Nour Jomaa

Appeal from summary judgment granting declaratory relief regarding a mortgage registered as security for a $300,000 consulting fee contingent on the receipt of a cannabis cultivation licence from Health Canada.

The motion judge found that the fee was conditional on licence issuance and, since no licence was ever obtained, the payment obligation never crystallized.

The appellate court upheld the finding that the mortgage was not a standalone unconditional obligation but security for a contingent payment, and that the motion judge properly considered the factual matrix including the Agreement of Purchase and Sale and the Transfer and Consultancy Agreement.

The Estate Trustees sought the court's advice and direction regarding the sale of a family cottage to pay estate debts, as two beneficiaries (also respondents) made a higher offer after an arm's length offer was accepted.

The court found the Estate Trustees acted in good faith and fairly, and directed them to accept the higher offer from the beneficiaries.

The court also declined to order a full accounting of the deceased's pre-death financial affairs.

The appellant challenged an application judge's determination of liability and damages for failure to timely discharge a mortgage, which allegedly deprived the respondent of financing for a secondary property purchase.

The appeal raised four issues: causation (respondent's reliance on equity), remoteness (loss on secondary transaction), mitigation (promptness of court application), and date of damage assessment.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the application judge's findings that the loss was foreseeable given the appellant's knowledge of the respondent's real estate business, that the respondent adequately mitigated, and that the date of assessment was appropriately chosen.

The applicant brought a motion for leave to examine the respondent's former counsel and for production of the counsel's file, arguing the respondent waived solicitor-client privilege during cross-examination.

The underlying dispute involved the respondent's refusal to discharge a vendor take-back mortgage, which allegedly caused the applicant damages.

The court found the respondent waived privilege by putting its instructions to counsel in issue.

Applying the First Capital test, the court granted leave to examine the former counsel under Rules 39.02(2) and 39.03, finding the evidence relevant to the assessment of damages and that the applicant had no prior notice of the respondent's position.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed an appeal challenging the quantum of damages awarded for trespass involving the removal of trees.

The trial judge had granted summary judgment for trespass and subsequently awarded damages for tree replacement, irrigation, fencing, and "loss of amenities" based on the cost of reasonable restoration.

The appellants argued errors in applying foreseeability, assessing the plaintiff's intent to build, and drainage-related findings.

The appellate court found no reviewable error, affirming the trial judge's holistic approach to damages, the application of the Kates v. Hall restoration principle, and the rejection of arguments that the damages were unforeseeable or that the trees would have been removed anyway.

The appellant sought to appeal a judgment regarding the personal care of Anna Hernandez.

Anna Hernandez died before the appeal was heard, rendering the primary relief moot.

The Court of Appeal declined to hear the appeal, finding no live controversy, no public importance, and that hearing it would not be an appropriate use of judicial resources, even for incidental costs or potential implications for a passing of accounts proceeding.

The appeal was dismissed as moot.

This case concerns the assessment of damages for trespass after the defendants clear-cut a tree line and filled a drainage ditch on the plaintiffs' adjacent farmland.

Liability for trespass was previously established by summary judgment.

The court awarded damages for reasonable restoration costs, out-of-pocket expenses related to a survey and municipal drain contribution, and compensation for loss of amenities.

The plaintiffs' claim for punitive damages was denied, as the court found the defendants' conduct reckless but not sufficiently high-handed or malicious to warrant such an award.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's motion to terminate her brother's authority as power of attorney for personal care for their mother, the successful respondent sought costs on a full indemnity basis.

The court awarded costs on a partial indemnity scale, noting the respondent's settlement offer was a package deal that included issues not before the court.

The court fixed costs at $37,500, payable by the applicant personally, reiterating that costs in estate and power of attorney matters are generally paid by the unsuccessful litigant, not the estate.

The defendants moved to transfer the action from Woodstock to Windsor, citing convenience and judicial resources.

The plaintiff opposed, arguing its chosen venue was reasonable and Windsor was not significantly better, and cross-moved for consolidation with three Small Claims Court actions if the transfer was granted.

The court dismissed the defendants' motion, finding that Woodstock was a reasonable venue and Windsor was not "significantly better" based on a holistic application of Rule 13.1.02 factors.

Consequently, the plaintiff's cross-motion for consolidation was not addressed.

Costs were awarded to the plaintiff, in the cause.