Frank Miller

The accused challenged a search warrant and sought to exclude evidence under s. 24(2) of the Charter, alleging a s. 8 violation.

The court found the information to obtain (ITO) the search warrant was flawed, containing a false assertion and relying on speculative and stale information, thus rendering the search unlawful and a breach of the accused's s. 8 Charter rights.

Applying the Grant analysis, the court determined that the seriousness of the state conduct and the significant impact on the accused's privacy interests outweighed society's interest in the admission of reliable evidence.

Consequently, the evidence was excluded, leading to the dismissal of all charges against both accused.

The appellant, Khaophone Sychantha, appealed an extradition order to the United States on drug-related charges.

He argued that the extradition hearing was unfair due to his unrepresented status and that the identification evidence was flawed.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no material unfairness in the hearing despite the appellant's self-representation, noting that he had discharged multiple lawyers.

The court also reiterated that an extradition judge's role is not to evaluate the strength, credibility, or reliability of evidence unless it is "so defective" or "so unreliable" and that challenges to identification quality are matters for trial.

This criminal trial concerned charges against the defendant, Warren Walls, for inviting sexual touching, transmitting sexually explicit material to a person believed to be under 16, and sexual assault.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of the complainant's testimony, noting significant inconsistencies and fabrications regarding the sexual assault and invitation to sexual touching allegations, which raised reasonable doubt.

While the transmission of sexually explicit material was proven, the Crown failed to establish the requisite purpose of facilitating a sexual offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

Consequently, the defendant was acquitted on all counts.

The offender pleaded guilty to wilfully causing unnecessary suffering to his 17-week-old puppy, resulting in severe injuries.

The Crown sought 9 to 12 months in custody, while the defence requested a conditional sentence or a 90-day intermittent sentence.

The court found a conditional sentence inappropriate due to the brutal and prolonged nature of the attack, emphasizing denunciation and deterrence.

The offender, a first-time offender with strong community ties, was sentenced to 90 days in jail to be served intermittently, along with 18 months of probation, a 10-year animal prohibition, and $1,817.60 in restitution.

This ruling addresses an application under s. 11(b) of the Charter for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The defendant faced multiple charges, including firearms and driving offences, across five different informations sworn between 2018 and 2020.

The court found that even after deducting defence-attributable delay and exceptional circumstances (COVID-19 pandemic), the net delay for all informations exceeded the presumptive Jordan ceiling of 18 months for provincial court matters.

The court apportioned responsibility for a significant period of confusion regarding trial vs. preliminary hearing between the Crown and defence.

The case was not deemed particularly complex to justify the delay.

Consequently, the court found the defendant's s. 11(b) rights were violated and ordered a stay of all charges.

The Offender, Ricky Simpson, pleaded guilty to assault and distributing an intimate image without consent.

The court considered aggravating factors including the violence of the assault, its intimate partner context, the significant impact on the victim, and the offender's prior domestic violence conviction.

Mitigating factors included the guilty plea (though late in the trial process) and family support.

The court also assessed pre-sentence custody credit (Summers credit) and additional mitigation for time on bail (Downes credit) and harsh custody conditions (Duncan credit) due to lockdowns and overcrowding during the pandemic.

The judge imposed a 7-month conditional sentence, credited with 95 days pre-sentence custody, followed by two years of probation, and a 5-year weapons prohibition.

The accused, Preet Kiran Singh Gill and Suresh Sharma, were charged with importing cocaine and possession for the purpose of trafficking after approximately 25 kg of cocaine were found in their commercial tractor-trailer at the Canadian border.

The Crown's case was circumstantial, relying on evidence of undocumented stops during their return trip from California and Mr. Gill's inconsistent and untruthful statements to authorities.

The defence argued that the accused were blind couriers and the cocaine was loaded at one of the pick-up locations without their knowledge.

The court found Mr. Gill's testimony not credible due to numerous inconsistencies and deliberate deceptions, concluding that the only reasonable inference was his knowledge and control of the cocaine.

However, for Mr. Sharma, the court found a rational inference that he was unaware, as he was sleeping during the undocumented stops and was not the primary driver or decision-maker.

Mr. Gill was found guilty on both counts, while Mr. Sharma was found not guilty on both counts.

The Crown applied for a common law peace bond against the respondent, Bruce Peters, who agreed to the resolution.

The Crown also sought confirmation that R. v. Mousseau, 2011 ONCJ 222, no longer impedes the issuance of such orders.

The court found that a common law peace bond is more than an order for the payment of money and can be enforced under s. 127(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court concluded that Mousseau has been superseded by subsequent binding caselaw and does not bar the use of common law peace bonds.

The peace bond was granted.

The applicant brought an application alleging her s. 8 Charter rights were violated by the covert, warrantless installation of a police camera in the hallway outside her apartment door.

The camera recorded persons entering and leaving her apartment for 60 days.

The court applied the Court of Appeal's decision in R. v. Yu, finding that the applicant had a reasonable expectation of privacy in the common area outside her apartment, and that building management's consent did not vitiate the need for a warrant.

The court declared that the applicant's s. 8 Charter rights were violated.

The offender, Cheng Sun, was convicted by a jury of manslaughter in the death of his wife, Weqiong Du-Sun, after initially being charged with second-degree murder.

The sentencing judge considered the circumstances of the offence, including the jury's implied finding of provocation by a knife threat, and the offender's personal background, lack of criminal record, and demonstrated remorse.

Aggravating factors included the domestic violence context, the brutality of the attack (multiple blunt force injuries and strangulation), the victim's social vulnerability, and the devastating impact on her daughter.

The Crown sought 11-12 years, while the defence sought no more than 7 years.

