Carlo Di Carlo

The appellant property developer sued the respondent municipal councillor for defamation after she made a police complaint about him following an altercation.

The motion judge dismissed the action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal, finding the action lacked substantial merit as the mere making of a police complaint that is closed without charges does not constitute defamation.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The court considered an anti-SLAPP motion under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act, brought by the defendant, a municipal councillor, to dismiss a multi-claim action by a developer shareholder.

The claims included defamation, breach of fiduciary duty, interference with economic relations, champerty and maintenance, and misfeasance in public office.

The court found that the claims lacked substantial merit, were improperly pleaded, and largely belonged to the corporation, not the individual plaintiff.

The court also found that the public interest in protecting political expression and participation outweighed any interest in allowing the action to proceed.

The action was dismissed.

This decision grants an interlocutory injunction exempting all existing supervised consumption sites (SCSs) in Ontario from the operation of section 2 of the Community Care and Recovery Act, 2024, pending a final decision on the merits.

The court finds that the three-part test for injunctive relief is met: there is a serious issue to be tried regarding Charter rights, irreparable harm would result from SCS closures, and the balance of convenience favours the applicants.

The ruling details the public health crisis of opioid use, the role of SCSs in harm reduction, and the disproportionate impact of closures on marginalized populations.

The appellant, a Markham city councillor, appealed the dismissal of her anti-SLAPP motion (pursuant to s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act) against an action brought by a developer.

The developer's action alleged defamation and other torts arising from the councillor's opposition to a development and her report to the police regarding an incident with the developer.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by adopting an overly narrow interpretation of "expression relating to a matter of public interest" and by conflating the stages of the s. 137.1 test.

The Court clarified that reporting concerns to the police and a city councillor's actions related to their public duties are matters of public interest, warranting a broad interpretation at the initial stage of the anti-SLAPP analysis.

The appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted to a different judge to consider the second stage of the s. 137.1 test.

The appellants, parents of a brain-injured son, appealed a trial judge's decision on the passing of accounts for a trust they administered.

The trial judge found significant mismanagement, including a failure to account for over $165,000, fabrication of receipts, and improper cash administration, ordering them to repay funds, prejudgment interest, and costs.

The appellants challenged the disallowance of expenses, the failure to consider quantum meruit/equitable set-off, the denial of legal fee indemnity, and prejudgment interest calculation.

The respondent cross-appealed, arguing the accounts should not have been passed given the breaches and that no trustee compensation should have been awarded.

The Court of Appeal largely affirmed the trial judge's findings, making only minor adjustments for calculation errors, and dismissed the cross-appeal, emphasizing the high onus on trustees to account and the deference owed to trial judges' factual findings in such complex cases.

This appeal concerned a proposed class action by inmates and their families against Bell Canada and the Ontario government regarding allegedly unreasonable and unconscionable collect call rates from correctional facilities.

The motion judge had dismissed claims for an ultra vires tax and a Telecommunications Act breach, and permanently stayed other claims (unjust enrichment, consumer protection, unconscionable contracts, breach of fiduciary duty), deferring to the CRTC's jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the ultra vires tax claim, finding the commissions paid to Ontario were proprietary/contractual charges, not taxes.

However, the Court substituted the permanent stay with a temporary stay for the remaining claims.

This was to allow the CRTC to first determine whether it had forborne from regulating these specific rates and, if not, to adjudicate their reasonableness, ensuring access to justice for the appellants if the CRTC declined jurisdiction.

The appellants appealed an order dismissing their action for delay under Rule 48.14(7)(a) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

They argued the Associate Justice erred by failing to consider contextual factors and made palpable and overriding errors regarding their lack of steps taken and the absence of prejudice to the respondents.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no errors in principle or palpable and overriding errors of fact, noting the appellants failed to provide an acceptable explanation for the delay or demonstrate that the respondents would suffer no non-compensable prejudice.

The appellants requested an adjournment on the day of their appeal hearing, citing a last-minute change in counsel.

The court noted that the hearing had been scheduled for months and that the late request wasted court resources.

However, given the breakdown in the solicitor-client relationship and the new counsel's inability to argue the appeal, the court granted a short adjournment.

The new hearing date was made peremptory on the appellants, and they were ordered to pay costs thrown away of $2,500 to each respondent group.

The plaintiffs commenced an action in 2015 but took no steps for over five years while the principal of the plaintiff corporations faced criminal charges.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for a status hearing to extend the time to set the action down for trial, but later abandoned it and served a trial record.

The defendants brought cross-motions to proceed with the status hearing.

The court found the plaintiffs failed to provide an acceptable explanation for the delay, as they unilaterally held the action in abeyance without communicating with the defendants.

The court also found the plaintiffs failed to rebut the strong presumption of prejudice arising from the delay.

The action was dismissed for delay.

The plaintiffs brought a proposed class action on behalf of prisoners and their families, alleging that Bell Canada and Ontario charged unconscionable rates for collect calls from provincial correctional facilities.

