Renee M. Pomerance

The appellants, pediatric neurologists, appealed a trial judgment finding them liable for medical negligence in their treatment of an infant with a rare seizure disorder.

The trial judge found that the appellants breached the standard of care by prematurely concluding that a pyridoxine trial was ineffective and failing to reintroduce it when seizures returned.

The trial judge also found a breach of the duty to obtain informed consent for failing to disclose the pyridoxine trial to the parents.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the trial judge's findings on the standard of care were grounded in expert evidence, the failure to disclose a reasonable alternative treatment constituted a breach of informed consent, and the causation finding was supported by a commonsense approach to the evidence.

The appellant, a foreign trustee based in Liechtenstein, appealed the dismissal of its motions to stay or dismiss two actions for lack of jurisdiction simpliciter or forum non conveniens.

The actions alleged that the principals of Bridging Finance Inc. misappropriated funds and transferred them to a trust managed by the appellant.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that Ontario had jurisdiction simpliciter because the tort of fraud was committed in Ontario and contracts connected to the dispute were made in Ontario.

The appellant failed to rebut these presumptive connecting factors, and the appeal was dismissed.

The appellant was convicted of dangerous driving causing bodily harm and failing to remain at the scene after engaging in a high-speed street race that resulted in a severe collision.

He appealed his convictions, arguing errors in the dismissal of his s. 11(b) Charter application, the admission of his police statement, and the jury instructions.

He also appealed his 15-month custodial sentence, arguing for a conditional sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no errors in the trial judge's rulings or jury instructions.

The sentence appeal was also dismissed, as the custodial sentence was deemed fit given the serious aggravating factors, including the appellant's efforts to conceal his involvement.

The Crown appealed from a summary conviction appeal court decision that quashed the respondent's conviction for sexual assault and entered an acquittal.

The SCAC judge found the verdict unreasonable and the trial judge's reasons insufficient due to frail identification evidence, which consisted of an in-dock identification over Zoom four years after the incident.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the trial judge failed to meaningfully consider the reliability of the identification evidence and that no reasonable jury could convict on the evidence.

The appellant sought leave to appeal her 32-month sentence for criminal negligence causing bodily harm after her one-year-old child nearly died from ingesting methamphetamines and fentanyl in the family home.

The appellant argued the sentencing judge failed to adequately apply the principle of restraint.

The Court of Appeal found no error, noting the sentencing judge properly prioritized denunciation and deterrence under s. 718.01 of the Criminal Code given the child's vulnerability and the inherently dangerous environment.

The sentence appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his convictions for possessing crystal methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, possessing hydromorphone, and possessing property obtained by crime, as well as his sentence.

On the conviction appeal, he alleged ineffective assistance of trial counsel.

The Court of Appeal admitted fresh evidence but found no incompetence and no reasonable probability that different tactical choices would have altered the verdict.

On the sentence appeal, the appellant argued he received insufficient credit for time spent under strict bail conditions.

The Court upheld the sentencing judge's approach of treating the strict bail conditions as a mitigating factor rather than a direct credit against the sentence.

The conviction and sentence appeals were dismissed.

The appellant, who previously pleaded guilty to second-degree murder and had his sentence appeal and motion to extend time to appeal conviction dismissed, filed a habeas corpus application seeking immediate release.

He alleged irregularities in his guilty plea and complained about his conditions of confinement.

The application judge summarily dismissed the application as manifestly frivolous, noting it was an attempt to bypass the statutory review process and appeal his conviction out of time.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the application judge's analysis and dismissed the appeal.

The appellant appealed his conviction for breach of probation, which arose from a voicemail message left for his estranged spouse in violation of a no-communication order.

At trial, the appellant denied leaving the message, but the trial judge accepted the testimony of the complainant and the appellant's son identifying his voice.

The Court of Appeal found no error in the trial judge's application of the W.(D). principles to the credibility assessment.

The appellant also sought to introduce fresh evidence alleging a police conspiracy, which the court rejected for failing to meet the Palmer test.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed his conviction for sexual interference and sought leave to appeal his five-year sentence.

The Court of Appeal bifurcated the sentence appeal to allow the appellant to seek Legal Aid funding.

On the conviction appeal, the appellant argued the trial judge erred in assessing the complainant's credibility and inconsistencies in her testimony.

The Court dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no reviewable error in the trial judge's credibility assessments, which are owed particular deference.

The applicant sought leave to appeal from a summary conviction appeal court decision affirming his conviction for criminal harassment.

He argued the appeal judge erred in upholding findings that he lacked lawful authority for his repeated communications and that the communications caused the complainant objectively reasonable fear.

The Court of Appeal found no clear error of law, noting the volume and content of the communications, and denied leave to appeal.

The appellant appealed his convictions for sexual assault and criminal harassment against a former co-worker.

