Stephen Proudlove

Police executed a search warrant at an apartment, finding a loaded firearm and various illicit drugs (crystal methamphetamine, powder cocaine, fentanyl).

Two defendants, Daylo Robinson and Dalton Wilson, were charged with multiple firearms and drug-related offences, as well as breaches of release orders.

The court assessed possession (personal, constructive, joint) based on circumstantial evidence, including the location of contraband, a digital scale, and a "daily diary" containing drug price lists.

The court found Daylo Robinson not guilty of firearms and drug charges but guilty of breaching his recognizance.

Dalton Wilson was found guilty of possession of cocaine and crystal methamphetamine for the purpose of trafficking, simple possession of fentanyl, and breach of probation, but not guilty of firearms charges and fentanyl trafficking.

This ruling addresses a Section 8 Charter application brought by Daylo Robinson and Dalton Wilson to exclude a firearm and illicit drugs seized during the execution of a search warrant at Mr. Wilson's residence.

The applicants argued that the Information to Obtain (ITO) the search warrant lacked reasonable grounds to believe a firearm would be found or that evidence of procuring and obstruction of justice would be present in electronic devices.

The court reviewed the ITO holistically, considering multiple police reports and the affiant's expert opinion, and found that there were sufficient credible and reliable grounds to support the issuance of the search warrant.

The application to exclude the evidence was dismissed.

Daylo Robinson and Dalton Wilson brought an application to exclude evidence found during a search warrant execution, arguing the information to obtain (ITO) did not establish reasonable grounds.

The Crown challenged Daylo Robinson's standing to assert a Section 8 Charter right, contending he lacked a reasonable expectation of privacy as an unlawful occupant of the searched apartment.

The court applied the Edwards and El-Azrak tests, finding that while Robinson had a subjective expectation of privacy and some historical use, his illegitimate occupancy as an uninvited visitor, coupled with the Crown's theory of exploitation and intimidation, undermined any objectively reasonable expectation of privacy.

Consequently, the court ruled that Robinson lacked standing to challenge the search.

In a criminal trial, the young person accused, C.A., was charged with two counts of sexual assault against the complainant, N.W. The incidents were alleged to have occurred in October 2022 and January 2023.

The court assessed the credibility and reliability of both young witnesses, noting their memory limitations regarding peripheral details.

The court explicitly rejected defence arguments based on common myths and stereotypes about sexual assault victims, such as the implausibility of assaults in public spaces or the victim's post-assault behaviour and disclosure patterns.

Despite finding both the complainant and the accused credible, the court determined that the accused's denial, coupled with the complainant's evidence, left a reasonable doubt as to what transpired.

Consequently, the accused was acquitted on all charges.

The Crown sought a ruling on the admissibility of a recorded telephone conversation between the accused and the complainant in a criminal trial involving charges of domestic violence and sexual assault.

The defence opposed its admission, arguing high prejudice due to evidence of other discreditable conduct and other sexual activity.

The court ruled the recording admissible, finding its probative value, particularly the accused's admissions regarding the alleged assaults and his state of mind concerning consent, outweighed its prejudicial effect.

The court emphasized the necessity of precise jury instructions to prevent misuse of the evidence for propensity reasoning or misapplication of consent law.

The offender, E.U., pleaded guilty to sexual interference and aggravated sexual assault against his 10/11-year-old stepdaughter, which resulted in her pregnancy and childbirth at age 11.

The court considered numerous aggravating factors, including a gross breach of trust, the victim's extremely young age, repeated incidents, severe physical and psychological impact on the victim and her family, the offences occurring in the family home, lack of birth control, and coercion to conceal the pregnancy.

Mitigating factors included the offender's lack of criminal record, guilty plea (though attenuated), and harsh pre-sentence custody conditions.

Emphasizing denunciation and deterrence as primary sentencing principles for child sexual abuse, the court imposed a global concurrent sentence of 19 years in custody, less pre-sentence custody credit of 3 years and 3 weeks, resulting in 15 years, 11 months, and 1 week remaining to serve.

Ancillary orders included a lifetime DNA order, lifetime weapons prohibition, lifetime Sex Offender Information Registry Act (SOIRA) order, and a lifetime s. 161 order with specific prohibitions, and a non-communication order with the victim and her child during incarceration.

