Deborah E. Palter

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal the decision of Akazaki J. dated January 14, 2026.

The Divisional Court granted the motion for leave to appeal, without costs.

Following the dismissal of the Receiver's motion to approve a sublease, the successful responding parties (the Oxford Parties) sought costs of $707,229.66 on a substantial indemnity basis, or alternatively $558,187.26 on a partial indemnity basis.

The Receiver argued no costs should be awarded or, alternatively, $250,000.

The court held that while restructuring proceedings are often not classic adversarial litigation, this dispute between commercial competitors warranted a costs award.

The court declined to hold the Receiver personally liable, ordering costs payable from the debtor's estate.

Finding the Oxford Parties' settlement offer non-compliant with Rule 49, the court awarded partial indemnity costs fixed at $400,000.

In an insolvency receivership involving Yorkdale leasehold interests, the court considered whether to approve a receiver-negotiated sublease entered without landlord consent and whether ancillary relief should issue.

Applying the contractual framework under the Head Lease and Commercial Tenancies Act, and considering insolvency discretion under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, the court held the landlord had not unreasonably withheld consent.

The court further held that s. 84.1 of the BIA did not apply directly or by analogy to the proposed sublease structure.

On a broader stakeholder-balancing analysis, the court found unfairness in the process and insufficient commercial soundness to justify discretionary approval.

The motion to approve the new sublease was dismissed, and ancillary relief was not addressed.

The moving party sought leave to appeal an order transferring a matter from the Family Law Team to the Civil Law Team in Toronto.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that while there was good reason to doubt the motion judge's finding on jurisdiction, the decision to have the matter addressed by the Civil Law Team was an exercise of administrative discretion that did not raise a matter of such importance to warrant leave to appeal.

HSBC Bank Canada appealed a summary judgment decision in its favour against Antonio Guido on a personal loan guarantee.

Guido, the principal of Royal Canadian Bedrock Inc., had defaulted on a loan and was bound by a personal guarantee.

Guido's principal defence was that HSBC was bound by a side agreement allegedly engineered by Bruno Campoli, who was retained as an exclusive agent for both Guido and RCB.

Guido claimed Campoli and Michael Thomas & Associates Inc. were also acting as agents for HSBC and made misrepresentations that HSBC would not enforce the guarantee.

Guido also alleged a conspiracy to extract unlawful fees.

The motion judge granted summary judgment to HSBC and dismissed Guido's counterclaim.

The Court of Appeal upheld the decision, finding no genuine issue requiring trial and no evidentiary support for Guido's allegations after five years of litigation.

The appellants brought motions under Rule 59.06 to set aside a 2018 Divisional Court judgment that upheld securities fraud findings and sanctions against them.

In response, the Ontario Securities Commission moved for security for costs and to strike out seven expert reports filed by the appellants.

The Divisional Court granted the Commission's motions, ordering the appellants to post $100,000 in security for costs due to unpaid prior costs awards.

The court also struck out all seven expert reports, finding they improperly opined on matters of domestic law and factual findings that are the exclusive province of the court, failing the necessity criterion for expert evidence.

This costs endorsement follows the court’s summary judgment decision in favour of HSBC Bank Canada against Antonio Guido, enforcing a guarantee and dismissing Guido’s $11 million counterclaim.

The court reviews the parties’ submissions on the scale and quantum of costs, ultimately awarding HSBC substantial indemnity costs, but in a reduced amount, having regard to proportionality, fairness, and reasonableness under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The decision addresses the contractual entitlement to substantial indemnity costs, the complexity and conduct of the litigation, and the appropriate adjustment of costs claimed.

The plaintiff financial institution sought summary judgment on a guarantee provided by the defendant guarantor and dismissal of the guarantor's counterclaim.

The guarantor alleged breach of contract, negligent misrepresentation, conspiracy, unjust enrichment, and unconscionability, primarily based on the assertion that a third-party agent was also an agent of the financial institution and conspired with its executives.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the financial institution's claim on the guarantee or the guarantor's defenses and counterclaim.

The court determined there was no evidence to support the agency assertion or the alleged conspiracy, and that the non-reliance and non-waiver clauses in the guarantee were enforceable.

Partial summary judgment was deemed appropriate as the claims against the financial institution were discrete from the guarantor's continuing claims against other parties.

The moving party, AutoLoans, sought a declaration of ownership over four vehicles, asserting a purchase agreement with Clonsilla Auto Sales and Leasing.

The court-appointed Receiver, Deloitte Restructuring Inc., opposed, arguing the transaction was a financing arrangement and, alternatively, a preferential transfer under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

The court found that the executed Fixed Rate Installment Notes (FRINs) constituted a binding financing transaction that was not legally displaced by subsequent backdated purchase documents.

Consequently, the vehicles remained property of the debtors, and AutoLoans' motion was dismissed.

The Limited Partners of YG Limited Partnership appealed a motion judge's order denying them standing to oppose a creditor's (CBRE Limited) appeal of a disallowed proof of claim under s. 135(4) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act (BIA).

The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed the appeal, holding that limited partners do not possess a direct economic interest in the claim sufficient for common law standing, nor are they granted standing under s. 135(4) or s. 37 of the BIA.

