Laura L. Joy

The applicant sought a remedy for alleged violations of her Charter rights, arguing that search warrants for her vehicle and home should be invalidated because they were based partly on information obtained through searches that violated her co-accused's Charter rights.

The applicant alternatively argued she had her own reasonable expectation of privacy in the cell phone and phone number that were the subject of the impugned searches.

The court ruled on the standing issue only, finding that the applicant lacked standing to attack the underlying warrants.

The applicant could not assert her co-accused's Charter rights, and she failed to establish her own reasonable expectation of privacy in the cell phone data.

A mid-trial Charter application was brought by the accused, Brook-Lynn Beal-Clark, alleging breaches of her fair trial rights (sections 7 and 11(d)) due to significant failures in court recording equipment, resulting in inaudible audio and indiscernible portions of the trial transcript.

The Crown proposed alternative remedies, including an agreed statement of facts or proceeding without certain evidence, or a mistrial.

The court found that the technological failures compromised the fairness of the trial and the accused's ability to make full answer and defence, determining that a stay of proceedings was the only appropriate remedy in this "clearest of cases."

Kourtny Lynn Audette pleaded guilty to manslaughter for the fatal stabbing of Nicholas Laprise, a client for sex-for-hire.

The court considered the circumstances of the offence, including the use of a hunting knife on a vulnerable, unarmed victim, and the offender's lack of prior record, history of abuse, mental health issues (PTSD, depression, anxiety, substance abuse), and intoxication at the time of the incident.

The court rejected further claims of provocation or self-defence beyond what justified the reduction from murder to manslaughter.

The judge imposed a sentence of eight and a half years, with credit for pre-sentence custody, along with a DNA order and a lifetime weapons prohibition.

The Crown sought to admit utterances from a 911 call made by the deceased complainant, Pierre Lefebvre, under the res gestae exception to the hearsay rule in a criminal trial for unlawfully being in a dwelling with intent to commit an indictable offence.

The court conducted a voir dire to determine admissibility.

The application was dismissed because the utterances did not meet the criteria for the res gestae exception nor the threshold reliability under the principled approach.

The court found that the declarant did not personally observe the events and his high anxiety and confusion raised concerns about the possibility of concoction or distortion, making the evidence an inadequate substitute for sworn testimony.

Curtis Elliott applied for a second bail review under s. 520 of the Criminal Code, facing 33 charges related to firearms trafficking.

The application was dismissed.

The court found no material change in circumstances to displace the need for detention on secondary grounds, despite arguments regarding new sureties, electronic monitoring, treatment availability, the COVID-19 pandemic, and the passage of time.

The court acknowledged the pandemic's impact and the principle of proportionality in detention but concluded that the scheduled trial dates mitigated the risk of disproportionate detention, outweighing the substantial public safety risks.

The defendant pleaded guilty to eleven criminal offences including uttering counterfeit currency on two separate occasions, fraud under $5,000, multiple breaches of court orders, break and enter into a dwelling house, and assault on an intimate partner.

The court imposed a global sentence of 15 months custody followed by 24 months probation, with ancillary orders including a lifetime weapons prohibition and DNA orders.

The sentencing considered the seriousness of the offences, the defendant's extensive criminal record, the context of intimate partner violence, and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on incarceration conditions.

Mr. Caron appealed his conviction for driving with a blood alcohol level in excess of the legal limit.

The appeal raised four grounds: (1) "evidence to the contrary" regarding the expiry date of the alcohol standard solution, (2) delay in advising the right to counsel, (3) the fairness of a blended voir dire, and (4) whether Mr. Caron waived his right to counsel.

The court dismissed all grounds of appeal, upholding the trial judge's findings on the alcohol standard's expiry, the reasonableness of the delay in advising counsel due to officer safety, the informed consent to the blended voir dire procedure, and the voluntary waiver of the right to counsel.

This is an application by Sophie Belleau for a stay of a one-year driving prohibition, imposed after her conviction for operating a motor vehicle with an alcohol concentration exceeding 80 mg, pending her summary conviction appeal.

Belleau alleged she drove to flee an alleged sexual assault involving a "date rape drug." The court applied the three-part test for a stay: whether the appeal is frivolous, whether continuation of the prohibition would cause hardship, and whether granting the stay would detrimentally affect public confidence in the justice system.

The court found the appeal was not frivolous, that Belleau would suffer hardship (risk to employment as a social worker and impact on family life), and that she did not pose a danger to the public.

The application for a stay was granted with a condition of zero blood alcohol content while driving.