The appellant, J.A., appealed his convictions for sexual interference and sexual assault.

The central issue on appeal was whether the trial judge erred in admitting the appellant's police statement as voluntary evidence.

The appellant contended that the trial judge, after finding an inducement, failed to adequately consider all oppressive circumstances in determining if his will was overborne.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming that the trial judge correctly applied the legal test for voluntariness and considered all relevant circumstances, and that the finding of voluntariness was entitled to significant appellate deference.

The appellant, Jeffrey Shuman, appealed his 15-year global sentence for seven counts of robbery with a firearm, arguing that the sentence was demonstrably unfit and that the sentencing judge's reasons were insufficient.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the sentence fit given the serious nature of the offences, the paramountcy of deterrence and denunciation, and the sentencing judge's adequate reasons which considered aggravating and mitigating factors and was clearly alive to the totality principle.

The appellant, Tracy Robinson, appealed convictions for causing damage by fire to property and arson with intent to defraud after a judge-alone trial.

The prosecution's case was circumstantial, relying heavily on an Ontario Fire Marshal investigator's expert opinion that the fire was deliberately set.

The defence presented a counter-expert suggesting an electrical cause.

The trial judge accepted the prosecution's expert and found motive and opportunity.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's factual and credibility findings, and no unreasonable verdicts.

While the trial judge erred in enunciating the R. v. W.(D.) test, the court found he applied it properly in context.

The accused, Mowafag Saboon, sought judicial interim release under s. 522 of the Criminal Code after being charged with first-degree murder and various firearm and drug trafficking offenses.

The court considered the secondary and tertiary grounds for detention, including the strength of the Crown's case, the gravity of the offenses, the circumstances of the offenses, and the impact of the COVID-19 pandemic on detention conditions.

The proposed release plan, involving a $15,000 bond with three sureties and electronic monitoring, was deemed inadequate due to the sureties' inability to supervise and the accused's history of misconduct.

The court found a substantial risk of reoffending and that release would undermine public confidence in the administration of justice, particularly given the violent nature of the charges and the strong Crown case.

The application for judicial interim release was dismissed, and detention was ordered on both secondary and tertiary grounds.

The accused pleaded guilty to conspiracy to traffic fentanyl and methamphetamine over a two-week period in October 2017.

The court found the accused was the directing mind and principal actor in a large drug trafficking conspiracy in Waterloo Region.

The accused possessed approximately three kilograms of fentanyl, cocaine, and methamphetamine for distribution.

The court imposed a sentence of fifteen years imprisonment on the fentanyl conspiracy count, with a concurrent five-year sentence on the methamphetamine count, after crediting three years time served.

The court emphasized the severity of fentanyl trafficking and its devastating impact on the community.

The accused was charged with second-degree murder after bludgeoning his father to death with a hammer.

The accused had a long history of severe, poorly controlled schizophrenia and substance abuse.

At trial, the sole issue was whether the accused was not criminally responsible (NCR) under s. 16(1) of the Criminal Code.

Relying on unchallenged expert psychiatric evidence, the court found that while the accused understood the physical consequences of his actions, his severe delusions and command hallucinations rendered him incapable of knowing that the killing was morally wrong.

The court found the accused not criminally responsible and remanded him to a secure psychiatric facility for a Review Board disposition hearing.

Two accused were sentenced for trafficking in dangerous controlled substances, including Carfentanil, fentanyl, methamphetamine, and cocaine.

The offences were discovered through Project Variance, a wiretap investigation by Waterloo Regional Police Service.

Substantial quantities of drugs and cash were seized from both their residence and a trailer.

Both accused entered guilty pleas to multiple counts of possession for the purpose of trafficking.

The Crown and defence jointly submitted that a sentence of 10 to 13 years was appropriate.

The court imposed sentences reflecting the serious nature of trafficking in highly potent opioids, the commercial scale of the operation, and the devastating community impact of the opioid crisis, while recognizing the significant mitigating value of early guilty pleas.

Albert Edward King was convicted of perjury after deliberately misrepresenting his history as a jailhouse informant during a first-degree murder preliminary hearing, falsely claiming he had never been an informant or testified previously.

