Andre Rajna

The accused was charged with two counts of sexual assault against the same complainant on December 20, 2012, and January 22, 2013.

The trial involved a Charter application regarding the admissibility of the accused's police interview, which was ultimately admitted.

The Crown relied primarily on the complainant's evidence and the accused's police statement.

The defence raised the issue of consent and honest but mistaken belief in consent.

The court found that the accused engaged in non-consensual sexual contact on three separate occasions and rejected his defence of honest but mistaken belief in consent, finding instead that he was reckless as to the existence of consent or willfully blind to the possibility that the complainant might not consent.

The accused was charged with perjury for making false statements during a bail hearing on April 5, 2013.

The accused testified that his twin brother and a friend, rather than himself, had been operating his motor vehicle on four separate dates in 2012 when he was under a driving suspension.

The Crown proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the accused was the person operating the vehicle on all four dates through consistent and credible police officer testimony.

The court found that the accused knew the statements were false and intended them to mislead the court regarding his credibility and willingness to comply with court orders.

The accused was convicted of perjury.

Several accused charged with robbery with a firearm, possession of marijuana for the purpose of trafficking, and attempted murder brought applications to exclude or edit numerous text and BBM messages that the Crown sought to introduce at trial.

The applicants argued the messages constituted impermissible similar fact evidence and risked unfair prejudice by suggesting involvement in multiple robberies.

Applying the principles governing similar fact evidence from R. v. Handy, the court assessed whether the probative value of each message outweighed its prejudicial effect.

The court held that references suggesting multiple robberies or unrelated criminal activity should generally be edited or excluded, while messages directly relevant to the planning or execution of the charged robbery were admissible.

The court therefore ordered specific edits or exclusions for numerous messages and permitted others with potential limiting instructions to the jury.

In pre‑trial rulings in a prosecution for robbery with a firearm, attempted murder, and drug trafficking offences arising from an alleged drug rip‑off, the Crown sought to admit extrinsic evidence including photographs of firearms found on an accused’s cellphone and text messages relating to a marijuana transaction.

The court applied the similar fact evidence framework and held that the probative value of the firearm photographs was weak and outweighed by their prejudicial effect because they did not establish possession, access, or connection to the charged offences.

Text messages with a third party discussing a marijuana purchase were also excluded because they risked reasoning prejudice and did not sufficiently support the Crown’s theory of organized drug rip‑offs.

However, the court granted the Crown’s application to qualify a police officer as an expert in firearm identification and coded or street language relating to firearms and vehicles, finding the opinion evidence relevant, necessary, and admissible under the Mohan and Abbey framework.

The appellant appealed his conviction for impaired driving, arguing that the verdict was unreasonable and that the trial judge improperly relied on evidence obtained following a breach of the right to counsel under s. 10(b) of the Charter.

Although the breath test results were excluded under s. 24(2), the appellant contended that other observations made after the breach should also have been excluded.

The appeal court held that the trial judge properly assessed the evidence and that police observations of impairment, including driving behaviour and physical indicia of intoxication, were admissible and sufficient to support the conviction.

No error in principle or palpable and overriding error was established.

The conviction was upheld.

In a pre‑trial application, the Crown sought to admit similar fact evidence against one accused in a prosecution for aggravated sexual assault involving alleged non‑disclosure of HIV‑positive status during sexual encounters.

The proposed evidence included testimony from other individuals alleging similar encounters, statements from a roommate suggesting non‑disclosure practices, and chat log communications from the accused’s computer.

Applying the governing framework for similar fact evidence articulated in R. v. Handy, the court assessed whether the probative value of the evidence outweighed its prejudicial effect.

The court found the proposed evidence inconsistent, partially related to outstanding charges in another jurisdiction, and largely directed to propensity reasoning.

Concluding that its prejudicial impact outweighed its probative value, the court ruled the evidence inadmissible, while noting the ruling could be revisited depending on the evidence at trial.