Michael John Lockner

Douglas DeBoer pleaded guilty to two counts of fraud and one count of trading in securities while subject to a cease trade order under the Securities Act.

The court considered the circumstances of the offence, which involved two fraudulent investment schemes (Hockley Energy and Rocky Point) that defrauded investors of $7.5 million USD, and the offender's personal circumstances.

Emphasizing general deterrence as paramount in regulatory offences, the court found a high degree of moral blameworthiness due to the sophisticated, persistent nature of the fraud and the significant harm to investors.

Despite a guilty plea and no prior criminal record, the court imposed a total sentence of three years' incarceration, noting the central role of the offender and the breach of a prior cease trade order.

The accused, Malcolm Dennis Edwards, pleaded not guilty to multiple charges including failing to stop, obstructing a peace officer, assault with a weapon, and various firearm possession offences.

The trial addressed Charter allegations regarding the validity of an arrest warrant and the admissibility of seized evidence, as well as the identity of the driver in a separate incident.

The court found the arrest warrant lawfully obtained and the firearm admissible.

While the accused conceded guilt on the August 7 driving allegation, the Crown failed to prove identity for the June 10 charges, leading to an acquittal on those counts.

The accused was convicted on the August 7 charges.

Mr. Daley was charged with firearm and drug trafficking offences following a car accident.

The case, initially a preliminary inquiry, proceeded as a trial focusing on Charter issues: whether Mr. Daley was arbitrarily detained in the ambulance, whether hospital staff and police searches violated his s. 8 Charter rights, and if evidence should be excluded under s. 24(2).

The court found no Charter violations, concluding that Mr. Daley was not detained in the ambulance, hospital staff were not state actors during the routine inventory search, and the subsequent police search was lawful as incident to arrest.

Mr. Daley was found guilty on all counts.

The accused was charged with dangerous driving causing death following a collision on May 15, 2018, that resulted in the death of Jonas Mitchell.

At the preliminary inquiry, the court found that while the Crown could establish the actus reus (the dangerous act of entering an intersection on a red light), it could not establish the required mens rea (mental element) of a marked departure from the standard of care expected of a reasonable driver.

The court discharged the accused, finding that momentary inattention for approximately nine to ten seconds, without evidence of speeding, deliberate red-light running, or erratic maneuvers, did not constitute the criminal fault required for dangerous driving.

The court emphasized that carelessness alone is insufficient for criminal liability and that the consequences of the accident, while tragic, cannot drive the charge when the manner of driving does not meet the criminal threshold.

Anissah Auckbaraullee was convicted of fraud over $5000 against the Ontario Hospital Association, involving a breach of trust.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the breach of trust and planning, and significant mitigating factors, such as a history of spousal abuse, health issues, financial hardship, and the profound impact of the criminal proceedings and potential deportation on her family life.

Despite the Crown seeking 12-18 months imprisonment, the court imposed a conditional sentence of two years less a day with house arrest, followed by two years probation, and a restitution order of $80,370, finding it to be one of the rare cases where a conditional sentence was appropriate for large-scale fraud due to compelling circumstances and the collateral immigration consequences.

The applicants, charged with fraud and conspiracy, brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from arrest to anticipated trial completion was 60.5 months, significantly exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

While a previous s. 11(b) application was dismissed, finding the case complex and acknowledging transitional circumstances, a subsequent 11-month adjournment was caused by the unavailability of judges due to medical reasons and systemic resource shortages.

The court found that while judicial illness is a discrete exceptional circumstance, the extended 11-month delay was primarily attributable to scarce judicial resources, which does not qualify as an exceptional circumstance under the Jordan framework.

Consequently, the Crown failed to rebut the presumption of unreasonable delay, and the applications for a stay of proceedings were granted.

The defendant Linda Lawlor sought a mistrial in her judge-alone fraud trial, arguing that the trial's scope improperly expanded beyond the single property she was committed on, leading to the introduction of prejudicial evidence and depriving her of an informed defence.

The court found a mutual error between Crown and defence regarding the scope but determined the evidence related to other properties was admissible for narrative and context, and the verdict was not tainted by impermissible reasoning.

The court distinguished the case from precedents involving adverse credibility findings and rejected a mistrial, offering a trial re-opening as an alternative remedy, which the applicant declined.

The application for a mistrial was dismissed.

The Crown applied to admit excerpts from a prior costs endorsement by Justice M.A. Penny as evidence in a criminal trial against John D’Souza and Peter D’Gama, who were accused of using a fake judgment bearing Justice Penny's forged signature.

The application sought to use the endorsement under the principled exception to the hearsay rule, arguing necessity (judges are not compellable) and reliability.

The court found Justice Penny not compellable to testify due to judicial immunity, as his potential testimony was inextricably intertwined with his judicial function.

The application was allowed in part, admitting factual statements from the endorsement that met threshold reliability and were not overly prejudicial, while excluding passages that reflected Justice Penny's judicial views, opinions, or reasoning, to prevent undue prejudice to the accused.

The defendant, Carolyn Burden, was charged with two counts of fraud over $5,000 arising from her employment at Max the Mutt Animation Inc., a Toronto-based animation school.

During her employment from mid-2010 to mid-2011, approximately $159,000 was electronically transferred from the company's account to the defendant's personal account.

The Crown alleged the defendant fraudulently obtained more than $100,000 in excess of her authorized compensation.

The defendant claimed all transfers were authorized by her employer, Maxine Schacker, either as salary or as payment for invoiced work performed at various hourly rates.

The court found the defendant guilty of both charges, rejecting her testimony and accepting the Crown's evidence that she had independent capacity to execute electronic transfers and that no invoices supporting her claimed additional work were ever produced.

The accused was charged with operating a motor vehicle while impaired by a drug contrary to section 253(1)(a) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown relied on observations by police officers, field sobriety tests, a drug evaluation officer's assessment, and toxicology evidence showing the presence of marijuana and prescription drugs in the accused's urine.

The defence challenged the admissibility of evidence and argued the Crown had not proven the charge beyond a reasonable doubt.

The court found that while the drug evaluation officer's opinion was admissible as non-expert opinion evidence under R. v. Graat, it did not rise to the level of expert evidence and therefore did not carry special weight.

Considering all evidence, including the absence of impaired driving, the court found the Crown had not proven the charge beyond a reasonable doubt and dismissed the charge.