The court emphasized that the BIA is a complete code designed for expeditious resolution of bankruptcy matters, and equity owners are generally excluded from direct participation in creditor claim appeals.

The appellants, Limited Partners of a debtor in a bankruptcy proposal, appealed an order for directions regarding the process for an appeal of a proof of claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal as premature, finding that the motion judge had not made any final orders regarding the appellants' standing in the anticipated claim appeal, but rather had made directions "subject to the discretion of the judge hearing the appeal." The court held that the possibility of influence or an incorrect underlying conclusion on discretionary standing was not a basis for appeal.

In a family law proceeding, the parties disputed whether the applicant, who suffers from mild dementia and requires a litigation guardian, had the testimonial competence to testify at trial.

The court reviewed the conflicting expert evidence from geriatric specialists regarding her capacity to observe, recollect, and communicate.

Applying section 18(2) of the Ontario Evidence Act, the court determined it was necessary to conduct an in-person examination of the applicant to assess her testimonial capacity before ruling on the issue.

The appellant tenant, Hudson's Bay Company (HBC), appealed a motion judge's decision regarding relief from forfeiture under s. 20 of the Commercial Tenancies Act, seeking rent abatement due to COVID-19 impacts.

The respondent landlords (Oxford and affiliates) cross-appealed the deferral of rent payments and reduction of interest rates.

The Court of Appeal dismissed HBC's appeal, affirming that s. 20 does not permit rent abatement or reduction as it would rewrite the lease.

The court allowed the landlords' cross-appeal, finding that deferrals should only be granted to allow the tenant to comply, not to mitigate economic harm, and that the interest rate should not have been varied from the lease terms.

Following a motion where the tenant successfully obtained relief from forfeiture and the landlord successfully obtained all rent arrears, both parties sought costs.

The landlord sought $300,000 based on partial indemnity and an unaccepted offer to settle, while the tenant sought $218,388 or that each party bear their own costs.

The court ordered that each party bear their own costs, noting the divided success, the withdrawal of the landlord's offer to settle prior to the hearing, and the unique and unforeseen circumstances of the COVID-19 pandemic.

The plaintiff tenant, a non-essential retailer, ceased paying rent during the COVID-19 pandemic, arguing the landlord breached the lease by failing to provide a first-class shopping centre due to government-mandated closures and restrictions.

The landlord sought to terminate the lease.

The court held that the landlord was not in breach of the lease, as it was complying with provincial laws, and the tenant was not entitled to an abatement of rent.

However, the court granted the tenant relief from forfeiture under the Commercial Tenancies Act, allowing a structured deferral of rent arrears with interest, noting the tenant's prior unblemished record and the unprecedented nature of the pandemic.

The plaintiffs, former executives of the Durham College student association (DCSI), sued Durham College and DCSI following their termination by DCSI.

Durham College brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the claims against it, arguing it had no involvement in the termination and owed no duty to supervise DCSI's employment relationships.

The court granted the motion, finding that the governing legislation prohibited Durham College from interfering with DCSI's normal activities, precluding any duty of care.

The court also dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for negligent misrepresentation, intentional infliction of mental distress, specific performance, and discrimination due to lack of evidence and insufficient pleadings.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking repayment of $195,000 in unsecured loans advanced to the defendant corporation.

The defendant argued that the loans were not proven and, alternatively, that a Proceeds Sharing and Priorities Agreement subordinated the plaintiff's unsecured debt to secured investors, preventing judgment.

The court found no genuine issue requiring trial, concluding the loans were advanced and remained unpaid, and that the Priorities Agreement did not apply to the unsecured loans.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff.

A consumer debtor, Muhammed Salman Pathan, sought an order compelling Western University to confer an MBA degree upon him, arguing his outstanding tuition debt was discharged by his consumer proposal.

Western opposed, asserting the debt constituted a student loan under section 178(1)(g) of the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, thus surviving the proposal, and that the conferral of a degree was solely within its discretion.

The court found the debt was indeed a student loan under a provincial enactment, not released by the consumer proposal, and affirmed Western's discretionary power to withhold a degree for non-payment of fees, concluding that this policy did not conflict with the "fresh start" principle of bankruptcy law.

The debtor's motion was dismissed.

In a priority dispute under the Construction Lien Act, the court determined the relative priorities of several mortgagees and construction lien claimants.

The court held that professional fees incurred by a first mortgagee to protect its security constituted an 'advance' under section 78(6) of the Act, granting it priority.

The court also found that a $10 million advance made jointly to two borrowers under a second mortgage was an advance in respect of that mortgage, giving it priority over the lien claimants.

However, the court ruled that an advance made under a loan agreement to a third party was not an advance in respect of a collateral mortgage given by the developer as guarantor, meaning the lien claimants had priority over the collateral mortgage.

The applicant in a dismissed bankruptcy application sought costs, alleging the respondent was a fiduciary and acted improperly.

The respondent sought substantial indemnity costs, claiming the application was an abuse of process.

The court denied both parties' cost claims, finding no judicial determination of fiduciary duty or improper conduct by the respondent, and no bad faith by the applicant in commencing the bankruptcy application.

Each party was ordered to bear their own costs.