John S. Contini

The plaintiffs, judgment creditors of the defendant for over $4 million arising from fraudulent schemes, brought a motion for orders under Rule 60.18(6) to examine the defendant's spouse and compel document production from non-party banks and accountants.

The plaintiffs also sought leave under Rule 60.08(2) to issue a notice of garnishment more than six years after the judgment.

The court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiffs had faced difficulty enforcing the judgment due to the defendant's refusals and non-compliance with previous orders, and that the non-parties likely possessed relevant information regarding the defendant's assets and income.

The plaintiffs, judgment creditors of the defendant Harold Spring, brought a motion seeking an order for examination in aid of execution of non-parties and production of documents from non-parties under Rule 60.18(6), and leave to issue a notice of garnishment more than six years after judgment under Rule 60.08(2).

The court granted the motion, finding that the plaintiffs had demonstrated difficulty in enforcing the judgments and had exhausted available means, and that the non-parties likely possessed relevant information.

The court also found that the plaintiffs had not waived their rights regarding garnishment despite the delay, and that the garnishee might be indebted to the defendant.

The appellant, Pauline Altberg, appealed a summary judgment that discharged a mortgage held by her and dismissed her counterclaim for payment, based on a limitation period defense.

The core issue was whether a $4,000 payment in 2010 by the respondent, Thomas Maxwell, reset the 10-year limitation period under s. 23(1) of the Real Property Limitations Act.

The motion judge, applying the Hryniak two-stage approach, found insufficient evidence to prove the payment was made towards the mortgage debt, and thus Altberg failed to meet her onus to show the action was within the limitation period.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, affirming that the motion judge was entitled to make a determination on summary judgment even if facts were difficult to resolve, and that the onus remained on the party seeking to enforce the right to prove the action was within the limitation period.

Following a successful summary judgment motion discharging a mortgage as statute-barred, the plaintiff sought costs of $33,557.18, arguing for substantial indemnity costs based on a $100 offer to settle.

The court found the offer contained no real element of compromise and applied an exception to Rule 49.10.

Applying principles of fairness, reasonableness, and proportionality, the court awarded the plaintiff partial indemnity costs fixed at $20,394.32.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment to discharge a collateral mortgage, arguing that the defendant's enforcement action was statute-barred under the Real Property Limitations Act.

The defendant claimed a $4,000 payment was made in May 2010, which would have reset the 10-year limitation period.

Applying the Hryniak framework, the court found the defendant's evidence of the payment—a single ambiguous bank book entry—insufficient to meet her onus of proving the claim was brought within the limitation period.

The plaintiff's motion was granted and the defendant's counterclaim was dismissed.

The plaintiff, Giang Long Nguyen, invested $100,000 in a trucking business venture with the defendants, Abdelraheem Adas and Krystalynn Kaur Manu (common-law spouses).

The defendants misrepresented their intentions, using the funds for personal expenses and a failed real estate investment.

A default judgment was initially obtained against both defendants, but later set aside for Mr. Adas.

At trial, the court found Mr. Adas liable for breach of fiduciary duty and civil fraud, concluding that he misused the funds and deliberately misled the plaintiff.

The court ordered Mr. Adas to repay the $100,000 jointly and severally with Ms. Manu, plus prejudgment interest.

This appeal concerned the reasonableness of a motion judge's exercise of enhanced powers under Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure in granting summary judgment to enforce guarantees.

The appellants argued the motion judge erred in finding no genuine issues requiring a trial, particularly regarding credibility issues arising from new evidence about representations limiting the guarantees.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, affirming the motion judge's careful application of the Hryniak framework, his findings on credibility, and his interpretation of the agreements, concluding there was no basis to interfere with the summary judgment.

The plaintiff factor moved for summary judgment against the defendants on personal guarantees they signed for a corporate borrower's debts.

The defendants argued they subjectively understood the guarantees only applied to the first factoring draw, and later claimed the plaintiff's president orally confirmed this limitation.

Applying the Hryniak framework, the court found no genuine issue requiring a trial, holding that subjective intentions cannot contradict the plain wording of a continuing guarantee and utilizing enhanced fact-finding powers to reject the defendants' late-raised oral evidence as incredible.

Summary judgment was granted to the plaintiff.

The appellant appealed a judgment finding him liable for civil conspiracy to cause economic injury and an award of substantial indemnity costs.

The respondent had lost his investment after being misled into transferring funds to a shell company, which were then diverted.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge applied the correct legal test for conspiracy to injure and made no palpable and overriding error in her factual findings.

The court also upheld the substantial indemnity costs award, noting it was justified by the appellant's egregious and fraudulent behaviour in furthering the conspiracy.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario issued a costs endorsement following an appeal.

The appellant was awarded costs of the appeal fixed at $12,300.00, inclusive of disbursements and taxes.

The costs of the summary judgment motion below were ordered to be fixed by the trial judge at the end of the proceedings.

The employee worked for a company for 36 years before its assets were sold to the appellant.

The appellant hired the employee, but laid her off after one month.

