Denyse Boulet

The applicant, a registered electoral district association, applied for an order extending the time to file its 2024 annual financial transactions return under the Canada Elections Act.

The applicant missed the statutory deadline and did not apply to the Chief Electoral Officer for an extension within the prescribed period.

The court dismissed the application, finding that it lacked jurisdiction to extend the deadline outside of the specific circumstances set out in section 475.93(2) of the Act.

The court noted that the doctrine of special circumstances no longer applies to statutory deadlines for filing applications.

Application by a corporate owner of adjacent property claiming entitlement to a disputed strip of land used as a driveway for over 30 years.

The applicant advanced claims in adverse possession and proprietary estoppel.

The court dismissed the adverse possession claim, finding the applicant could not show that its use of the disputed strip was inconsistent with the respondent's intended use of keeping the land vacant, as required by Court of Appeal authority.

However, the court granted the application on the basis of proprietary estoppel, finding that the respondent's 30-plus years of silence while the applicant and its predecessors used and improved the driveway constituted encouragement, that the applicant detrimentally relied on that silence, and that it was unconscionable for the respondent to erect a fence dividing the driveway without notice or consultation.

The respondent was ordered to remove the fence and repair damaged interlocking brick.

The Crown sought to vacate preliminary inquiries in five cases on the basis that amendments to the Criminal Code contained in Bill C-75, which came into force on September 19, 2019, retrospectively eliminated the right to a preliminary inquiry for offences punishable by less than 14 years imprisonment.

The accused had all elected to be tried by judge and jury and requested preliminary inquiries before the amendments came into force, but the inquiries had not been completed by the effective date.

The court held that the amendments do not apply retrospectively because they affect substantive rights and vested rights of the accused.

The preliminary inquiry is a substantive right that protects accused persons from exposure to unwarranted public trials.

The Crown's application was dismissed.

This decision addresses the costs of a motion for security for costs brought by the respondent, Seema Narula, which was dismissed.

The applicant, Farhad Derakhshan, who was self-represented, sought $6,707.00 in costs.

The court awarded Derakhshan $714.30, fixed on a partial indemnity basis, primarily for legal consultation fees and some disbursements, disallowing claims for lost income and unsupported disbursements.

The awarded costs were ordered to be set off against costs Derakhshan owed Narula from a prior unsuccessful motion.

The Crown applied to admit excerpts from a prior costs endorsement by Justice M.A. Penny as evidence in a criminal trial against John D’Souza and Peter D’Gama, who were accused of using a fake judgment bearing Justice Penny's forged signature.

The application sought to use the endorsement under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, arguing necessity (judges are not compellable) and reliability.

The court found Justice Penny not compellable to testify due to judicial immunity, as his potential testimony was inextricably intertwined with his judicial function.

The application was allowed in part, admitting factual statements from the endorsement that met threshold reliability and were not overly prejudicial, while excluding passages that reflected Justice Penny's judicial views, opinions, or reasoning, to prevent undue prejudice to the accused.

The respondent, Seema Narula, brought a motion for security for costs against the applicant, Farhad Derakhshan, under Rule 24(13)(4) of the Family Law Rules, alleging his case was a waste of time or a nuisance and he lacked sufficient assets to pay costs.

The court found that while the applicant's self-represented presentation caused delays, it was premature to conclude the case itself was a waste of time or a nuisance.

Furthermore, the court was not satisfied that the applicant lacked sufficient assets in Ontario to pay costs, especially considering his claims of impoverishment due to the respondent's actions.

The motion for security for costs was dismissed, and the applicant was awarded costs.

This decision addresses the costs arising from two unsuccessful motions brought by the self-represented applicant, Farhad Derakhshan, seeking various relief including amending the claim, document production, action consolidation, and property inspection by an appraiser.

The motions were dismissed as wasteful of time and money.

The court awarded costs to the respondent, Seema Narula, at 80% of her counsel's hourly rates, totaling $5,388.70, payable within 30 days.

The court emphasized that cost rules apply equally to self-represented litigants and that the applicant's conduct was unreasonable.

This decision addresses costs arising from two motions brought by the Attorney General of Canada (AGC) to set aside Summonses to Witness served by Farhad Derakhshan during a matrimonial trial.

Seema Narula, the respondent in the main trial, supported the AGC's motions.

The court found Derakhshan's conduct unreasonable and in bad faith for refusing to withdraw the improper summonses, which sought confidential taxpayer information and evidence from irrelevant federal employees, despite clear warnings.

Costs were awarded to the AGC on a substantial indemnity basis, with a reduction in claimed hours, and to Narula for counsel attendance.

During an ongoing family law trial, the self-represented applicant brought motions seeking to adduce new expert appraisal evidence, add several new parties, obtain further documentary production, and consolidate a Small Claims Court action.

The court dismissed all the motions, finding that the requests were brought far too late and would cause incurable prejudice to the respondent.

The court also noted that several of the requests had already been dismissed by another judge prior to trial and were therefore res judicata.

The applicant, an international medical graduate, filed human rights applications against the university and hospital alleging discrimination after he was suspended from his neurosurgery residency program.

The respondents sought to dismiss the applications under section 45.1 of the Human Rights Code or as an abuse of process, arguing the matters were resolved through settlement agreements reached during a related grievance arbitration.

The Tribunal found that the settlement agreements contained ongoing contingencies and the arbitrator remained seized of the matters.

Consequently, the Tribunal deferred the human rights applications pending the final conclusion of the grievance and arbitration process.

The applicant filed human rights applications alleging that a physician and his staff discriminated against him and his son on the basis of disability by terminating the physician-patient relationship.

The respondents requested that the applications be dismissed under s. 45.1 of the Human Rights Code, arguing that the substance of the complaints had already been appropriately dealt with by the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (CPSO) and the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board (HPARB).

The Tribunal found that the CPSO and HPARB processes constituted another proceeding that appropriately dealt with the substance of the human rights allegations.

The applications were dismissed.

The applicant, a disabled single mother, alleged discrimination on the basis of disability, sexual orientation, family status, or marital status after being denied a volunteer position as a Cub leader with Scouts Canada.

The Tribunal held a summary hearing to determine if the application had no reasonable prospect of success.

Finding that the applicant had presented circumstantial evidence and that the respondent possessed most of the relevant information regarding the denial, the Tribunal concluded it was premature to dismiss the application and ordered it to proceed to a full hearing.

The applicant requested to reactivate two deferred human rights applications following the conclusion of proceedings before the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board (HPARB).

The respondents objected, arguing the substance of the applications had been addressed in the other proceeding.

The Tribunal granted the request to reactivate, finding the other proceeding had concluded, but directed that a preliminary hearing be scheduled to determine whether the applications should be dismissed under section 45.1 of the Human Rights Code.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination while in custody at a provincial correctional facility.

The Tribunal scheduled a summary hearing by teleconference to determine if the application had a reasonable prospect of success.

The applicant failed to attend the hearing despite receiving proper notice and having access to a telephone at the facility.

The Tribunal dismissed the application as abandoned.