Thomas Mathews

The appellant made a complaint to Serbian Orthodox Church authorities about the respondent, a priest, regarding his involvement in her family law proceedings.

The respondent sued for defamation, and the appellant brought an anti-SLAPP motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding the expression did not relate to a matter of public interest because it was a private grievance not widely disseminated.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge erred by focusing on the size of the audience rather than the content of the expression, which raised broader concerns about the propriety of priests participating in private litigation.

The matter was remitted to the Superior Court for a full s. 137.1 analysis.

The plaintiff, Robert Matuk, sought summary judgment against the defendants, James Vannelli and associated corporations, regarding claims stemming from the breakdown of their shareholder relationship in HappyGo Marketing Inc. The court granted partial summary judgment, ruling that Vannelli's effective appropriation of Matuk's shares constituted oppressive conduct under the Canada Business Corporations Act.

The court found Vannelli personally liable to compensate Matuk for the fair market value of his shares as of May 20, 2020.

However, the court dismissed Matuk's claims for breach of contract related to the corporation's dissolution without unanimous consent and alleged non-competition by a new entity.

A trial is required to determine the precise amount of compensation for the oppressive conduct and to adjudicate whether Vannelli breached the non-disclosure covenant regarding intellectual property, and if so, the appropriate remedy for that specific breach.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their action for delay under Rule 48.14(7)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

They argued the Associate Justice erred by failing to consider contextual factors and made palpable and overriding errors regarding their lack of steps taken and the absence of prejudice to the respondents.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in principle or palpable and overriding errors of fact, noting the appellants failed to provide an acceptable explanation for the delay or demonstrate that the respondents would suffer no non-compensable prejudice.

The plaintiff brought a motion for the return of computer files and devices from its former Chief Operating Officer.

The parties agreed to appoint an Independent Solicitor to review the files for privilege.

After the Independent Solicitor's report was released, the defendants eventually returned the non-privileged files and the laptop, settling the motion.

The court determined that the plaintiff was the successful party and awarded costs, but reduced the amount claimed because the parties had acted in good faith to agree on the review process.

The costs of the Independent Solicitor were ordered to be shared equally.

The applicant brought a motion to remove counsel representing both the individual respondent and the corporate respondent in an oppression application.

The applicant argued that counsel had a conflict of interest in jointly representing both respondents and that counsel might be called as a witness.

The court found no basis to remove counsel on the grounds of being a potential witness.

However, the court held that a conflict of interest existed because the interests of the individual respondent and the corporate respondent were not aligned in the context of a shareholder dispute.

The motion was allowed in part, and counsel was disqualified from acting for the corporate respondent.

The plaintiffs, a corporation and one of its directors, brought a motion for a Mareva injunction and other relief against the defendant, the other director.

The dispute arose after the defendant applied for a CEBA loan and transferred corporate funds to his personal account.

The court dismissed the motion for a Mareva injunction, finding no strong prima facie case of fraud and that the balance of convenience favoured the defendant.

However, the court ordered the defendant to provide an accounting, produce personal banking records, and deposit outstanding receivables into the corporate account.

The court also provided directions for the ongoing management of the corporation, requiring both directors to authorize future transactions and repay any unauthorized personal withdrawals.

The Crown appealed a stay of proceedings granted to five accused charged with a $13 million fraud.

The trial was delayed by 60 months, significantly exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in Jordan.

The Crown argued the delay was justified by the complexity of the case, the unexpected illness of two judges, and transitional exceptional circumstances.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the application judge properly accounted for the case's complexity and the discrete event of the judges' illnesses, and correctly concluded that the delay was unreasonable and could not be justified under the transitional exception.

The applicants, who were respondents on a Crown appeal from a stay of proceedings for unreasonable delay, brought a motion to dismiss the appeal for the Crown's failure to perfect it in time.

The Crown filed its factum over nine months late without explanation.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that while the Crown's delay was excessive and negligent, the applicants had taken no steps to ensure timely perfection, were not prejudiced by the delay, and the charges of serious fraud warranted a hearing on the merits.

The court also dismissed the applicants' request for costs against the Crown, as the Crown's conduct did not amount to a marked and substantial departure from reasonable standards.

A separate motion by one applicant for the appointment of counsel under s. 684 of the Criminal Code was granted.

Following the dismissal of the appellants' Small Claims Court appeal, the successful respondent sought costs on a substantial indemnity basis fixed at $22,810, or alternatively on a partial indemnity basis fixed at $15,395.

The appellants argued the requested costs were disproportionate to the issues, noting their own costs were $5,794.

