James B. Tausendfreund

The appellants appealed a jury verdict awarding the respondent over $1.5 million in damages arising from a motor vehicle accident.

The trial judge declined to put certain jury questions proposed by the appellants regarding causation and apportionment of damages between three successive motor vehicle accidents.

The appellants also challenged the trial judge's summary of evidence and her failure to instruct the jury to disregard expert evidence concerning past income loss.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the trial judge's approach to jury questions and instructions, and finding the jury's damage award was not plainly unreasonable.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of a commercial lease, specifically the allocation of risk for fire damage.

The landlord, James Dick Construction Limited (JDC), sued its tenant, Courtice Auto Wreckers Limited (CAW), for damages after a fire destroyed one leased building and damaged another.

JDC alleged CAW breached the lease by failing to maintain the sprinkler system.

The trial judge dismissed the action, finding that the landlord's covenant to insure the buildings allocated the risk of fire loss to the landlord, even if the tenant was responsible for sprinkler system repair expenses.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, affirming that while a covenant to insure generally implies risk allocation to the covenantor, this is not an absolute rule and requires a holistic interpretation of the entire contract and surrounding circumstances.

The Court found no extricable error of law or palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's application of the law.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action against TD Canada Trust, arguing errors regarding the availability of summary judgment in civil jury actions, the exclusion of expert evidence, and procedural fairness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the Hryniak test for summary judgment applies equally to civil jury actions, the motion judge properly excluded the expert evidence, and the process was procedurally fair.

This is an appeal concerning the application of the doctrine of equitable contribution between two insurers, Northbridge and Aviva, for the defence and indemnification of a shared insured, Mr. Daneshvari, in an underlying professional misconduct action.

Both insurers' policies contained "other insurance" clauses purporting to be excess.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the policies were irreconcilable, requiring equal contribution.

The court affirmed that the standard of review for interpreting these specific "other insurance" clauses was palpable and overriding error, not correctness, as they were not standard form contracts with significant precedential value.

The appeal was dismissed, and Aviva was ordered to pay costs to Northbridge.

A teenage plaintiff was catastrophically injured when she deliberately jumped from a moving school bus on the last day of Grade 8 as part of an informal tradition among graduating students.

The bus operator had received prior reports of students jumping from buses but failed to report these incidents to the school as required by its own handbook.

A jury found the defendant 75 per cent liable and the plaintiff 25 per cent contributorily negligent, awarding substantial damages.

The defendant appealed on grounds of improper jury charge regarding causation and contributory negligence, erroneous removal of the mitigation issue from the jury, and failure to deduct statutory accident benefits.

The Court of Appeal upheld the jury verdict on causation and contributory negligence, found the trial judge erred in removing mitigation from the jury but determined no miscarriage of justice resulted, and remitted the statutory accident benefits deduction issue to the Superior Court for determination.

On appeal from a trial judgment in a personal injury case arising from a motorcycle accident, the appellants challenged the trial judge's decisions regarding collateral benefits deductions under the Insurance Act.

Specifically, they contested the trial judge's refusal to deduct an overpayment of income replacement benefits and short-term disability benefits from the jury's award.

The appellants argued that if successful on either issue, the respondent's judgment would fall below their Rule 49 settlement offer, warranting a costs adjustment.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decisions on both issues and dismissed the appeal.

This is a costs decision on appeal from a trial judgment concerning liability for damages arising from an accident.

The appellants sought to challenge the trial judge's costs award.

The Court of Appeal determined that liability should be apportioned two-thirds to Safranyos and one-third to Hamilton.

The court made a Sanderson order requiring Safranyos to pay one-third of McHugh's costs of trial and appeal, but declined to impose such an order against Hamilton, as Hamilton made no arguments relating to McHugh's liability at trial or on appeal.

The plaintiff sought to add two proposed defendants, Enbridge Gas Distribution Inc. and Rabcon Contractors Ltd., to a personal injury action more than two years after the accident.

The proposed defendants resisted the motion, arguing that the plaintiff failed to exercise due diligence in identifying them within the limitation period.

The court considered the discoverability principle, noting that the City of Toronto (the original defendant) had not disclosed the involvement of other parties in its initial response, pleadings, or discovery, despite having commenced a separate action for contribution and indemnity against the proposed defendants.

Applying proportionality and the principle that cases should be heard on their merits, the court found that no further diligence was required from the plaintiff given the circumstances.

The motion to add the proposed defendants was granted, with costs reserved to the ultimate trier of facts.

A motor vehicle collision occurred at an intersection in Hamilton when a vehicle operated by Ms. Safranyos failed to yield the right-of-way and was struck by a vehicle operated by Mr. McHugh, who had consumed alcohol and was speeding.

The trial judge found all three defendants liable: Ms. Safranyos at 50%, Mr. McHugh at 25%, and the City of Hamilton at 25%.

The City appealed on grounds that the trial judge misapplied the non-repair standard and improperly used adverse inferences.

Mr. McHugh appealed on grounds that the trial judge erred in finding he could have avoided the collision and misused evidence regarding his intoxication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the City's appeal but allowed Mr. McHugh's appeal, finding the trial judge committed palpable and overriding errors in her factual findings and legal analysis regarding Mr. McHugh's liability.

A motor vehicle accident occurred at an intersection where a stop sign was positioned between 8.4 and 9.4 metres behind a faded stop line.

The driver of the westbound vehicle failed to see a northbound vehicle and T-boned it, causing serious injury to a passenger.

The trial judge found the driver negligent and also found the municipality breached its duty of repair by failing to repaint the faded stop line, apportioning 50 per cent liability to the city.

The Court of Appeal allowed the city's appeal, finding the trial judge misapplied the ordinary reasonable driver standard by focusing on precise stopping distances rather than considering that reasonable drivers would stop at a point providing sightlines in both directions, as required by the Highway Traffic Act.