Carlo Di Carlo

The court considered an anti-SLAPP motion under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, brought by the defendant, a municipal councillor, to dismiss a multi-claim action by a developer shareholder.

The claims included defamation, breach of fiduciary duty, interference with economic relations, champerty and maintenance, and misfeasance in public office.

The court found that the claims lacked substantial merit, were improperly pleaded, and largely belonged to the corporation, not the individual plaintiff.

The court also found that the public interest in protecting political expression and participation outweighed any interest in allowing the action to proceed.

The action was dismissed.

This decision grants an interlocutory injunction exempting all existing supervised consumption sites (SCSs) in Ontario from the operation of section 2 of the Community Care and Recovery Act, 2024, pending a final decision on the merits.

The court finds that the three-part test for injunctive relief is met: there is a serious issue to be tried regarding Charter rights, irreparable harm would result from SCS closures, and the balance of convenience favours the applicants.

The ruling details the public health crisis of opioid use, the role of SCSs in harm reduction, and the disproportionate impact of closures on marginalized populations.

The appellant, a Markham city councillor, appealed the dismissal of her anti-SLAPP motion (pursuant to s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act) against an action brought by a developer.

The developer's action alleged defamation and other torts arising from the councillor's opposition to a development and her report to the police regarding an incident with the developer.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by adopting an overly narrow interpretation of "expression relating to a matter of public interest" and by conflating the stages of the s. 137.1 test.

The Court clarified that reporting concerns to the police and a city councillor's actions related to their public duties are matters of public interest, warranting a broad interpretation at the initial stage of the anti-SLAPP analysis.

The appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted to a different judge to consider the second stage of the s. 137.1 test.

The appellants, parents of a brain-injured son, appealed a trial judge's decision on the passing of accounts for a trust they administered.

The trial judge found significant mismanagement, including a failure to account for over $165,000, fabrication of receipts, and improper cash administration, ordering them to repay funds, prejudgment interest, and costs.

The appellants challenged the disallowance of expenses, the failure to consider quantum meruit/equitable set-off, the denial of legal fee indemnity, and prejudgment interest calculation.

The respondent cross-appealed, arguing the accounts should not have been passed given the breaches and that no trustee compensation should have been awarded.

The Court of Appeal largely affirmed the trial judge's findings, making only minor adjustments for calculation errors, and dismissed the cross-appeal, emphasizing the high onus on trustees to account and the deference owed to trial judges' factual findings in such complex cases.

This appeal concerned a proposed class action by inmates and their families against Bell Canada and the Ontario government regarding allegedly unreasonable and unconscionable collect call rates from correctional facilities.

The motion judge had dismissed claims for an ultra vires tax and a Telecommunications Act breach, and permanently stayed other claims (unjust enrichment, consumer protection, unconscionable contracts, breach of fiduciary duty), deferring to the CRTC's jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the ultra vires tax claim, finding the commissions paid to Ontario were proprietary/contractual charges, not taxes.

However, the Court substituted the permanent stay with a temporary stay for the remaining claims.

This was to allow the CRTC to first determine whether it had forborne from regulating these specific rates and, if not, to adjudicate their reasonableness, ensuring access to justice for the appellants if the CRTC declined jurisdiction.

The plaintiffs brought a proposed class action on behalf of prisoners and their families, alleging that Bell Canada and Ontario charged unconscionable rates for collect calls from provincial correctional facilities.

The plaintiffs sought certification, while the defendants brought cross-motions to stay the action, arguing the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) had exclusive jurisdiction.

The Superior Court of Justice struck the plaintiffs' claims for an ultra vires tax and breach of the Telecommunications Act, finding it plain and obvious they could not succeed.

The court permanently stayed the remaining claims, concluding that the pith and substance of the dispute concerned telecommunications rates, which fall squarely within the specialized jurisdiction and remedial authority of the CRTC.

The applicant, a former Senior Manager, Compliance, sought court advice and direction regarding claims for solicitor-client privilege asserted by the Toronto-Dominion Bank and its subsidiaries over documents and information in her possession.

The applicant had previously initiated a wrongful dismissal claim and sent whistleblower reports to regulators using internal Bank documents.

The Bank asserted privilege over certain materials and applied redactions.

The court found that the documents and information in the applicant's possession were subject to solicitor-client privilege and should be returned or redacted.

The court also denied the applicant's request for her litigation counsel to review the privileged materials, finding no "absolute necessity," and rejected arguments that the privilege belonged to trust beneficiaries or was negated by a future crimes/fraud exception.

The application was dismissed in its entirety, and costs were awarded to the Bank.

In a proposed class action regarding the rates charged for collect calls made by prisoners in Ontario correctional facilities, the plaintiffs brought a motion to strike portions of an affidavit sworn by an employee of the defendant telecommunications company.

The plaintiffs argued the affiant was improperly giving expert opinion evidence.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the affiant was providing factual evidence regarding the regulatory framework and the operation of the telephone system, not expert opinion.

In a CCAA proceeding, the Monitor sought leave to appeal an order dismissing its motion for a declaration that funds swept into a UK bank account were subject to a statutory trust under the Construction Lien Act.

The CCAA judge had found the funds were irreconcilably commingled and could not be traced.

The Court of Appeal refused to admit fresh evidence and denied leave to appeal, finding the proposed appeal was not prima facie meritorious and the decision was fact-specific and consistent with established jurisprudence regarding tracing.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his defamation action, which was brought against the respondent under Ontario's anti-SLAPP legislation.

The motion judge had dismissed the action, finding that the respondent's expression (a complaint to a volunteer organization about the appellant's conduct) related to a matter of public interest, the appellant's action lacked substantial merit as the respondent had valid defenses (justification, fair comment, qualified privilege), and the harm to the appellant did not outweigh the public interest in protecting the expression.

