, and the insurable interest ceases upon project completion.

The plaintiff brought a motion to amend the statement of claim to substitute the correct limousine company and driver as defendants after initially naming the wrong company and a John Doe driver.

The proposed defendants opposed the amendment on the basis that the limitation period had expired.

The court considered whether the amendment constituted the correction of a misnomer under s. 21(2) of the Limitations Act, 2002.

Finding that the statement of claim clearly intended to sue the owner and driver of the limousine involved in the accident and that the insurer for both entities had knowledge of the claim, the court held the amendment corrected a misdescription rather than adding a new party.

The court also declined to exercise its discretion to refuse the amendment, finding no inordinate delay and no prejudice to the responding parties.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment.

The Tribunal issued a Notice of Intent to Dismiss under s. 34(11) of the Human Rights Code because the applicant had commenced a civil proceeding seeking damages for wrongful dismissal that included allegations of discrimination.

The applicant argued that he had brought a motion to stay the civil proceeding and amend the statement of claim to remove references to the Code.

The Tribunal held that a motion to stay or amend the civil claim does not prevent the application of s. 34(11), as the civil proceeding had not been finally determined or withdrawn.

The application was dismissed as barred by s. 34(11).

Following a successful appeal, the appellant police service sought costs of over $90,000.

The Court of Appeal awarded the appellant $20,000 for the costs of the underlying application.

However, the court found the requested appeal costs unreasonable, noting the appeal involved novel issues that the appellant had an institutional interest in resolving.

The court fixed the appeal costs at $25,000, payable by the respondent.

No costs were ordered for or against the interveners.

The respondent, whose criminal charges for sexual offences were withdrawn upon entering a peace bond, applied for jobs requiring a Vulnerable Persons Search.

He signed consent forms authorizing the Toronto Police Service to conduct the search.

The Peel Police Service disclosed the withdrawn charges to the Toronto Police Service.

The respondent obtained an injunction prohibiting the Peel Police Service from disclosing the withdrawn charges.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the disclosure was authorized by the respondent's consent under s. 32(b) of the Municipal Freedom of Information and Protection of Privacy Act.

The Court also dismissed the respondent's cross-appeal, finding no violation of his Charter rights under ss. 7 and 8.

The appellants, estate trustees for the deceased aunt of a party to a family law action, appealed the dismissal of their motion to set aside a family law trial judgment.

The trial judgment had awarded the respondent a one-half interest in a property previously held in joint tenancy by her ex-husband and the deceased aunt.

The aunt died before trial, and her interest passed to the ex-husband by right of survivorship.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the estate trustees failed to move in a timely manner, having waited until after the ex-husband's appeal was dismissed before asserting the estate's rights.

Furthermore, the estate's claim lacked potential merit as the deceased had never taken steps to sever the joint tenancy during her lifetime.

The plaintiffs sought leave to appeal a motion judge's decision that directed a trial on the issue of whether a franchise disclosure document was merely incomplete under s. 6(1) of the Arthur Wishart Act or amounted to no disclosure under s. 6(2).

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the sufficiency of a disclosure document is a highly fact-specific inquiry.

The court concluded that the proposed appeal did not raise a question of general importance warranting the attention of the Divisional Court.