Lisa Brownstone

Dr. Thirlwell, a psychiatrist, sought a stay of a Divisional Court order that upheld an interim order by the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario (CPSO).

The ICRC's interim order imposed terms on Thirlwell's registration, including a prohibition on issuing vaccine exemptions and a requirement to consent to OHIP inquiries, due to concerns about her providing improper medical exemption letters for cash.

The Divisional Court dismissed Thirlwell's judicial review application, finding the OHIP term reasonable for patient protection.

Thirlwell moved for a stay of the Divisional Court order pending her motion for leave to appeal to the Court of Appeal.

The Court of Appeal denied the stay, finding no serious question to be tried and that the public interest in patient safety and confidence in the College's disciplinary system outweighed Thirlwell's personal interests.

The self-represented applicants sought judicial review of decisions by the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board regarding their late father's medical treatment.

The Divisional Court issued a notice under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, identifying significant defects in the application, including naming improper parties and seeking relief beyond the court's jurisdiction.

Despite opportunities to correct the defects, the applicants refused.

The court dismissed the application as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, noting that the proceeding failed to meet basic legal requirements.

The applicants sought to commence an application for judicial review of three decisions of the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board regarding their late father's medical treatment.

The request was improperly formatted, named incorrect parties, and sought relief beyond the Divisional Court's jurisdiction.

Despite being given opportunities to correct the defects, the applicants refused.

The court issued a notice under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, directing the registrar to notify the applicants that the court is considering dismissing the application as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, and stayed the proceeding pending the outcome.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, which found he committed professional misconduct by improperly billing OHIP and falsifying patient records, and revoked his certificate of registration.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding errors of fact or errors of law in the Committee's liability decision.

The Court also upheld the penalty of revocation, concluding it was not clearly unfit given the intentional and dishonest nature of the misconduct and the appellant's lack of insight.

The College of Physicians and Surgeons brought a motion to settle an order flowing from previous reasons for judgment and to vary its terms due to the COVID-19 pandemic.

The motion addressed the wording of the order regarding the handling of Patient A's medical file, specifically the inclusion of a caveat allowing transfer of records "to the extent necessary for the College to carry out its regulatory functions." The court found the College's proposed wording, though an addition, accurately captured the implicit logic of the prior reasons.

Additionally, due to public health concerns, the court varied the order to allow the College's investigator, Greg Hutchinson, to be the repository for Patient A's file instead of SJO's counsel, and permitted the investigator to share materials with the College's expert, Dr. Sian Rawkins.

The court also clarified that newly discovered emails from SJO's hospital account were part of the file covered by the ruling and that the restrictions on file handling did not apply past the investigation stage.

An amended Reasons for Judgment was also ordered to address privacy concerns.

The College of Physicians and Surgeons initiated an investigation into a psychiatrist, SJO, concerning boundary violations and the receipt of confidential information from a patient (Patient A), who was a former College employee.

SJO resisted producing Patient A's medical records, arguing patient-psychiatrist privilege and a conflict of interest for the College due to parallel investigations.

The court dismissed SJO's application for an injunction, holding that the College's statutory investigatory powers under the Regulated Health Professions Act and Health Professions Procedural Code override common law claims of privilege and patient confidentiality in this regulatory context.

The court ordered SJO to produce the patient's medical records and communications to an external investigator, with strict confidentiality protocols to limit College staff access.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, which revoked his certificate of registration for sexually abusing a patient.

The appellant argued that the Committee erred in finding a physician-patient relationship existed and in refusing to quash a summons issued to the reluctant patient.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Committee's determination of a physician-patient relationship was reasonable based on medical records, OHIP billings, and medical notes provided to the patient.

The Court also upheld the Committee's decision not to quash the summons, concluding that the College's broad investigatory powers and the public interest in prosecuting sexual abuse allegations outweighed the patient's privacy interests.

Appeal of a Divisional Court decision upholding College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario policies requiring physicians who object to providing certain medical procedures on religious grounds to provide effective referrals to non-objecting providers.

The appellants, individual physicians and physician organizations, challenged the policies as violating their freedom of conscience and religion under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and their equality rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the policies infringe freedom of religion, the infringement is justified under s. 1 of the Charter as a reasonable limit demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.

The court emphasized the importance of equitable patient access to health care services, particularly for vulnerable populations, and the role of family physicians as gatekeepers in the health care system.

The applicants, including several religious physicians and organizations, challenged two policies of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario that require physicians who object to providing certain medical services (such as abortion or medical assistance in dying) on religious or conscientious grounds to provide an 'effective referral' to a non-objecting provider.

The applicants argued these policies infringed their rights to freedom of religion and equality under the Charter.

The Divisional Court held that while the effective referral requirements did infringe the physicians' freedom of religion under s. 2(a) of the Charter, the infringement was justified under s. 1 as a reasonable limit to ensure equitable access to healthcare for patients.

