John S. Contini

The plaintiffs, judgment creditors of the defendant Harold Spring, brought a motion seeking an order for examination in aid of execution of non-parties and production of documents from non-parties under Rule 60.18(6), and leave to issue a notice of garnishment more than six years after judgment under Rule 60.08(2).

The court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiffs had demonstrated difficulty in enforcing the judgments and had exhausted available means, and that the non-parties likely possessed relevant information.

The court also found that the plaintiffs had not waived their rights regarding garnishment despite the delay, and that the garnishee might be indebted to the defendant.

The appellant, Pauline Altberg, appealed a summary judgment that discharged a mortgage held by her and dismissed her counterclaim for payment, based on a limitation period defense.

The core issue was whether a $4,000 payment in 2010 by the respondent, Thomas Maxwell, reset the 10-year limitation period under s. 23(1) of the Real Property Limitations Act.

The motion judge, applying the Hryniak two-stage approach, found insufficient evidence to prove the payment was made towards the mortgage debt, and thus Altberg failed to meet her onus to show the action was within the limitation period.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, affirming that the motion judge was entitled to make a determination on summary judgment even if facts were difficult to resolve, and that the onus remained on the party seeking to enforce the right to prove the action was within the limitation period.

Following a successful summary judgment motion discharging a mortgage as statute-barred, the plaintiff sought costs of $33,557.18, arguing for substantial indemnity costs based on a $100 offer to settle.

The court found the offer contained no real element of compromise and applied an exception to Rule 49.10.

Applying principles of fairness, reasonableness, and proportionality, the court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs fixed at $20,394.32.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment to discharge a collateral mortgage, arguing that the defendant's enforcement action was statute-barred under the Real Property Limitations Act.

The defendant claimed a $4,000 payment was made in May 2010, which would have reset the 10-year limitation period.

Applying the Hryniak framework, the court found the defendant's evidence of the payment—a single ambiguous bank book entry—insufficient to meet her onus of proving the claim was brought within the limitation period.

The plaintiff's motion was granted and the defendant's counterclaim was dismissed.

The plaintiff, Giang Long Nguyen, invested $100,000 in a trucking business venture with the defendants, Abdelraheem Adas and Krystalynn Kaur Manu (common-law spouses).

The defendants misrepresented their intentions, using the funds for personal expenses and a failed real estate investment.

A default judgment was initially obtained against both defendants, but later set aside for Mr. Adas.

At trial, the court found Mr. Adas liable for breach of fiduciary duty and civil fraud, concluding that he misused the funds and deliberately misled the plaintiff.

The court ordered Mr. Adas to repay the $100,000 jointly and severally with Ms. Manu, plus prejudgment interest.

This appeal concerned the reasonableness of a motion judge's exercise of enhanced powers under Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in granting summary judgment to enforce guarantees.

The appellants argued the motion judge erred in finding no genuine issues requiring a trial, particularly regarding credibility issues arising from new evidence about representations limiting the guarantees.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's careful application of the Hryniak framework, his findings on credibility, and his interpretation of the agreements, concluding there was no basis to interfere with the summary judgment.

The plaintiffs, licensed real estate agents, sought commissions from the defendant Fufa Limited for the sale of a multi-residential property.

They claimed entitlement based on alleged verbal agreements, or alternatively, unjust enrichment and quantum meruit.

The court found no valid verbal agreement for commission, noting the absence of essential terms and the existence of an exclusive written listing agreement with another brokerage (ReMax) that had expired.

The plaintiffs also failed to establish they were the "effective cause" of the sale due to intervening events and significant differences in the final sale terms.

Claims for unjust enrichment and quantum meruit were dismissed as they could not circumvent the requirements of the Real Estate Business Brokers Act and there was insufficient evidence to quantify damages for services rendered.

The plaintiff bank brought a Rule 20 motion for summary judgment against a borrower and guarantor for outstanding balances on several credit facilities, including personal and business loans.

The responding party admitted liability for certain personal loans but asserted that she had resigned as director of the borrowing company and had notified the bank that she would no longer be responsible for corporate debts.

She argued the bank accepted this notice and was estopped from enforcing the loans.

The court found significant conflicting evidence regarding whether notice was provided, whether the bank accepted any release of liability, and the meaning of various correspondence and alleged discussions between the parties.

Because credibility issues and material facts were in dispute, the court held that a full appreciation of the evidence required viva voce testimony and could not be achieved on a summary judgment motion.