Anthony R. Leardi

The Town of Amherstburg issued a Notice of Intention to Designate the property at 109 Park Street under the Ontario Heritage Act.

The property owners objected, and the matter was referred to the Ontario Land Tribunal.

The sole issue was whether the property had contextual value under s. 3(i) of O. Reg 9/06 by defining, maintaining, or supporting the character of the area.

The Tribunal preferred the evidence of the Town's expert, finding that the property is part of a relatively intact 19th-century residential streetscape and archetypal to that character.

The Tribunal recommended that the property be designated, subject to revising the designating by-law to reflect only its contextual value.

The appellant sought to appeal a judgment regarding the personal care of Anna Hernandez.

Anna Hernandez died before the appeal was heard, rendering the primary relief moot.

The Court of Appeal declined to hear the appeal, finding no live controversy, no public importance, and that hearing it would not be an appropriate use of judicial resources, even for incidental costs or potential implications for a passing of accounts proceeding.

The appeal was dismissed as moot.

The applicant brought a motion seeking an order that one-half of the sale proceeds of a mobile home owned by the respondent be placed in trust as security for his claim of a joint family venture.

The parties, who were unmarried, lived together for a lengthy period.

The applicant claimed to have made significant financial and physical contributions to the mobile home.

Because the parties were not married, the court determined the applicant could not rely on section 12 of the Family Law Act and instead applied the test for a Mareva injunction.

The court found the applicant established a strong prima facie case, a serious risk of dissipation of assets, and that the balance of convenience favoured granting the injunction.

The motion was granted, requiring one-half of the net proceeds to be held in trust upon the applicant filing an undertaking as to damages.

The applicants brought an application to enforce minutes of settlement reached at mediation regarding the administration of an estate.

The respondent opposed, arguing the applicants had breached the agreement by failing to transfer a specific property to her.

The court found that the delay in transferring the property was due to the respondent's own failure to provide a necessary direction as to title.

Emphasizing the principle of finality in settlements, the court granted judgment enforcing the minutes of settlement.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's motion to terminate her brother's authority as power of attorney for personal care for their mother, the successful respondent sought costs on a full indemnity basis.

The court awarded costs on a partial indemnity scale, noting the respondent's settlement offer was a package deal that included issues not before the court.

The court fixed costs at $37,500, payable by the applicant personally, reiterating that costs in estate and power of attorney matters are generally paid by the unsuccessful litigant, not the estate.

The defendant, Glenn Swinton, brought a motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss a libel action commenced by the plaintiff, John Miceli, as a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP suit).

The court found that Swinton's Facebook posts, which accused Miceli (a municipal CAO and public figure) of corruption, fraud involvement, and undue influence, related to a matter of public interest.

However, the plaintiff successfully demonstrated that his claim had substantial merit, that the defendant had no valid defence (such as truth, fair comment, or responsible communication), and that the harm suffered by the plaintiff outweighed the public interest in protecting the defendant's expression, especially given the false nature and vindictive tone of the posts.

The motion to dismiss was denied.

The respondents requested a reconsideration of a previous Tribunal decision that found they had discriminated against the applicant based on sex (pregnancy) and family status, and engaged in reprisal.

The respondents challenged only the quantum of the remedy, arguing the awards for general damages and lost wages were too high and in conflict with established jurisprudence.

The Tribunal dismissed the request, finding the respondents failed to establish that the decision conflicted with established case law or raised a matter of general or public importance under Rule 26.5(c) of the Tribunal's Rules of Procedure.

The applicant, an early childhood educator, alleged discrimination on the basis of sex (pregnancy) and family status, as well as reprisal, after her employment was terminated by the respondent preschool.

The Tribunal found that the respondents had adequately accommodated the applicant's family status and child care needs.

While the respondents ultimately granted the applicant's request for time off to attend pregnancy-related medical appointments, the Tribunal found that the request was a factor in the respondents' decision to terminate her employment 72 hours later.

The Tribunal concluded that the termination was discriminatory and constituted a reprisal for seeking accommodation under the Human Rights Code.

The applicant was awarded $5,587 for lost wages and $10,000 for injury to dignity, feelings, and self-respect.

The appellant appealed an order removing her as power of attorney for property and care for her elderly mother.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the application judge had sufficient evidence to support the order and made no palpable and overriding error in her factual findings.