Sherilyn J. Pickering

The appellant was injured when the public transit bus she was riding stopped abruptly, throwing her forward.

She sought statutory accident benefits, which were denied by the Licence Appeal Tribunal under s. 268(1.1) of the Insurance Act because the bus did not collide with another vehicle or object.

On appeal, the appellant argued she constituted 'any other object' under the statute.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the plain wording and context of the provision require the object to be outside the vehicle, and a bus does not collide with a person inside it.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to amend their statement of claim to correct the misnomer of several John Doe defendants, identifying them as specific treating physicians and a wound care provider (ParaMed).

The underlying action involved allegations of medical malpractice relating to the development and failure to treat the deceased's bedsores at various care facilities.

The proposed defendants opposed the motion, arguing it was an attempt to add parties after the expiry of the strict two-year limitation period under the Trustee Act.

The court granted the motion, finding that the pleadings were drafted with sufficient particularity such that the 'litigation finger' pointed squarely at the proposed defendants, and that a properly informed defendant would have recognized they were the target of the allegations.

The court also found no non-compensable prejudice to the proposed defendants.

The appellant, who was injured in a motor vehicle accident, appealed and sought judicial review of a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision denying her catastrophic impairment benefits.

The Divisional Court found that while there was no breach of procedural fairness, the Adjudicator's findings regarding the appellant's whole person impairment under Criterion 6 of the AMA Guides were unreasonable.

Specifically, the Adjudicator unreasonably dismissed evidence of double vision, peripheral neuropathy, and medication side effects.

The court quashed the decision and remitted the matter to the LAT for a new hearing before a different adjudicator.

The appellant sought judicial review and appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) decision dismissing his application for Income Replacement Benefits (IRBs) as statute-barred.

The LAT found that the insurer's May 3, 2021 letter constituted a clear and unequivocal denial of benefits, triggering the two-year limitation period under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The Divisional Court upheld the LAT's decision, finding no error in its application of the limitation period or its refusal to extend the time to appeal.

The court also rejected the appellant's arguments regarding discoverability and the impact of subsequent correspondence from the insurer.

The defendant, His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario, moved for an order requiring the plaintiff’s accident benefits insurer to produce a file relating to a 2011 motor vehicle accident, arguing its relevance to a 2017 accident at issue in the present action.

The court found the moving party failed to establish either the relevance of the documents or that it would be unfair to proceed to trial without them, and dismissed the motion.

The court also awarded costs to the plaintiff.

The appellant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) decision regarding her entitlement to attendant care benefits and home modifications under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule following a 2010 motor vehicle accident.

The appellant argued LAT erred in determining the applicable hourly rates, assessing her need for supervisory care, denying home modifications, and violating her Charter equality rights by distinguishing between mental and physical impairments.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no errors of law, as LAT correctly applied the 1996 Schedule rates, provided adequate reasons for preferring the respondent's expert evidence, and appropriately applied the reasonable and necessary test for home modifications.

The appellant, a firefighter who responded to the 2018 Toronto van attack, sought statutory accident benefits for psychological impairments resulting from witnessing the aftermath.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal denied the claim, finding the incident did not meet the definition of an 'accident' under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule because the rental van was used as a weapon and the firetruck did not directly cause the injuries.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the adjudicator made no error of law in applying the purpose and causation tests, and rejected the appellant's Charter argument regarding discrimination against mental injuries.

The defendants, Turgut Askar and Beck Taxi Ltd., brought a motion to change the trial venue from Barrie to Toronto.

The plaintiff, Leela Rampersad, opposed the motion.

The court granted the defendants' motion, finding that Toronto was a "substantially better" venue given the location of the motor vehicle accident, the residences of the parties and most potential witnesses, and the plaintiff's connections to Toronto for employment and medical treatment.

The only connection to Barrie was the location of the plaintiff's counsel.

The appellant insurer appealed a preliminary issue decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) regarding whether the respondent's slip and fall incident constituted an 'accident' under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The LAT intervened to raise a preliminary issue regarding the Divisional Court's jurisdiction to hear an appeal from an interlocutory decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, confirming that appeals lie only from final decisions of the LAT to prevent fragmentation and delay.

The court also declined the parties' joint request to convert the appeal into an application for judicial review.

The appellants appealed a summary judgment dismissing their action against TD Canada Trust, arguing errors regarding the availability of summary judgment in civil jury actions, the exclusion of expert evidence, and procedural fairness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the Hryniak test for summary judgment applies equally to civil jury actions, the motion judge properly excluded the expert evidence, and the process was procedurally fair.

The defendants brought a motion to transfer a personal injury action from Barrie to Toronto.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing it was brought late and for tactical reasons.