The court imposed a total sentence of nine years' incarceration, with credit for pre-sentence custody.

The appellant was convicted after trial of two counts each of production and possession for the purpose of trafficking in marijuana, and theft of electricity, arising from the operation of two marijuana grow operations in residential premises owned by the appellant.

The appellant received a blended sentence of 15 months imprisonment followed by one year probation.

On appeal, the appellant challenged both the conviction and the sentence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal from conviction, finding no error in the trial judge's analysis of the search warrant validity and the sufficiency of the evidentiary predicate.

The appeal from sentence was also dismissed as the sentence was fit, though the victim surcharge was set aside.

The accused, a commercial truck driver, was charged with importing cocaine and possession for the purpose of trafficking after 30 kilograms of cocaine were found in his trailer at the Canada-US border.

The accused admitted to knowingly bringing the cocaine into Canada but raised the defences of duress and innocent possession.

The court rejected the defence of duress, finding that the accused did not reasonably believe the alleged threats, had safe avenues of escape, and acted for financial gain.

The court also rejected the defence of innocent possession, as the accused exercised control over the drugs for several days.

The accused was found guilty on both counts.

In a pre-trial voir dire for a second-degree murder charge, the Crown and defence brought applications regarding the admissibility of evidence.

The court found the accused's statements to police were voluntary and that his s. 10(b) Charter rights were not violated, as police took reasonable steps to ensure he understood his rights despite a language barrier.

However, the court dismissed the Crown's application to admit the deceased's text messages to her daughter under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, finding the statements lacked threshold reliability.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired operation of a motor vehicle by drug.

He argued the trial judge misapprehended evidence regarding the smell of 'freshly' burnt marijuana and the timing of the drug recognition evaluator's conclusion.

He also argued the trial judge improperly limited cross-examination and improperly questioned an officer about his criminal record.

The summary conviction appeal court dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's misstatements were minor, the limits on cross-examination were appropriate, and the brief reference to the criminal record was for a permissible purpose and did not affect the verdict.

The appellant, David Monzon, appealed his conviction for assault and the associated sentence.

The appeal court found that the trial judge committed several errors of law, including failing to provide sufficient reasons for judgment, particularly regarding credibility findings and the legal justification for self-defence.

The trial judge also misapprehended evidence by finding the appellant was the aggressor without supporting evidence and erred in making a judicial notice about the removal of an earring without considering the appellant's explanation.

The appeal was allowed, the conviction quashed, and a new trial ordered.

Following a multi-count criminal trial arising from intimate partner violence over a single weekend, the court found the accused guilty of sexual assault, mischief under $5,000, assault, and assault causing bodily harm.

The central issue was whether the complainant’s active participation in oral and vaginal sex in a parked car constituted voluntary consent after recent assaults, yelling, and coercive control within the relationship.

Applying the governing consent principles, the court held that submission, resignation, and an attempt to 'make the best of it' did not amount to free and voluntary agreement, and that the accused knew the complainant was not consenting.

The court also rejected any air of reality to an honest but mistaken belief in consent and found the accused responsible for related property damage and the earlier assaults.

The applicant, Sean Walters, charged with possession of cocaine for trafficking, sought to exclude evidence obtained during his detention and arrest.

Walters argued that he was illegally searched, arbitrarily detained, and denied his right to counsel, contrary to sections 8, 9, and 10(b) of the Charter.

The court found multiple Charter breaches, including unlawful investigative detention, unconstitutional searches (pat-down, identification/CPIC, and two subsequent physical searches), and delayed facilitation of the right to counsel.

Despite the reliability and importance of the drug evidence to the prosecution, the court concluded that the seriousness and pattern of police misconduct, approaching recklessness, and the significant impact on the accused's Charter-protected interests, necessitated the exclusion of the evidence to maintain the administration of justice's repute.

During a criminal trial for importing cocaine and possession for the purpose of trafficking, a voir dire was held to determine the admissibility of evidence from a detector dog and an ion scan machine.

The accused, a commercial truck driver, was found with 30 kilograms of cocaine in his trailer at a border crossing.

The Crown sought to introduce evidence that a detector dog indicated the presence of a target odour on a suitcase in the truck's cab, and that an ion scan of the suitcase tested positive for cocaine residue.

The court applied the Mohan criteria and held that the detector dog evidence was admissible only for the limited purpose of narrative to explain why the ion scan was conducted, due to its prejudicial effect outweighing its probative value.

The court further held that the ion scan evidence was admissible but would be given very little weight due to the possibility of false positives and its inability to determine when or how the residue was deposited.

The accused, a commercial truck driver, was charged with importing cocaine after 30 kilograms of cocaine were found in his trailer at a secondary inspection site near the border.

At the close of the Crown's case, the accused brought a motion for a directed verdict, arguing that the offence of importation was not complete because he had not cleared customs with the contraband.

The court dismissed the motion, applying jurisprudence to find that the offence of importing is legally complete as soon as an accused crosses the border into Canada with contraband, even if it is not factually complete until customs is cleared.

The appellant appealed a sentence of 30 days custody imposed for being an unregistered motor vehicle dealer contrary to section 4(1)(a) of the Motor Vehicle Dealers Act, 2002.

The sentencing judge imposed custody based on the appellant's prior convictions for fraud, unpaid fines and restitution, and an outstanding restitution order.

The appellate court found two errors in principle: first, the sentencing objective was specific deterrence of the appellant rather than general deterrence within a regulatory framework; second, the sentencing judge improperly equated the appellant's past fraudulent conduct with the regulatory offence of being an unregistered dealer.

The court held that the 30-day custodial sentence was clearly excessive and varied it to a fine of $7,500.00 plus administrative costs.