Geoffrey L. Keating

The moving party, Aviva General Insurance Company, sought leave to appeal a Divisional Court decision that found Carrie-Anne Davis suffered an "accident" under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule (SABS) after slipping on ice near her car.

The Court of Appeal clarified that the `Sault Dock` framework for leave to appeal remains unchanged, despite recent comments in `West Whitby`.

The Court denied leave, finding the dispute largely fact-specific and that Aviva had not presented an arguable case to change the settled SABS "accident" test.

The appellant slipped and fell on black ice while holding her key fob and reaching to unlock her car door.

She applied for accident benefits, which the insurer initially paid but later disputed by raising a preliminary issue that the incident was not an 'accident' under s. 3(1) of the SABS.

The Licence Appeal Tribunal found the incident was not an accident.

On appeal, the Divisional Court held that the LAT did not err in allowing the preliminary issue to be raised late, but erred in law in its causation analysis.

The court found the appellant was engaged in the ordinary use of her vehicle and the ice was not an intervening cause, concluding the incident met the definition of an accident.

The appellant insurer appealed a preliminary issue decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) regarding whether the respondent's slip and fall incident constituted an 'accident' under the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The LAT intervened to raise a preliminary issue regarding the Divisional Court's jurisdiction to hear an appeal from an interlocutory decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, confirming that appeals lie only from final decisions of the LAT to prevent fragmentation and delay.

The court also declined the parties' joint request to convert the appeal into an application for judicial review.

The plaintiffs' claim for personal injuries, stemming from a 2003 motor vehicle accident, was dismissed by the Superior Court of Justice.

The action, commenced in 2007, had a long history of delays, including the plaintiffs' repeated failure to attend court conferences, non-compliance with court orders, and requests for adjournments of peremptory trial dates without sufficient medical evidence.

Despite being granted numerous indulgences and warnings, the plaintiffs failed to proceed with the trial on the final peremptory date.

The court emphasized the need to control its procedure and ensure fairness to all litigants, noting that access to justice is not without limits and cannot be abused by disregarding court rulings.

The defendant insurer brought a motion relating to a defence medical examination conducted under s. 105 of the Courts of Justice Act.

After the examination, the examining physician disclosed that her fellowship in physical medicine and rehabilitation had been withdrawn before she issued a report.

The court held that because the examination had been conducted by a licensed physician, the examiner was required under rule 33.06 of the Rules of Civil Procedure to prepare and deliver a written report, which the defendant was then required to serve on the plaintiff.

The defendant’s request was treated as a request for a further medical examination under s. 105(4), which was permitted only after service of the first report.

The court also directed that the subsequent physiatry examination be conducted in Windsor for the plaintiff’s convenience.