Richard L. Pollock

The Claimant brought a motion for directions seeking an order compelling the Respondents to produce various documents related to municipal infrastructure construction and an order to amend its Statement of Claim.

The Claimant sought damages for injurious affection due to construction impacts on its business.

The Tribunal granted the motion, finding the requested documents were relevant, necessary, and in the exclusive control of the Respondents, who had failed to produce them despite repeated requests.

The Tribunal ordered production within 30 days and permitted the amendment of the Statement of Claim.

The decision concerns the admissibility and sufficiency of evidence in a prosecution for firearms and drug offences.

The accused, Hussein Al Hayawi, was stopped by police and found in possession of drugs and firearms.

The court considered whether the accused had knowledge and control over the firearms, ammunition, and cannabis found in the trunk of the vehicle, and whether the cannabis was possessed for the purpose of selling.

The court found the accused guilty on all remaining counts, concluding that the circumstantial evidence established knowledge and control beyond a reasonable doubt.

The accused brought a Charter application to exclude evidence seized during a traffic stop and subsequent search, alleging arbitrary detention, unlawful search, and racial profiling.

The court found that the police lacked statutory authority under the Highway Traffic Act and reasonable suspicion for investigative detention, rendering the initial detention unlawful.

Furthermore, the court determined that racial stereotypes about Black criminality and dangerousness tainted the police's treatment of the accused throughout the interaction, leading to breaches of his ss. 9, 10(a), and 10(b) Charter rights.

Applying the R. v. Grant test, the court concluded that the seriousness of the Charter-infringing state conduct, particularly the racial profiling, and the severe impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests, warranted the exclusion of all seized evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

Mohamed Ahmed Abdirahman was charged with importation and possession for the purpose of trafficking of 196.7 kg of methamphetamine, found in his commercial truck cab at the Ambassador Bridge border crossing.

The Crown's case relied on circumstantial evidence to prove the accused's knowledge of the drugs.

The court found the circumstantial evidence, including the drug's quantity, value, location, a strong chemical odor, and the use of matching duct tape found in the cab, to be overwhelming.

The defence's alternative theories were dismissed as speculative.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

The accused challenged a search warrant and sought to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging a s. 8 violation.

The court found the information to obtain (ITO) the search warrant was flawed, containing a false assertion and relying on speculative and stale information, thus rendering the search unlawful and a breach of the accused's s. 8 Charter rights.

Applying the Grant analysis, the court determined that the seriousness of the state conduct and the significant impact on the accused's privacy interests outweighed society's interest in the admission of reliable evidence.

Consequently, the evidence was excluded, leading to the dismissal of all charges against both accused.

Mark John Ryn was found guilty by a jury of conspiracy to import fentanyl and possession of fentanyl for the purpose of trafficking.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the dangerous nature of fentanyl, the duration of the trafficking enterprise, and the offender's profit motive and manipulation of a vulnerable co-accused.

Mitigating factors included his youth at the time of the offence and lack of a prior criminal record.

The court rejected the defence's request for a conditional sentence, emphasizing the need for general deterrence and denunciation in fentanyl cases and distinguishing Ryn's circumstances from his co-accused due to her guilty plea, cooperation, and victim status.

Ryn was sentenced to a concurrent term of four years imprisonment for each count.

The applicant brought a Charter application alleging infringements of his ss. 8, 9, and 10(a) and (b) rights following a vehicle stop and search that led to charges for drug and firearm offences.

The court found that the police search of the vehicle was unlawful and unreasonable due to a lack of reasonable and probable grounds under the Cannabis Act, and that the applicant's detention became unlawful and arbitrary, infringing his ss. 8, 9, and 10(a) and (b) Charter rights.

However, applying the Grant factors under s. 24(2) of the Charter, the court determined that the seriousness of the charges and the high reliability and importance of the evidence to the prosecution's case outweighed the Charter breaches, leading to the admission of the seized evidence.

The accused was arrested for murder and a search incident to arrest revealed controlled substances.

The murder charges were later withdrawn, but the drug charges proceeded.

The accused brought a Charter motion to exclude the drug evidence, arguing his s. 8 rights were violated by an unlawful arrest and his s. 10(b) rights were violated by a delay in facilitating access to counsel.

The court found the arrest was lawful, but the police seriously breached the accused's right to counsel by inexplicably delaying his access to a lawyer for almost three hours.

Given the seriousness of the breach and misleading testimony by a police officer, the court excluded the evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter.

The accused, charged with drug offences following a search incident to an arrest for an unrelated murder, brought a motion to compel disclosure of redacted documents from the ongoing murder investigation.

The defence sought the unredacted documents to challenge the lawfulness of the murder arrest under s. 8 of the Charter.

The Crown asserted investigative privilege over the redacted portions.

The court applied the Richards test and the Barnes four-prong approach, concluding that while the information was relevant, it was unlikely to affect the outcome of the Charter hearing or prevent the accused from making full answer and defence.

The court held that the public interest in protecting the ongoing murder investigation outweighed the accused's marginal interest in disclosure, and dismissed the motion.

The applicant, charged with importing and trafficking fentanyl, brought a Charter application alleging his ss. 8 and 9 rights were violated during his arrest and the subsequent seizure and search of his cellphone.

The police had conducted a controlled delivery of a package containing fentanyl to a residence where the applicant was found in close proximity to the package shortly after it was opened.

The court found the police had reasonable grounds for the arrest based on the totality of the circumstances.

The court also upheld the seizure of the cellphone as a valid search incident to arrest and found the subsequent search warrants were properly issued.

The application was dismissed.