The court considered the gravity of perjury, particularly when committed by jailhouse informants, and applied sentencing principles of denunciation and deterrence.

Aggravating factors included the planned nature of the perjury in a serious criminal proceeding and its impact on the preliminary hearing's truth-seeking function.

Mitigating factors included King's age, abusive upbringing, a 14-year gap in criminal convictions, and positive family support.

The Crown sought 2.5 years imprisonment, while the defence requested a suspended or intermittent sentence.

The court sentenced King to 2 years imprisonment and imposed a DNA order.

The accused, Albert Edward King, was charged with perjury for allegedly providing false statements under oath during the preliminary hearing of R. v. Chouart and Marshall.

The Crown alleged King intentionally misled the court about his history as a jail-house informant, prior testimonies, and previous confessions from inmates.

The defence argued King did not intend to mislead, citing a belief in a "gag order" and confusing questions.

The court found beyond a reasonable doubt that King purposely misled the preliminary hearing court regarding his prior jail-house informant activities and previous confessions, rejecting his "mistake of law" defence concerning publication bans.

The court had reasonable doubt regarding the perjury allegation concerning Crime Stoppers use.

King was found guilty of perjury.

J.C. was charged with sexual assault and voyeurism (Counts 1 & 2) and extortion and sexual assault (Counts 3 & 4).

The court acquitted J.C. on Counts 1 and 2, finding insufficient evidence to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the complainant, H.D., was incapable of consenting or that the video was made surreptitiously.

However, the court convicted J.C. on Counts 3 and 4, finding that he extorted sexual favours from H.D. by threatening to post a compromising video online, and that H.D. did not consent to subsequent sexual acts due to duress and power imbalance.

The accused applied for an order permitting him to sit at counsel table rather than in the prisoner's dock during his upcoming trial.

The Crown opposed the application, citing the accused's lengthy criminal record and past courtroom outbursts, though acknowledging he was not an escape risk.

The court granted the application, preferring the line of authority that locating an accused outside the prisoner's dock better reflects the presumption of innocence.

The court ordered that the accused be permitted to sit at counsel table, subject to discreet security measures.

Several accused brought Garofoli applications seeking exclusion of evidence obtained through multiple Part VI wiretap authorizations in a large drug trafficking investigation.

They argued the affidavits failed to establish reasonable and probable grounds and improperly named them as known parties under s. 185(1)(e) of the Criminal Code.

The court held that one authorization related to a homicide investigation lacked sufficient grounds on the edited record and therefore violated s. 8 of the Charter; intercepted room‑probe communications from a residence were excluded under s. 24(2).

However, the court found that the principal drug trafficking wiretap authorizations were supported by reasonable grounds based on confidential informant information, surveillance, phone records, and associations among targets.

Applications to exclude evidence obtained under those authorizations were dismissed.

The applicants brought a preliminary motion in advance of a Garofoli application seeking excision of all references to a vehicle stop and resulting seizures that had previously been found to violate Charter rights.

The impugned events were relied upon in affidavits supporting Part VI wiretap authorizations, a production order for subscriber records, and search warrants for cellular phone contents.

The Crown argued that the applicants lacked standing to seek excision of evidence obtained in violation of third parties’ Charter rights.

The court held that where illegally obtained evidence forms part of the grounds for authorizations affecting the applicants’ privacy interests, the applicants are entitled to challenge the legality of that evidence and seek its removal from the supporting materials.

All references to the unlawful vehicle stop, arrests, and seizures were ordered excised from the affidavits and informations to obtain.

The applicants, charged with drug-related offences, brought a Section 8 Charter application to exclude evidence obtained from Dialled Number Recorder and tracking warrants.

They argued the Information to Obtain (ITO) was deficient due to unconfirmed confidential informant tips, tainted informant pools from police misconduct, and material non-disclosure by the affiant.

The court strongly condemned the egregious conduct of one officer and the sloppiness of the affiant in failing to disclose relevant police reports.

However, after excising inaccuracies and reading in omissions, the court found the remaining reliable information still provided reasonable grounds to suspect the applicant was trafficking drugs.

The application to exclude evidence was dismissed.