The court dismissed the applications.

The appellant physician appealed a penalty decision of the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario revoking his medical license.

The Committee found he engaged in unwanted touching of hospital employees and coercive sexual activity with a 17-year-old camp counsellor.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appellant's motion to adduce fresh evidence and upheld the penalty, finding the revocation was a reasonable outcome given the serious nature of the misconduct, the need to protect the public, and the lack of evidence regarding the risk of future misconduct.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario Discipline Committee Panel, which found him guilty of professional misconduct and sexual abuse of a former patient.

The panel's decision was split 3-2, with the minority finding the sexual abuse allegations unproven.

The appellant argued the majority's credibility assessments and factual findings were unreasonable.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the majority's findings were reasonable, supported by the evidence, and entitled to deference.

The appellant physician appealed findings by the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons that he engaged in sexual abuse of a patient and professional misconduct.

The appellant argued the Committee failed to properly consider inconsistencies in the complainant's evidence and video surveillance footage.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding the Committee's credibility assessments and conclusions were reasonable and supported by the evidence.

The appellant physician appealed decisions of the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons finding her guilty of professional misconduct and incompetence following the death of a patient who underwent high-volume liposuction.

The Committee found she breached standards of practice regarding extraction volumes, informed consent, and post-operative care, and that her website advertising violated regulations banning testimonials and superlatives.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, upholding the Committee's findings on the standard of practice, its evidentiary rulings, and its conclusion that the advertising ban was a justified limit on freedom of expression under s. 1 of the Charter.

The penalty restricting her practice to acting as a surgical assistant in a hospital was also upheld as reasonable.

The moving party, a physician whose certificate of registration was suspended for two years followed by indefinite restrictions after a discipline committee found her incompetent following a patient's death during liposuction, brought a motion to stay the penalty order pending her appeal.

She sought to perform non-surgical cosmetic procedures in the interim.

The Divisional Court applied the RJR MacDonald test and dismissed the motion.

While the appeal raised a serious issue, the moving party failed to establish irreparable harm, as financial loss alone is insufficient.

Furthermore, the balance of convenience favoured the respondent, as the court found that allowing the moving party to perform or supervise controlled acts would pose a risk to public safety and undermine public confidence in the medical profession's regulatory process.

The appellant physicians, who performed cosmetic surgery without formal surgical residency, were investigated by the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario for potential professional misconduct or incompetence.

The College sought to have investigators observe their surgical practices, which the appellants refused, arguing the governing legislation did not authorize compelled observation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the Divisional Court's decision, finding that the power to 'inquire into and examine the practice' under s. 76(1) of the Health Professions Procedural Code encompasses the direct observation of a member's practice, particularly to protect the public interest.

The applicant physician sought judicial review of an interim order made by the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario restricting her cosmetic surgery practice pending a disciplinary hearing.

The order was issued after investigations into patient complaints, including one patient death following a liposuction procedure.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the College's decision was reasonable, supported by ample evidence of risk to patient safety, and did not demonstrate a reasonable apprehension of bias.

The applicants, physicians under investigation by the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, brought applications for judicial review challenging the scope of investigators' powers under the Health Professions Procedural Code.

They argued that investigators could not compel them to submit to interviews or allow observation of their surgical practices.

The Divisional Court dismissed the applications, holding that the statutory power to 'inquire into and examine the practice' includes the power to observe surgeries, and the incorporation of the Public Inquiries Act grants investigators the power to compel interviews.

The court also dismissed as premature the challenge to the Registrar's decision that there were reasonable and probable grounds to initiate the investigations.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the Discipline Committee of the College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario, which revoked his certificate of registration for sexual abuse and professional misconduct.

The appellant argued for a 'spousal exemption' to the sexual abuse provisions and claimed the legislation was applied retroactively.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the concurrent doctor-patient and sexual relationships met the definition of sexual abuse, no spousal exemption existed, and the legislation was not applied retroactively.

The College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario brought a motion to lift a stay of the revocation of a physician's certificate of registration.

The stay had been granted pending the physician's appeal of a disciplinary finding of sexual abuse involving a patient with whom he had a long-term common-law relationship.

The College argued that a recent appellate decision upholding the mandatory revocation provisions eliminated any serious issue to be tried.

The court dismissed the motion, finding that the physician raised distinct constitutional and factual issues regarding the spousal exception and retroactive punishment, and that the balance of convenience continued to favour maintaining the stay.

The appellant physician engaged in a sexual relationship with a patient and his certificate of registration was revoked pursuant to the mandatory revocation provisions of the Health Professions Procedural Code.

He appealed, arguing the provisions violated sections 7, 12, and 2(d) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the Charter does not protect the purely economic right to practice a profession.

Even if engaged, the provisions did not violate section 7 as they were not unconstitutionally vague or overbroad, did not constitute cruel and unusual punishment under section 12, and did not infringe freedom of association under section 2(d).