Sapna Thakker

Following the approval of an amended restructuring proposal under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, two limited partner applicant groups sought costs for their participation in the proceedings.

The court declined to award costs, noting the Commercial List practice of generally not awarding costs in restructuring matters.

The court emphasized that restructuring is not a classic adversarial proceeding and that stakeholders should not be discouraged from participating by the threat of costs.

No order as to costs was made for the bankruptcy proceeding, though the court left open the possibility of addressing costs in the related civil proceedings if funds flow back to the partnership.

The debtors, YG Limited Partnership and YSL Residences Inc., sought court approval for version 2 of Amended Proposal #3 under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act, following the court's previous rejection of an earlier proposal.

The amended proposal addressed the court's prior concerns by treating related party claims as equity, ensuring construction lien claims did not dilute unsecured creditors' recoveries, and providing that any surplus funds would be returned to the limited partnership.

The court found the amended proposal to be reasonable, calculated to benefit the general body of creditors, and advanced in good faith, and therefore granted the order approving the proposal.

The debtors, YG Limited Partnership and YSL Residences Inc., sought court approval of a bankruptcy proposal under the Bankruptcy and Insolvency Act.

Two groups of limited partners opposed the proposal, arguing it was not reasonable, was advanced in bad faith, and improperly treated related-party advances as debt rather than equity.

The court refused to approve the proposal, finding that the related-party claims were equity claims, the proposal sponsor had improperly induced unaffected lien claimants to vote as affected creditors, and the general partner had breached its fiduciary duties by advancing a proposal designed to benefit related parties at the expense of the limited partners.

The Estate Trustee During Litigation brought a motion to quash an appeal in a matter involving the estate of Elias Gefen.

The appeal involved multiple parties including the estate trustee, family members, and various institutions.

The motion to quash was granted on March 14, 2019.

The court awarded costs of the motion and appeal to the Estate Trustee During Litigation in the amount of $30,000 inclusive of disbursements and applicable taxes, payable jointly by the appellant and respondents to the motion.

The Estate Trustee During Litigation (ETDL) moved to quash an appeal on the grounds that it should have been brought to the Divisional Court under section 28 of the Estates Act.

The respondents argued that the ETDL's appointment was made under Rule 75 of the Rules of Civil Procedure or the court's inherent jurisdiction, not the Estates Act.

The Court of Appeal held that the appointment order was made pursuant to the Estates Act and that the allegation of a constructive trust "touches on" the validity of the will or grant of administration within the meaning of section 28.

The appeal was quashed and the matter was directed to the Divisional Court.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment seeking repayment of $195,000 in unsecured loans advanced to the defendant corporation.

The defendant argued that the loans were not proven and, alternatively, that a Proceeds Sharing and Priorities Agreement subordinated the plaintiff's unsecured debt to secured investors, preventing judgment.

The court found no genuine issue requiring trial, concluding the loans were advanced and remained unpaid, and that the Priorities Agreement did not apply to the unsecured loans.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff.

The plaintiff, the former manager of the defendant investment fund, sued for fees and damages following the termination of its management agreement.

The defendant fund counterclaimed, alleging the manager was terminated for cause due to material breaches of the standard of care, particularly regarding its handling of the fund's liquidity crisis and its recommendation to enter into a high-interest loan rather than suspending redemptions.

The court found that the manager materially breached the standard of care, justifying the termination.

However, the fund's counterclaim for damages was dismissed as statute-barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The manager was awarded certain unpaid fees accrued prior to termination.

The defendant published a report criticizing the governance and contracting practices of the Niagara Peninsula Conservation Authority.

The Authority, its former CAO, and a contractor sued the defendant for defamation.

The defendant brought a motion to dismiss the actions under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act (s. 137.1).

The court dismissed the Authority's action, holding that a government entity cannot sue an individual for defamation.

The court dismissed the remaining plaintiffs' actions because they failed to show the defendant had no valid defence, as the expressions were made on occasions of qualified privilege without malice.

The court heard two motions in consolidated actions: one by ORBCOMM for the return of corporate data from former senior managers (Chan and Tourian) and the representative shareholder (Randy Taylor Professional Corporation), and another by ORBCOMM, Skywave, and Marc Eisenberg to strike a defamation claim brought by Chan and Tourian.

The court ordered Chan and Tourian to provide copies of the data but allowed them to retain their own copies, finding no contractual obligation to destroy them.

The defamation claim was struck for lack of particularity but with leave to amend, as the former managers were not parties to the main action and thus had no direct means to dispute allegations affecting their reputation.

Two doctors subpoenaed to testify at a murder trial brought a motion seeking an order authorizing them to disclose the deceased child's personal health information under the Personal Health Information Protection Act.

The court dismissed the motion, holding that no such order is necessary because a witness compelled by law to answer relevant questions at trial is not exposed to liability for breaching confidentiality.