Sam P. Rappos

The plaintiff, a former registered perfusionist employed by the defendant hospital, brought a motion for leave to amend his statement of claim in a wrongful dismissal and human rights action, to transfer the action from simplified to ordinary procedure, and to impose a litigation timetable.

The proposed amendments added 48 new paragraphs, claims for moral/aggravated and punitive damages, and detailed factual allegations responding to the defence.

The court granted the motion in part, permitting most amendments as particularizations of the existing causes of action, but refused amendments relating to a forced resignation in February 2022 and mitigation-related allegations as new causes of action raised outside the limitation period.

The defendants brought a motion under Rule 39.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure seeking to compel the plaintiff to produce its Chief Executive Officer as a necessary witness for an interlocutory motion hearing.

The underlying motion concerns an order for inspection of a laptop under Rule 32.01.

The court dismissed the defendants' motion, finding that the evidence sought from the CEO was not relevant to the narrow issues to be determined on the Rule 32.01 motion and that allowing the examination would constitute an improper use of Rule 39.03 as a substitute for discovery and a means to litigate the underlying claim prematurely.

A secured creditor sought a declaration that the automatic stay of proceedings under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act did not prevent it from enforcing an eviction order against a debtor who had filed a consumer proposal.

The court dismissed the request for a declaration but lifted the stay on the basis that the creditor would be materially prejudiced by its continuation.

The court found that the creditor's enforcement of a court judgment for possession was distinct from realizing on security and therefore subject to the stay, but that material prejudice warranted lifting the stay to permit the eviction to proceed.

The defendant brought a motion for an order requiring the plaintiff to provide greater particulars in response to his demand for particulars in a sexual assault claim.

The plaintiff alleged that she was sexually abused by the defendant between 1993 and 1997/8 when both were minors.

The defendant sought specific dates, locations, and details of each incident.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the plaintiff had provided sufficient particulars in her statement of claim to enable the defendant to understand the case he had to meet, that the defendant had already pleaded a defence, and that further details were appropriately left for examination for discovery.

The trustee in bankruptcy (MNP Ltd.) brought a motion for discharge from its duties administering the bankruptcy estate of Blue Mountain Four Season Limited.

The largest creditors, Ron and Sharon Suter, filed a notice of objection arguing that the trustee failed to properly investigate and recover the bankrupt's assets, particularly equipment allegedly owned by the company but being used by its former owner and operator.

The court found that the trustee had taken reasonable steps to investigate the bankrupt's affairs, including arranging for the examination of the company's owner under oath by the Office of the Superintendent of Bankruptcy.

The court granted the trustee's discharge, noting that the trustee's decision not to pursue further litigation was reasonable given the lack of funds in the estate and the risk of personal liability for costs.

The court considered whether, at a case conference, an associate judge has jurisdiction to determine if the plaintiff may examine a third party in the main action under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiff sought to examine Andrew Clark, a third party, but the associate judge found that such a determination would constitute interlocutory relief, which is beyond the jurisdiction of an associate judge at a case conference.

The request was denied, and the plaintiff was directed to bring a motion if it wished to pursue the matter.

The court considered a motion by Luis Alejandro Correa Rucci to vary the conditions of his bankruptcy discharge order.

The motion was dismissed because it was brought before the expiry of the one-year waiting period required by section 172(3) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The court clarified the distinction between the powers to vary under sections 172(3) and 187(5) of the Act, and set out the requirements for future motions to vary a conditional discharge.

This endorsement addresses a motion by the City of Toronto and Adam Vaughan, creditors of 1631651 Ontario Inc., seeking an order that the assignment in bankruptcy does not take precedence over a prior order for payment and directing the Accountant to release funds to their counsel.

The court reviews the application of section 70(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act and considers relevant case law from other jurisdictions and Ontario.

The motion is adjourned to allow further submissions on Ontario authorities.

The plaintiff, Maria Prete, brought a motion for leave to add three new defendants and to amend her statement of claim in a slip-and-fall action.

The court found that the motion to add Avison Young (Canada) Inc. as a defendant was brought outside the applicable limitation period and must be dismissed.

The motion was granted as against the other two proposed defendants, Bay International Inc. and Long & Morris Property Management Ltd., who did not oppose the motion, but without prejudice to their right to plead a limitation defence.

Costs were awarded to Avison Young.

The decision addresses a motion by Osama Ebid and Fast to Canada for an order requiring the plaintiffs, a group of Syrian and Iraqi refugees, to post $45,000 as security for costs in a civil action regarding failed permanent residency applications.

The court reviews the legal principles for security for costs, the timing of the motion, the residence and assets of the plaintiffs, the merits of the litigation, and the interests of justice.

Despite the late timing of the motion, the court grants the order, finding the plaintiffs have no connection to Ontario and the amount sought is reasonable.

The decision addresses a motion by the plaintiff to amend her statement of claim in a real estate dispute.

