Jonathan Shulman

M.R. pleaded guilty to failing to provide necessaries of life and assault with a weapon against a child (B.L.).

The Crown sought 18 months to two years less a day in custody, plus probation.

The defence sought a two-year less a day conditional sentence.

The court considered aggravating factors, including M.R.'s position of trust, the child victim's vulnerability, the prolonged nature of the abuse, and physical assaults.

Significant mitigating factors included M.R.'s genuine remorse, cooperation with police and child welfare, lack of a prior criminal record, strong family support, and engagement in counselling.

The court emphasized the primary sentencing objectives of denunciation and deterrence for child abuse offenses, while also balancing rehabilitation and restraint.

Ultimately, a two-year less a day conditional sentence was imposed, with restrictive conditions including 18 months of house arrest with GPS monitoring, recognizing the unique mitigating circumstances and the importance of M.R.'s continued employment for the family's stability.

This decision provides reasons for the sentencing of three individuals convicted in the murder of Theepa Seevaratnam and attempted murder of Leelavathi Seevaratnam.

Steadley Kerr and Vijendran Balasubramaniam were convicted of first-degree murder and conspiracy to commit murder.

Gary Samuel was convicted of manslaughter.

The court applied sentencing principles, including proportionality, denunciation, and deterrence, considering aggravating factors such as firearm involvement, planning, the domestic nature of the murder, and the vulnerability of the victims.

Mitigating factors, such as lack of criminal record and rehabilitative potential for some offenders, and harsh presentence custody conditions, were also considered.

Sentences included life imprisonment for murder and concurrent terms for conspiracy and attempted murder, along with ancillary orders.

Following the dismissal of the applicant's motion to invalidate a condominium lien, the respondent condominium corporation sought full indemnity costs of $23,905.99.

The court found that the conduct of the applicant's counsel was reprehensible, scandalous, and outrageous, including making unsubstantiated allegations of professional misconduct and fraud, failing to respond to communications, and acting abusively.

The court awarded the respondent its full indemnity costs to sanction this conduct and bring finality to the litigation.

During an application to set aside a condominium lien, the applicant's counsel was administratively suspended by the Law Society of Ontario.

The court convened a hearing to determine if it had jurisdiction to rule on the application and whether counsel should pay costs personally.

The court found it had jurisdiction to rule on the application as it was fully argued before the suspension was known.

The court ordered the applicant's counsel to personally pay $800 in costs to the respondent due to his failure to address the suspension promptly and communicate with the court, which caused unnecessary delay and expense.

A request to seal the endorsement was denied.

The defendant pleaded guilty to failing to stop at the scene of an accident involving a death, contrary to section 320.16(3) of the Criminal Code.

The court considered aggravating factors, including the seriousness of the offence, the defendant being a suspended driver, and being on probation at the time of the offence.

Mitigating factors included the early guilty plea, genuine remorse, no evidence of improper driving or impairment, and strong family support due to parental health issues.

The Crown sought a 6-month jail sentence and a 2-year driving prohibition, while the defence sought 90 days intermittent and an 18-month prohibition.

The court imposed a 90-day jail sentence (in addition to 8 days pre-sentence custody credit) and an 18-month driving prohibition, emphasizing general deterrence and denunciation while acknowledging the absence of dangerous or impaired driving.

The plaintiffs, former executives of the Durham College student association (DCSI), sued Durham College and DCSI following their termination by DCSI.

Durham College brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the claims against it, arguing it had no involvement in the termination and owed no duty to supervise DCSI's employment relationships.

The court granted the motion, finding that the governing legislation prohibited Durham College from interfering with DCSI's normal activities, precluding any duty of care.

The court also dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for negligent misrepresentation, intentional infliction of mental distress, specific performance, and discrimination due to lack of evidence and insufficient pleadings.

The appellant, Felice Scala, appealed a trial judgment that dismissed his claim for damages alleging excessive police force during his arrest and the associated costs award.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's findings of fact and credibility, which largely favoured the police officers' account over the appellant's.

The trial judge found the appellant's evidence inconsistent and implausible, while the police officers' evidence was credible and reliable.

