Adriana Di Biase

The court considered a motion by several defendants to strike out claims in a civil action involving allegations of mortgage fraud, conspiracy, and related causes of action.

The moving defendants sought to strike the statement of claim as disclosing no reasonable cause of action and as being frivolous and vexatious.

The court granted the motion in part, striking claims of negligent misrepresentation, fraudulent misrepresentation, fraud, breach of fiduciary duty, and negligence against the moving defendants without leave to amend, but allowed the claim against Mr. Geraci personally to be amended.

The court also addressed the admissibility of late-served motion materials and the requirements for amending pleadings in the face of a motion to strike.

This endorsement addresses a case conference requested by Sergio Grillone, an undischarged bankrupt, seeking directions regarding his proposed appeal from a scheduling endorsement and related matters in ongoing bankruptcy proceedings.

The court finds that Mr. Grillone has no right of appeal from the scheduling endorsement, as no order has been made from which an appeal lies, and dismisses his proposed motion as frivolous, vexatious, or an abuse of process under rule 2.1.01.

The decision details the procedural history, the positions of the parties, and the court’s reasoning for dismissing the motion.

The decision addresses a motion by the plaintiff to amend her statement of claim in a real estate dispute.

The plaintiff sought to add claims related to a "Development Pause" and "Walk Away Offers" in a failed home purchase.

The court found the Development Pause amendments were statute-barred and dismissed them, but allowed amendments regarding the Walk Away Offers, as they were timely and not prima facie unmeritorious.

The court also ordered further document disclosure and permitted further discovery, deferring a decision on certain refusals.

The court determined the scale and quantum of costs following previous motions.

Primont Homes (Vaughan) Inc. sought substantial indemnity costs, arguing delay and unproven fraud allegations by the defendants, Maplequest (Vaughan) Developments Inc. and 2373480 Ontario Inc. The defendants argued for reduced partial indemnity costs due to mixed success and over-lawyering by Primont.

The court found partial indemnity was appropriate, rejecting substantial indemnity as the fraud allegations were not adjudicated on their merits.

The court also reduced Primont's requested quantum due to its unsuccessful abuse of process argument and duplicative work by its multiple timekeepers, ultimately awarding $140,000.00 in partial indemnity costs.

The plaintiff, Primont Homes (Vaughan) Inc., sought an interlocutory injunction to prevent the defendants, Maplequest (Vaughan) Developments Inc. and 2373480 Ontario Inc., from dealing with certain land lots, asserting a contractual right to acquire them.

The defendants moved to dissolve an existing interim injunction, arguing the plaintiff failed to provide an adequate undertaking as to damages and made material non-disclosures.

The court dismissed the defendants' motions to dissolve the interim injunction, finding them precluded by Rule 2.02 due to significant delay.

The court then granted the plaintiff's motion for an interlocutory injunction, determining there was a serious issue to be tried regarding the enforceability of the agreement and entitlement to specific performance, that the plaintiff would suffer irreparable harm due to the primary defendant's inability to satisfy a damages award, and that the balance of convenience favored maintaining the injunction.

The court also found the plaintiff's undertaking as to damages sufficient given the defendants' failure to quantify their potential damages from delay.

The appellant, a Markham city councillor, appealed the dismissal of her anti-SLAPP motion (pursuant to s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act) against an action brought by a developer.

The developer's action alleged defamation and other torts arising from the councillor's opposition to a development and her report to the police regarding an incident with the developer.

The Court of Appeal found that the motion judge erred by adopting an overly narrow interpretation of "expression relating to a matter of public interest" and by conflating the stages of the s. 137.1 test.

The Court clarified that reporting concerns to the police and a city councillor's actions related to their public duties are matters of public interest, warranting a broad interpretation at the initial stage of the anti-SLAPP analysis.

The appeal was allowed, and the matter was remitted to a different judge to consider the second stage of the s. 137.1 test.