The plaintiff sought to add claims related to a "Development Pause" and "Walk Away Offers" in a failed home purchase.

The court found the Development Pause amendments were statute-barred and dismissed them, but allowed amendments regarding the Walk Away Offers, as they were timely and not prima facie unmeritorious.

The court also ordered further document disclosure and permitted further discovery, deferring a decision on certain refusals.

The decision addresses a motion by Greensides & Breen Insurance Brokers Limited to compel Sound Insurance Services Inc. and Chris Hossein to answer certain refused questions and to provide further and better answers to undertakings arising from examinations for discovery.

The court found that Greensides did not require leave to bring the motion, refused to compel answers to the disputed questions, but ordered Sound to provide more detailed responses to five undertakings.

The court considered whether to dismiss the plaintiffs' action for delay under Rule 48.14 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiffs argued that the delay was due to their former counsel and the conduct of the defendants, and that they always intended to prosecute the action.

The court refrained from deciding the motion, directing that the former counsel be served with the motion materials and given an opportunity to respond, as the allegations against him could affect his interests and the fairness of the process.

The trustee in bankruptcy, Goldhar & Associates Ltd., brought a motion to annul Qui Thieu Mac’s discharge from bankruptcy, arguing that the discharge was granted due to inadvertence in failing to file a notice of opposition.

The court found that there was a bona fide error, that opposition would have been filed but for the error, and that a discharge hearing would likely have led to a different result given the facts proven under section 173(1) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The court exercised its discretion to set aside the absolute discharge and granted the trustee’s motion.

The defendant brought a motion to dismiss the action for delay, citing the plaintiff's failure to set the action down for trial since its commencement in 2015.

The court raised concerns about the plaintiff's potential disability, noting a prior temporary guardianship by the Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) and a recent doctor's letter indicating the plaintiff's inability to self-represent due to complex health issues.

As the PGT was not served with the motion, as required by Rule 24.02 for plaintiffs under disability, the court declined to rule on the merits of the dismissal motion.

A case conference was ordered to address next steps, including PGT involvement and a potential recusal motion by the plaintiff.

The Trustee in Bankruptcy, Goldhar & Associates Ltd., brought a motion to annul the automatic discharge of Qui Thieu Mac, a second-time bankrupt.

The Trustee intended to oppose the discharge due to prior bankruptcy, failure to provide income statements, and gambling contributing to the bankruptcy, but failed to file the opposition notice and report due to inadvertence.

The court noted the Trustee's lack of legal submissions and specific BIA sections relied upon for annulment.

The motion was adjourned sine die, requiring the Trustee to provide proper legal submissions addressing applicable BIA sections (e.g., 187(5), 187(9)) and relevant jurisprudence.

The Plaintiff brought a motion to validate service of a statement of claim on the Defendant, Shakil Ahmad, or alternatively for substituted service or to dispense with service.

The core issue was the Defendant's lawyer's refusal to accept service despite being retained and engaging in substantive discussions.

The court found the lawyer's conduct to be contrary to professional obligations and the principles of expeditious proceedings.

The motion to validate service was granted, and costs were awarded to the Plaintiff on a substantial indemnity basis due to the unnecessary nature of the motion caused by the Defendant's conduct.

This motion concerned the approval of the Trustee in Bankruptcy's final statement of receipts and disbursements in the bankruptcy of Ametra Dave.

A creditor, Linda Zaplotinsky, objected to the Trustee's and its legal counsel's fees and disbursements, alleging mismanagement, ill-timed legal proceedings, and unnecessary costs.

The court found that while the Trustee's administration of assets was reasonable, the fees related to an unsuccessful property sale motion were not.

Consequently, the court exercised its discretion to reduce the Trustee's fees by $10,000 and its counsel's fees by $9,123.

This decision addresses motions by plaintiffs (M.A. and C.S. et al.) to lift stays of proceedings against Christine Ramgulam-Rafiq (under a consumer proposal) and Kishen Vicky Doon (in bankruptcy) pursuant to section 69.4 of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The underlying civil actions seek damages for torts including voyeurism, negligence, and intrusion upon seclusion, stemming from incidents at a spa.

The court considered whether the debtors were necessary parties for complete adjudication, if the BIA's summary claim procedure was inappropriate for complex tort claims, and if the debts would survive discharge under section 178(1) of the BIA.

The court found that both debtors were necessary parties and that the summary procedure was unsuitable.

For Mr. Doon, the claims were found to potentially fall under section 178(1)(a.1)(i) (bodily harm intentionally inflicted) and section 178(1)(e) (false pretenses) due to his guilty plea to voyeurism.

For Ms. Ramgulam-Rafiq, the court found little prospect of success for claims under section 178(1) as the allegations were primarily negligence-based, not intentional torts, and she denied knowledge.

Despite the latter, the court granted the motions to lift the stays against both debtors, concluding there were sound reasons and material prejudice to the plaintiffs if the stays continued.