The appeal court found no palpable and overriding error in the trial judge's assessment of evidence or the application of the law regarding necessary and objectively reasonable force under s. 25(1) of the Criminal Code.

The appeal regarding the costs award was also dismissed, finding no basis to interfere with the trial judge's discretion.

This is the applicant's second application for bail pending appeal following convictions for sexual assault and distributing intimate images.

The applicant argued a material change of circumstances based on newly available transcripts and an affidavit, alleging ineffective assistance from both previous counsel and an uninformed guilty plea.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the application, finding no material change of circumstances as the new grounds of appeal were not "not frivolous." The court also held that public confidence in the administration of justice required the applicant's continued detention, as the enforceability interest outweighed the weak reviewability interest.

The plaintiff brought an urgent motion seeking to vary a previous order, permit cloning of a defendant's laptop hard drive, compel password disclosure, freeze and disclose defendant's assets at Sun Life, and reserve costs.

This was the third time the issue of preserving laptop data was before the court.

The court denied the request to clone the laptop, finding no sufficient evidence of relevance beyond speculation and that the balance of convenience weighed against preservation.

The court ordered the immediate return of the laptop to the defendant.

The Mareva Injunction was extended to include Sun Life assets for clarity, but specifically excluded a newly opened TD Canada Trust account.

Costs were reserved.

The Toronto Standard Condominium Corporation No. 1724 brought an application against a unit owner, Evgeni Evdassin, for a compliance order to replace defective Kitec pipes and for various other permanent prohibitory orders, seeking costs on a full indemnity basis.

The court granted the compliance order for pipe replacement, as the unit owner had largely consented to this, but dismissed the broader prohibitory orders, finding the Condominium had over-reached.

On the issue of costs, the court declined to award full indemnity costs, emphasizing that section 134(5) of the Condominium Act provides an enforcement mechanism for actual costs but does not dictate the court's assessment of costs.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs, reducing the amount claimed due to the Condominium's partial success and over-reaching on certain requests.

The Condominium Corporation sought compliance orders against a unit owner for refusing access to replace defective Kitec pipes and for alleged abusive and interfering behaviour.

The court ordered the owner to allow access for pipe replacement and to pay associated costs, finding he had interfered with the work.

However, the court declined to issue broader, indefinite compliance orders regarding future conduct, finding the alleged misconduct was not sufficiently persistent or egregious to warrant such extensive restrictions, and that some evidence was inadmissible hearsay.

This endorsement addresses the issue of costs following the dismissal of the plaintiffs' action for damages arising from an arrest.

The defendants, as the successful parties, sought costs.

The plaintiffs argued against a cost award, citing divided success, public interest litigation, and access to justice concerns.

The court rejected these arguments, affirming the general principle that costs follow the event.

While finding the defendants entitled to costs, the court declined to impose joint and several liability on both plaintiffs, instead apportioning costs separately.

The total amount of costs awarded was significantly reduced from the amount sought by the defendants, emphasizing proportionality and reasonableness, particularly given the case's initial designation as a simplified procedure action.

The plaintiff brought a civil action against the Toronto Police Services Board and individual officers, alleging they used excessive force during his arrest and were negligent in his subsequent detention.

The plaintiff claimed he was severely beaten without warning, while the police testified they executed a controlled take-down after he resisted arrest.

The court found the police officers' evidence credible and reliable, concluding that the force used was necessary, justified, and not excessive under section 25(1) of the Criminal Code.

The court also dismissed the plaintiff's claims of negligence and breach of fiduciary duty, ultimately dismissing the action in its entirety.

The accused pleaded guilty to luring contrary to s. 172.1(1) of the Criminal Code.

The Crown proceeded summarily, invoking a mandatory six-month minimum sentence.

The accused challenged the constitutionality of the minimum sentence provision under s. 7 and s. 12 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, arguing it was grossly disproportionate.

The court found a s. 12 breach that was not saved by s. 1 of the Charter, and imposed a sentence of 90 days intermittent incarceration with a three-year probationary period, rather than the mandatory minimum of six months.