The court dismissed the motion, noting that the defendants failed to raise the issue until after the pretrial conference and that transferring the action to Toronto would result in significant delay in securing a trial date.

Following a successful summary judgment motion dismissing the plaintiffs' action, the defendant TD sought partial indemnity costs of $231,077.50.

The plaintiffs argued for a reduction based on the principal plaintiff's impecuniosity, the novelty of the case, and excessive time claimed.

The court found that while the plaintiff's financial circumstances warranted some moderation, the novelty of the case did not justify a reduction as basic negligence principles applied.

The court also found some of TD's claimed time excessive, but noted the plaintiffs' conduct caused significant delay.

The court awarded TD costs of $130,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

At the outset of a personal injury trial arising from a motor vehicle accident, the defendant moved to exclude expert evidence based on a brain SPECT scan used to diagnose a traumatic brain injury (TBI).

The court held that using a SPECT scan to diagnose TBI and distinguish it from anxiety or depression constitutes novel science.

Applying the reliable foundation test from R. v. J.-L.J., the court found the methodology had not been tested, lacked peer review, had no known error rate, and was not generally accepted by the relevant scientific community.

The evidence was ruled inadmissible.

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike the defendant's jury notice in a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle collision, citing anticipated delays in scheduling civil jury trials due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court granted the plaintiff leave to bring the motion under Rule 48.04(1) but ultimately dismissed the motion to strike the jury notice.

The court found that the plaintiff had not moved the action forward expeditiously prior to the pandemic and failed to demonstrate that any potential delay outweighed the defendant's substantive right to a jury trial, noting that civil jury trials were likely to resume by May 2022.

The plaintiff was severely assaulted by another customer in the vestibule of a TD Bank ATM late at night.

The plaintiff sued TD Bank for negligence and breach of the Occupier's Liability Act, alleging inadequate security measures.

TD brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the action.

After conducting a voir dire to determine the admissibility of five expert reports, the court found that the assault was a random, unforeseeable event and that TD's security measures were reasonable for a low-risk branch.

The court granted summary judgment and dismissed the action against TD.

The plaintiff brought a motion to strike the defendant's jury notice due to significant trial delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The plaintiff argued that waiting for a jury trial would cause substantial financial prejudice, as his future income loss would convert to past income loss subject to statutory deductions.

The court found that the practical reality in the Central East Region meant a jury trial would be delayed until at least late 2022, whereas a judge-alone trial could proceed much sooner.

The motion was granted and the jury notice was struck to ensure the timely delivery of justice.

The applicant sought court approval for an accident benefit settlement.

The court previously identified deficiencies and concerns regarding the allocation of settlement funds, legal fees, and a solicitor's loan.

Following a capacity assessment report indicating the applicant was not mentally incapable, the court noted that judicial approval was not required.

The court requested an explanation from the applicant's counsel regarding a prior representation to the Licence Appeal Tribunal that a court order had appointed a litigation guardian, and a copy of any such order, before considering dismissing the application without costs.

This motion concerned an application for judicial approval of a settlement for statutory accident benefits (SABS) for a catastrophically injured claimant who lacked capacity to instruct counsel.

The court expressed significant concerns regarding the adequacy of the proposed settlement amount, the fairness and applicability of the contingency fee agreement to a SABS claim, the claimant's capacity at the time of signing the fee agreement and various loans, and the absence of a proper management plan for the lump sum payment.

The court refused to approve the settlement as proposed and referred the matter to the Office of the Public Guardian and Trustee for further input, remaining seized of the matter.

The court denied approval of a settlement for a party under disability due to significant deficiencies in the motion material.

These deficiencies included insufficient medical evidence to assess the injured party's present and future needs, lack of full disclosure regarding a companion tort action and any settlement offers therein, and inadequate details for the proposed allocation of settlement funds.

Furthermore, the court found insufficient information regarding a loan from counsel to the applicant and the fairness and reasonableness of the contingency fee agreement, which appeared to conflate tort and accident benefits claims.

The court also dismissed the request to seal the court record, emphasizing the high bar for such an extraordinary order.

The matter was to be re-submitted after the identified deficiencies were addressed.

The plaintiff's counsel sought an adjournment of a long motion brought by the defendant to dismiss a class action.

The adjournment was requested primarily due to the recent retention of outside counsel who was unavailable, among other reasons.

The court reluctantly granted the adjournment, criticizing plaintiff's counsel's conduct for causing needless delay and wasting judicial resources, but found it necessary to prevent irreparable prejudice to the plaintiff.

The court emphasized that retaining new counsel on the eve of a hearing will not constitute exceptional circumstances for future adjournments.

Costs of $10,000 were awarded against the plaintiff's counsel.