The motion judge also awarded damages and full indemnity costs, characterizing the defamation action as a reprisal brought in bad faith.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings of fact and application of the anti-SLAPP test, dismissing the appeal and affirming the damages and costs awards.

The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' action for solicitor negligence because the plaintiffs failed to post security for costs as ordered by a Master.

The self-represented plaintiffs argued they were impecunious and sought to appeal or vary the Master's order.

The court found the plaintiffs failed to provide the required financial disclosure to prove impecuniosity and offered no compelling reason for their non-compliance.

The court also found no merit in the proposed appeal of the Master's order, noting the underlying claim appeared frivolous and vexatious.

The motion was granted and the action was dismissed.

The plaintiff and defendants were neighbours involved in a bitter dispute over a property line, a fence, and alleged defamation.

After most claims were resolved, abandoned, or rendered moot by the sale of both properties, the plaintiff sought summary judgment for $1,412.50 representing the cost of removing and replacing a portion of the fence.

The court dismissed the motion, finding the local bylaw did not entitle the plaintiff to unilaterally hire a contractor and seek reimbursement.

As the plaintiff had abandoned the majority of her claims, the court dismissed the action entirely and awarded the defendant partial indemnity costs of $31,812.52.

The plaintiff sought leave under s. 138.8(1) of the Securities Act (OSA) to bring a claim for secondary market misrepresentation against the defendant.

The claim alleged that the defendant's November 29, 2018 Management Discussion and Analysis (MD&A) misrepresented material facts regarding a 220,000 square foot construction project.

The defendant issued a corrective disclosure on January 8, 2019, stating the project would be completed in 2019, but this was buried in a positive press release.

Subsequent press releases on February 6 and 7, 2019, revealed the collapse of the project's financing and partnership, leading to a significant market impact.

The court granted leave, finding a reasonable chance the action would succeed, emphasizing that materiality must be assessed contextually, considering the full business circumstances, not just immediate market reaction to a decontextualized disclosure.

The plaintiff, Alex M. Bodnarchuk, brought a consent motion to certify a class action for settlement purposes and to obtain leave to proceed with a secondary market misrepresentation claim under the Ontario Securities Act against Guestlogix Inc., Brett Proud, and Patrick Leung.

The action alleged misrepresentations and omissions regarding credit facilities and financial covenants.

The parties reached a settlement of $1,275,000.

The court granted leave, finding the action was brought in good faith and had a reasonable possibility of success for settlement purposes.

The court also certified the action as a class proceeding for settlement purposes, finding all criteria under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992 were met.

The order approved the settlement notices and procedures for opt-outs and objections, and set a date for the settlement approval hearing.

The defendant brought an anti-SLAPP motion to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation action.

The plaintiff, a self-represented individual, sued after the defendant complained to a community organization about his alleged harassing behavior.

The court found that the defendant's expression related to a matter of public interest (character and integrity of mentors in a volunteer organization).

While the plaintiff's claim had substantial merit, the defendant had valid defenses (justification, fair comment, qualified privilege).

Furthermore, the harm suffered by the plaintiff was not sufficiently serious to outweigh the public interest in protecting the defendant's expression.

The action was dismissed, and the defendant was awarded full indemnity costs and damages for bad faith.

This continued case conference endorsement addresses the plaintiff's request to adjourn a multi-day leave motion in a proposed class action until an in-person hearing is possible, due to concerns about conducting a complex hearing virtually during the COVID-19 pandemic.

The defendant was prepared to proceed virtually.

The court, acknowledging the evolving confidence in virtual hearings and the need for courts to operate, ordered the motion to proceed by videoconference on the previously scheduled dates of June 23 and 24, 2020, finding that remote procedures are not inherently unfair and practical issues can be addressed through cooperation.

The defendant ANI Media Private Ltd. moved to dismiss or permanently stay the action brought by Sikhs for Justice (SFJ) on grounds of lack of jurisdiction or *forum non conveniens*.

SFJ, an Ontario-incorporated not-for-profit, alleged a defamation campaign orchestrated by the Republic of India and carried out by Indian media outlets, including ANI Media.

The court found that while a presumptive connecting factor (tort committed in Ontario due to online access) was arguable, it was rebutted because the claims were not sufficiently connected to Ontario to reasonably expect ANI Media to respond there, especially given the Republic of India's immunity and the broad nature of the alleged campaign.

Consequently, the Ontario Superior Court of Justice declined jurisdiction and dismissed the action.

The court also briefly addressed *forum non conveniens* for completeness, noting that India was not clearly a more appropriate forum due to significant impediments for SFJ to litigate there.

In a proposed class action, the defendant sought to proceed with a two-day leave motion virtually via videoconference due to COVID-19 court suspensions.

The plaintiff opposed, citing logistical difficulties for a complex motion with a voluminous evidentiary record, including the inability for counsel teams to be together.

The court, while acknowledging the desire to avoid delay, declined to compel the plaintiff to proceed virtually, prioritizing due process concerns and the plaintiff's ability to present their case effectively.

The leave motion was rescheduled for an in-court hearing.

The parties agreed to a timetable for the plaintiff's upcoming motion, with the hearing scheduled for May 5 and 6, 2020.

The plaintiff sought costs following the dismissal of the defendant's motion to set aside his noting in default and his cross-motion under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found that the defendant had flouted the Rules of Civil Procedure, attempted to bully his way out, and rejected early offers to set aside the noting in default for a nominal payment.

The defendant's conduct warranted an elevated award of costs.

The court ordered the defendant to pay costs of $18,000, inclusive of disbursements and HST, which was slightly above partial indemnity costs.