The accused, Johnathan McIlvride-Lister, sought to strike her guilty plea to one count of sexual assault, asserting factual innocence despite having entered a plea.

The court examined whether the plea was voluntary, informed, and unequivocal, and whether striking the plea was in the interests of justice to prevent a miscarriage of justice.

The accused cited pressures including a significant sentencing disparity between a plea and a trial, financial constraints, perceived lack of success at trial, and concerns about accommodation for her transgender status in custody.

The court found the plea to be voluntary and informed, but acknowledged initial equivocation regarding the facts.

Ultimately, the court accepted that the accused maintained a belief in her innocence and pleaded guilty for pragmatic reasons unrelated to culpability, concluding that such a plea constitutes a miscarriage of justice.

The court also expressed discomfort with the Crown's plea offer condition that defence counsel not cross-examine the complainant at the preliminary inquiry.

The Crown applied to qualify Constable Philip Kolody as an expert witness in a drug trafficking case.

The accused opposed, citing alleged bias and lack of impartiality due to the Constable's minor involvement in a prior traffic stop related to the accused.

The court applied the three-step test for expert evidence admissibility (scope/purpose, threshold requirements, discretionary gatekeeping).

It found the evidence logically relevant and necessary, and Constable Kolody qualified.

Despite an initial discrepancy in his testimony regarding prior involvement with the accused, the court found him credible and unbiased, noting his minimal role in the traffic stop and his history of objective expert reports.

The court concluded that the potential benefits of admitting the evidence outweighed the risks.

The appellant, Guy Baltzer, appealed his conviction for assault under s. 266 of the Criminal Code.

The trial judge had convicted him for pushing his wife into a fence after locking her out of their home in sub-zero temperatures.

The appeal raised four grounds: misapprehension of evidence regarding application of force, failure to consider de minimis non curat lex, apprehension of bias due to judicial comments, and misapplication of the burden of proof or failure to conduct a proper W.(D.) analysis.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the appeal, finding no merit in any of the grounds.

The court affirmed the trial judge's factual findings and legal reasoning, emphasizing that the de minimis principle does not apply to intentional domestic violence, and that the trial judge correctly applied the burden of proof and credibility assessment.

Six accused persons charged with offences under the Controlled Drugs and Substances Act and related Criminal Code firearms charges made dissimilar elections as to mode of trial.

Some accused elected trial by judge and jury, while others elected trial by provincial court judge.

Some accused subsequently re-elected without obtaining written Crown consent as required by statute.

The court addressed whether a justice presiding at a preliminary inquiry has residual jurisdiction to remedy or disregard recorded elections to avoid a multiplicity of proceedings.

The court held that elections and re-elections as recorded must stand, and that a justice has no power to strike down or disregard a recorded election after the fact.

The applicant sought an order in the nature of certiorari to review and set aside his committal to trial on various firearm charges.

The central issue was whether there was any evidence from which a reasonably instructed jury could infer the applicant's knowledge of a firearm, an essential element of possession.

The court reviewed the preliminary hearing judge's reliance on circumstantial evidence, including the location of a hidden firearm, a single 9mm round in a jar, and the applicant's control over the apartment.

The court found that the inferences drawn by the preliminary hearing judge regarding the applicant's knowledge of the firearm and the link between the single round and the hidden firearm were speculative and not supported by the evidence, which was equally consistent with the co-accused's possession.

Consequently, the application for certiorari was granted, and the committal to trial was quashed.

The applicant, Darren John Pundyk, sought an order of certiorari to quash a committal order made by a preliminary inquiry judge, which required him to stand trial on charges of robbery with a handgun, possession of a break-in instrument, possession of a weapon for an indictable offence, and disguise with intent.

Pundyk argued that the preliminary inquiry judge exceeded jurisdiction by committing him despite an alleged absence of evidence on the essential element of identity.

The court reviewed the preliminary inquiry judge's decision, applying the "some evidence" test for committal based on circumstantial evidence.

The court found that there was sufficient circumstantial evidence from which a properly instructed jury could reasonably infer the applicant's identity as one of the robbers, and therefore, the preliminary inquiry judge did not act without jurisdiction.

The application for certiorari was dismissed.

The accused was charged with sexual assault against a college student intern.

After the conclusion of testimony, the defence sought to reopen the trial to introduce fresh evidence from a former college instructor regarding an alleged assault allegation the complainant had made against the instructor approximately three months prior to the incident at issue.

The defence argued this evidence was relevant to the complainant's credibility and motive to fabricate.

The court dismissed the application, finding the proposed evidence was irrelevant and collateral to the main issue, and that allowing it would interfere with the orderly conduct of the trial.