The plaintiffs sought certification, while the defendants brought cross-motions to stay the action, arguing the Canadian Radio-television and Telecommunications Commission (CRTC) had exclusive jurisdiction.

The Superior Court of Justice struck the plaintiffs' claims for an ultra vires tax and breach of the Telecommunications Act, finding it plain and obvious they could not succeed.

The court permanently stayed the remaining claims, concluding that the pith and substance of the dispute concerned telecommunications rates, which fall squarely within the specialized jurisdiction and remedial authority of the CRTC.

The applicant, a former Senior Manager, Compliance, sought court advice and direction regarding claims for solicitor-client privilege asserted by the Toronto-Dominion Bank and its subsidiaries over documents and information in her possession.

The applicant had previously initiated a wrongful dismissal claim and sent whistleblower reports to regulators using internal Bank documents.

The Bank asserted privilege over certain materials and applied redactions.

The court found that the documents and information in the applicant's possession were subject to solicitor-client privilege and should be returned or redacted.

The court also denied the applicant's request for her litigation counsel to review the privileged materials, finding no "absolute necessity" and rejected arguments that the privilege belonged to trust beneficiaries or was negated by a future crimes/fraud exception.

The application was dismissed in its entirety, and costs were awarded to the Bank.

The plaintiffs brought a motion seeking an order to continue the examination for discovery of the defendant's representative for a further 4.5 days, while the defendant submitted that only one further day was appropriate.

The action involves claims of defamation and intentional interference with economic relations.

The case management judge found the motion to be a waste of the court's time and ordered a compromise of two additional days (12 hours) of discovery, noting the parties had previously consented to exceed the seven-hour limit under Rule 31.05.1.

The plaintiffs' request regarding a Request to Admit was deemed moot as the defendant had delivered a compliant response prior to the hearing.

The appellant appealed a motion judge's decision dismissing her defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions.

The appellant argued the motion judge erred in finding a published photo was not defamatory and in upholding the respondents' defence of responsible communication.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the motion judge applied the proper legal framework from Pointes Protection and Grant v. Torstar, and her conclusions were entitled to deference.

Staff of the Ontario Securities Commission and the respondent jointly submitted a settlement agreement for approval following the respondent's guilty plea to unregistered trading in the Ontario Court of Justice.

The respondent had formed a purported hedge fund and engaged in trading without registration, though he believed the business was legitimate and was himself deceived by a co-founder who lost the investors' funds.

The Commission approved the settlement, which included a $60,000 disgorgement order and a 10-year ban on trading and acting as a director or officer, finding the terms fell within a reasonable range and served the public interest.

In a proposed class action regarding the rates charged for collect calls made by prisoners in Ontario correctional facilities, the plaintiffs brought a motion to strike portions of an affidavit sworn by an employee of the defendant telecommunications company.

The plaintiffs argued the affiant was improperly giving expert opinion evidence.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the affiant was providing factual evidence regarding the regulatory framework and the operation of the telephone system, not expert opinion.

The plaintiff brought a motion to compel answers to refusals arising from cross-examinations on affidavits filed by the defendant in support of her pending anti-SLAPP motion.

The underlying action involves claims of defamation and misfeasance in public office against a municipal councillor.

The court applied the test for relevance on a motion, balancing the scope of the anti-SLAPP motion with the principle of proportionality.

The court ordered the defendant to answer certain narrowed questions regarding her communications with third parties and the police, but dismissed overbroad requests and upheld solicitor-client privilege regarding a non-party lawyer's communications.

In a CCAA proceeding, the Monitor sought leave to appeal an order dismissing its motion for a declaration that funds swept into a UK bank account were subject to a statutory trust under the Construction Lien Act.

The CCAA judge had found the funds were irreconcilably commingled and could not be traced.

The Court of Appeal refused to admit fresh evidence and denied leave to appeal, finding the proposed appeal was not prima facie meritorious and the decision was fact-specific and consistent with established jurisprudence regarding tracing.

The appellant appealed the dismissal of his defamation action, which was brought against the respondent under Ontario's anti-SLAPP legislation.

The motion judge had dismissed the action, finding that the respondent's expression (a complaint to a volunteer organization about the appellant's conduct) related to a matter of public interest, the appellant's action lacked substantial merit as the respondent had valid defenses (justification, fair comment, qualified privilege), and the harm to the appellant did not outweigh the public interest in protecting the expression.

The motion judge also awarded damages and full indemnity costs, characterizing the defamation action as a reprisal brought in bad faith.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings of fact and application of the anti-SLAPP test, dismissing the appeal and affirming the damages and costs awards.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal and awarded costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs' action for solicitor negligence because the plaintiffs failed to post security for costs as ordered by a Master.

The self-represented plaintiffs argued they were impecunious and sought to appeal or vary the Master's order.

The court found the plaintiffs failed to provide the required financial disclosure to prove impecuniosity and offered no compelling reason for their non-compliance.

The court also found no merit in the proposed appeal of the Master's order, noting the underlying claim appeared frivolous and vexatious.

The motion was granted and the action was dismissed.