The court considered the factors under Rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, including the necessity of defending the appeal and the reasonable hourly rate of the respondent's junior counsel.

The court fixed costs on a partial indemnity basis at $13,395, payable by the appellants to the respondent.

The appellants appealed a Small Claims Court judgment ordering them to pay $1,300 in debt and $5,000 in punitive damages.

The appellant lawyer had sent emails threatening the respondent with criminal prosecution for fraud in relation to a civil dispute over physiotherapy fees.

On appeal, the appellants argued the trial judge erred by admitting privileged settlement conference communications and by awarding punitive damages.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the admission of the settlement communications did not taint the trial and the lawyer's threats of criminal prosecution were reprehensible conduct justifying punitive damages.

The applicants, charged with fraud and conspiracy, brought an application under s. 11(b) of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay.

The total delay from arrest to anticipated trial completion was 60.5 months, significantly exceeding the 30-month presumptive ceiling established in R. v. Jordan.

While a previous s. 11(b) application was dismissed, finding the case complex and acknowledging transitional circumstances, a subsequent 11-month adjournment was caused by the unavailability of judges due to medical reasons and systemic resource shortages.

The court found that while judicial illness is a discrete exceptional circumstance, the extended 11-month delay was primarily attributable to scarce judicial resources, which does not qualify as an exceptional circumstance under the Jordan framework.

Consequently, the Crown failed to rebut the presumption of unreasonable delay, and the applications for a stay of proceedings were granted.

The five accused, charged with fraud and conspiracy related to a multi-million dollar tax avoidance scheme, brought applications for a stay of proceedings due to unreasonable delay under s. 11(b) of the Charter.

The total delay was approximately 44 months.

The court dismissed the delay application, finding the delay justified by the exceptional complexity of the case, which involved voluminous disclosure and multiple accused, as well as transitional exceptional circumstances under the Jordan framework.

The court granted an adjournment for three accused to retain counsel but denied a severance application by the remaining two accused, emphasizing the strong presumption in favour of joint trials for alleged co-conspirators.

This decision addresses the quantum and payor of costs following the dismissal of the Plaintiff's motion to restore her action to the trial list.

The court fixed partial indemnity costs for the motion and the action, finding the Defendant's claimed hours excessive for a relatively simple motion.

The court declined to award costs personally against the Plaintiff's solicitor, emphasizing that such orders are reserved for extraordinary circumstances and that the Plaintiff's extra-jurisdictional residence or counsel's misstatements are not sufficient grounds.

The plaintiff brought a motion to restore her action, commenced in 2006 for injuries sustained in 2001, to the trial list.

The action had been struck off in 2010 due to the plaintiff's prolonged lack of communication with counsel while residing in Hong Kong.

The court denied the motion and dismissed the action, finding an unacceptable 8-year delay in prosecution without a satisfactory explanation and minimal evidence of the plaintiff's serious intent to pursue the case.

The court also found a presumption of prejudice to the defendant due to the cumulative 16-year delay from the incident date, leading to inevitably faded memories of parties and potential witnesses, which the plaintiff failed to rebut.

The plaintiffs sued the Bank of Montreal for $211,999.62 arising from unauthorized debits from a corporate account and moved for summary judgment.

The Bank of Montreal also moved for summary judgment, seeking dismissal of the claims based on a limitations period and an account verification agreement.

The court found genuine issues requiring a trial regarding the start date of the limitation period due to conflicting evidence on when the plaintiff discovered the loss and when BMO provided account documentation.

The court also identified an ambiguity in the account verification clause regarding written versus oral notice, suggesting the `contra proferentem` rule might apply.

Both motions for summary judgment were dismissed, and no costs were awarded due to divided success.

The respondents sued the appellant for $580,000 paid pursuant to an oral contract for temporary foreign worker employment positions, alleging the contracts were fraudulent.

The appellant counterclaimed for $170,000 and pleaded equitable set-off.

The motion judge struck the defence of set-off.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge failed to apply the Telford factors for equitable set-off and that the appellant's claim was proper given the close connection between the parties' claims.

The plaintiff, a former member of the Ontario College of Social Workers and Social Service Workers, sued the College, its external counsel, the complainant, and witnesses for damages arising from the revocation of her registration following a disciplinary hearing.

The defendants moved to strike the claim.

The court granted the motion, finding that the College and its counsel were protected by statutory immunity under the Social Work and Social Services Work Act, 1998, and that the complainant and witnesses were protected by the doctrine of absolute privilege.

The court also struck claims relying on evidence rendered inadmissible by statute and claims lacking sufficient material facts, granting leave to amend only certain specific claims.