The employee sued for wrongful dismissal and was granted summary judgment based on the motion judge's finding that her employment was continuous under the common law, mirroring the Employment Standards Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that summary judgment was inappropriate due to material factual disputes regarding the terms of her new employment.

The Court clarified that at common law, a sale of a business results in constructive dismissal, and while a successor employer must give some recognition to prior service when assessing reasonable notice, it is not a seamless continuation of employment.

The respondent, a Quebec-based farm equipment dealer, brought a motion to dismiss the applicant's dispute under the Farm Implements Act for lack of jurisdiction.

The respondent argued it had no physical location in Ontario and relied on a choice of law clause in the contract specifying Quebec law.

The Tribunal found a real and substantial connection to Ontario because the respondent advertised, delivered, and serviced equipment in Ontario, and was registered as a dealer under the Ontario Act.

The Tribunal also found the choice of law clause unenforceable as an unfair term because it was not brought to the applicant's attention.

The motion to dismiss was denied.

The plaintiffs, licensed real estate agents, sought commissions from the defendant Fufa Limited for the sale of a multi-residential property.

They claimed entitlement based on alleged verbal agreements, or alternatively, unjust enrichment and quantum meruit.

The court found no valid verbal agreement for commission, noting the absence of essential terms and the existence of an exclusive written listing agreement with another brokerage (ReMax) that had expired.

The plaintiffs also failed to establish they were the "effective cause" of the sale due to intervening events and significant differences in the final sale terms.

Claims for unjust enrichment and quantum meruit were dismissed as they could not circumvent the requirements of the Real Estate Business Brokers Act and there was insufficient evidence to quantify damages for services rendered.

The plaintiff, a farm equipment dealer, brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to prevent the defendant manufacturer from terminating their dealership agreement.

The plaintiff intended to argue before the Agriculture, Food and Rural Affairs Tribunal that the termination violated the Farm Implements Act, but had not yet commenced proceedings there.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that an injunction is an ancillary remedy and cannot be granted where no underlying proceeding exists.

Alternatively, the court held that the requested relief was a mandatory injunction for which the plaintiff failed to establish a strong prima facie case, and even under the lower threshold for a prohibitive injunction, the plaintiff failed to demonstrate irreparable harm or that the balance of convenience favoured granting the injunction.

The appellant tenant appealed a trial judgment finding he failed to pay rent and that the landlord's distraint, which included changing the locks, did not constitute a forfeiture of the lease.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding the trial judge's conclusions were supported by the evidentiary record and that changing the locks does not alone render an otherwise lawful distraint a forfeiture.

The plaintiff bank brought a Rule 20 motion for summary judgment against a borrower and guarantor for outstanding balances on several credit facilities, including personal and business loans.

The responding party admitted liability for certain personal loans but asserted that she had resigned as director of the borrowing company and had notified the bank that she would no longer be responsible for corporate debts.

She argued the bank accepted this notice and was estopped from enforcing the loans.

The court found significant conflicting evidence regarding whether notice was provided, whether the bank accepted any release of liability, and the meaning of various correspondence and alleged discussions between the parties.

Because credibility issues and material facts were in dispute, the court held that a full appreciation of the evidence required viva voce testimony and could not be achieved on a summary judgment motion.

The Ontario Securities Commission approved a settlement agreement with a former vice president regarding allegations of insider trading and failure to disclose a material change.

The respondent admitted to exercising options and selling shares while aware of an undisclosed contract dispute, avoiding a loss of approximately $729,000.

The settlement included a 15-year trading ban, a 15-year ban on acting as a director or officer, and a $150,000 administrative penalty.

The Commission found the settlement to be in the public interest, noting mitigating factors such as the respondent's lack of experience, reliance on the company's CFO, and cooperation with Staff.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Director refusing to issue a certificate of amendment under s. 12 of the Business Corporations Act to change its corporate name.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Director properly exercised her discretion in considering the public interest in avoiding confusion and the relative hardship to the parties.

The court exercised its own discretion anew and reached the same conclusion, awarding costs to the respondent.

The applicant sought leave to appeal to the Divisional Court from a decision refusing an interlocutory injunction to prevent a professional engineering consulting firm from acting for a competitor.

The motion judge found a serious issue to be tried regarding a potential breach of fiduciary duty but found no irreparable harm.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal, finding that there was good reason to doubt the correctness of the decision because it was open to serious debate whether the strict conflict of interest approach applied to accountants in Drabinsky should also apply to engineers in a fiduciary relationship.

Commercial appeal arising from a manufacturing contract dispute over delayed and deficient mold production for an automotive supply program.

The appellant argued that the respondent's transfer of one mold to another subcontractor constituted accord and satisfaction and challenged the reasonableness of the respondent's mitigation costs.

The court rejected those arguments, holding that there was no agreement discharging the appellant's original obligations and that subcontracting completion was a necessary mitigation step in light of the delivery pressures imposed by the end customer.

The appeal was allowed only in part to correct the accounting by crediting the appellant with the unpaid final one-third contract amount for the transferred mold.

The respondent remained substantially successful and was awarded three-quarters of its appeal costs.