The defendant, Glenn Swinton, brought a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss a libel action commenced by the plaintiff, John Miceli, as a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP suit).

The court found that Swinton's Facebook posts, which accused Miceli (a municipal CAO and public figure) of corruption, fraud involvement, and undue influence, related to a matter of public interest.

However, the plaintiff successfully demonstrated that his claim had substantial merit, that the defendant had no valid defence (such as truth, fair comment, or responsible communication), and that the harm suffered by the plaintiff outweighed the public interest in protecting the defendant's expression, especially given the false nature and vindictive tone of the posts.

The motion to dismiss was denied.

The Crown applied to qualify Constable Philip Kolody as an expert witness in a drug trafficking case.

The accused opposed, citing alleged bias and lack of impartiality due to the Constable's minor involvement in a prior traffic stop related to the accused.

The court applied the three-step test for expert evidence admissibility (scope/purpose, threshold requirements, discretionary gatekeeping).

It found the evidence logically relevant and necessary, and Constable Kolody qualified.

Despite an initial discrepancy in his testimony regarding prior involvement with the accused, the court found him credible and unbiased, noting his minimal role in the traffic stop and his history of objective expert reports.

The court concluded that the potential benefits of admitting the evidence outweighed the risks.

The accused brought a Charter application under s. 8 and s. 24(2) to exclude evidence seized during the execution of a search warrant at a trailer residence.

The court found the Information to Obtain (ITO) contained sufficient grounds based on informant tips to justify the search of the trailer.

However, the court ruled that the police lacked lawful authority to search a locked shed located behind the trailer, as it fell outside the curtilage of the residence described in the warrant.

Applying the Grant framework, the court concluded that admitting the evidence from the shed would bring the administration of justice into disrepute due to the seriousness of the police conduct in failing to obtain a separate warrant.

The evidence found in the shed was excluded.

The applicants were charged with drug and firearms offences in June 2010.

After a first trial resulted in acquittals that were later overturned on appeal, a second trial was ordered.

The applicants brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Charter, arguing unreasonable delay.

Applying the new framework from R. v. Jordan, the court calculated a total delay of 79 months.

After deducting defence delay and appellate delay, the net remaining delay was 38 months, which exceeded the 30-month presumptive ceiling.

The court found the transitional exceptional circumstance did not apply and stayed the proceedings.

The offender, an immigration lawyer, was convicted of fabricating a fraudulent refugee claim for an undercover police officer posing as a client.

The Crown sought a penitentiary sentence of three to five years, while the defence requested a conditional sentence.

The court emphasized the paramount principles of denunciation and general deterrence, noting that the offender's status as a lawyer and the systemic impact of immigration fraud aggravated the offences.

Despite mitigating factors including the offender's mental health struggles and loss of her legal career, the court found a conditional sentence inappropriate and imposed a concurrent sentence of 12 months' incarceration on each count.

Following conviction for importing cocaine, the Crown sought to have the accused sentenced in absentia after he failed to attend multiple post-verdict appearances and absconded.

The court held that while s. 475(1) of the Criminal Code permits proceedings to continue in an accused's absence where the interests of justice require it, that discretion should be exercised sparingly at sentencing.

Emphasizing proportionality and the individualized nature of sentencing, the court found the evidentiary record too incomplete and the process too functionally ex parte to determine a fit sentence, particularly where the Crown sought a penitentiary term above the asserted range.

The application was dismissed and sentencing adjourned until the accused is apprehended or another mechanism allows fuller information to be placed before the court.

The accused sought exclusion of cocaine and related evidence discovered in a tractor‑trailer at the border after border services officers used the cargo for an impromptu detector dog training exercise.

The court held the accused had standing to challenge the search of the commercial load and that the manipulation of the cargo solely for a training exercise fell outside the statutory authority of s. 99(1)(a) of the Customs Act.

The conduct violated ss. 8, 9, and 10 of the Charter because the inspection authority had effectively been spent once officers were satisfied there was no contraband.

Applying the Grant framework under s. 24(2), the court found the officers acted in good faith, the privacy impact at the border was low, and society’s interest in adjudication on the merits was strong.

The cocaine and related evidence were admitted.

The accused, a truck driver, was charged with importing cocaine into Canada and possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking after 69 kilograms of cocaine were discovered hidden in bins of oranges in his trailer at the border.

The central issue at trial was whether the accused knew about the cocaine concealed within the load.

The court relied heavily on physical and forensic evidence, including suitcase wheel impressions on the lids of the orange bins matching suitcases found in the accused’s truck cab.

The court rejected the accused’s explanation that he found the suitcases in the garbage and concluded the suitcases were used to transport the cocaine across the loaded bins before concealment.

Applying the W.(D.) framework, the court found the accused’s testimony neither credible nor capable of raising a reasonable doubt and held the Crown proved knowledge and control of the drugs beyond a reasonable doubt.

The complainant, a senior manager, grieved that the employer breached a settlement agreement by offering her a Project Manager position reporting to a manager she disliked, and subsequently grieved her termination for just cause.

The employer terminated her after discovering she had attended a full-time college program while collecting short-term sick benefits, and had been untruthful during the ensuing investigation.

The Public Service Grievance Board dismissed both grievances, finding no breach of the settlement agreement and concluding that the complainant's deliberate dishonesty and lack of remorse irrevocably broke the employment relationship, justifying her discharge.

The complainant filed a grievance alleging a breach of minutes of settlement and challenging their termination.

The Public Service Grievance Board found no breach of the settlement and concluded that the employer had proven just cause for the termination.

The complaint was dismissed, with full reasons to follow.