He argued the trial judge erred by improperly relying on his evidence of prior consensual sexual activity with the complainant, which was not subject to a section 276 application, to undermine his credibility.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge did not rely on the sexual nature of the activity but solely on the fact that it revealed an inconsistency in the appellant's timeline of when he met the complainant.

This use did not impermissibly engage twin myths or stereotypes.

The appellant pleaded guilty to several offences, including hostage taking and intimidation of a justice system participant, after bringing an imitation explosive device into a courtroom during a family law proceeding.

He was sentenced to nine years in prison.

On appeal, he argued the sentence was disproportionate and failed to apply the principle of restraint.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentencing judge made no reversible error and properly balanced the aggravating and mitigating factors given the extreme seriousness of the offences.

The appellant appealed his convictions for human trafficking and related offences, as well as his designation as a dangerous offender.

At trial, the complainant recanted her allegations, but the trial judge admitted her prior videotaped statements to police for their truth and relied on them to convict.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the conviction appeal, finding no circular reasoning, no improper reliance on demeanour evidence, and no error in the application of the W.(D.) framework to the rejected exculpatory testimony.

The Court also dismissed the sentence appeal, holding that the sentencing judge reasonably concluded the appellant's violent conduct was intractable despite psychiatric evidence suggesting his risk could potentially be managed in the community under strict contingencies.

This five-judge appeal reconsidered the common law governing non-disclosure of partial settlement agreements in multi-party civil litigation.

The court held that the prior rule mandating an automatic finding of abuse of process and an automatic stay, without proof of prejudice or regard to proportionality, was wrongly decided and should be overruled.

The proper approach requires a contextual and discretionary abuse of process analysis focused on unfairness, prejudice, oppression, harm to the administration of justice, and a proportionate remedy, with r. 49.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure reinforcing that framework.

Applying that approach, the court allowed two appeals and remitted those matters, while dismissing two others where the record was sufficient to determine the result.

The appellant, who was previously found not criminally responsible, appealed a Review Board disposition ordering his continued detention at a secure forensic psychiatric unit.

The appellant argued that he no longer posed a significant threat to public safety and that the detention order was not the least onerous disposition.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board's decision was reasonable and supported by evidence from a psychological risk assessment and the treating psychiatrist, which indicated a continued moderate-to-high risk of violent recidivism and a need for a gradual transition into the community.

The appellant appealed his convictions for four counts of sexual assault and his 11-year sentence.

He argued that expert evidence on the neurobiology of trauma was improperly admitted and that similar fact evidence was erroneously used across counts.

The Court of Appeal found that while the expert evidence was admitted in error, the error was harmless due to robust jury instructions, applying the curative proviso.

The court also upheld the trial judge's admission of similar fact evidence.

A motion to introduce fresh evidence regarding the appellant's deteriorating health was dismissed, as it would not have altered the proportionate sentence.

The appeal was dismissed.

The francophone appellant appealed his conviction, seeking to adduce fresh evidence that he was not informed of his right to apply for a trial in French under s. 530(3) of the Criminal Code.

Relying on the Supreme Court's decision in Tayo Tompouba, the Court of Appeal found that non-compliance with s. 530(3) created a presumption that the appellant's language rights were violated.

The Crown conceded it could not rebut this presumption using the curative proviso.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial in French was ordered.

The appellant appealed his convictions for first degree murder and attempted murder arising from a shooting.

He argued that the verdict was unreasonable because the circumstantial evidence was incapable of establishing that he aided the unknown shooter, and that the trial judge erred in instructing the jury on wilful blindness.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding ample circumstantial evidence to support the inference that the appellant aided the shooter by identifying the victims and letting the shooter into the unit.

The court also held that the wilful blindness instruction was appropriate and did not risk lowering the standard of proof.

The appellant appealed his convictions for human trafficking-related offences, arguing that the application judge erred in dismissing his section 11(b) Charter application for unreasonable delay.

The Court of Appeal found that while the application judge double-counted a five-month period of defence delay, the error was immaterial because the deduction of 24 months for the suspension of jury trials due to the COVID-19 pandemic was appropriate.

As the total delay fell well under the 30-month presumptive ceiling and the Crown made efforts to move the matter forward, the exceptional remedy of a stay was not warranted.

The appeal was dismissed.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of a faint hope application seeking a jury review of a 25-year parole ineligibility period for first degree murder.

The Court of Appeal held that the application judge applied the correct pre-2011 reasonable prospect screening standard under s. 745.6 of the Criminal Code, did not misapprehend the evidence, and was entitled to consider institutional misconduct, psychological risk assessments, limited acceptance of responsibility, and the likely loss of community support upon deportation.

The court rejected the submission that reliance on static factors foreclosed any future application, noting that the judge expressly left open a renewed application in two years.

The appeal was dismissed as the screening decision fell within the broad range of reasonableness.