Eugene Meehan

The applicants sought to set aside an arbitral award under section 46 of the Arbitration Act, 1991, and moved for leave to introduce fresh evidence.

The court found that the fresh evidence was not relevant to the issues before the arbitrator and would not have affected the outcome.

The application was dismissed as an impermissible appeal of the merits of the arbitration, as the parties had excluded any right of appeal in their agreement.

The court confirmed that section 46 provides only limited grounds for setting aside an award and is not a substitute for an appeal.

Costs were awarded to the respondent.

The moving parties sought leave to appeal a decision of the Superior Court of Justice.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal in writing, awarding costs of $5,000 to the responding party.

The appellants, members of the Blood Tribe, appealed a Federal Court of Appeal decision holding that their treaty land entitlement (TLE) claim under Treaty No. 7 was statute-barred under Alberta's six-year limitation period.

The Blood Tribe argued that no actionable cause of action for breach of treaty rights existed until s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 came into force.

The Supreme Court held that s. 35(1) did not create a cause of action for breach of treaty rights — treaty rights flow from the treaty itself and were enforceable at common law from the date of execution.

Accordingly, the TLE claim was statute-barred.

However, the Court exercised its discretion to grant declaratory relief, finding that the Crown's dishonourable breach of Treaty No. 7 warranted a declaration to promote reconciliation, identify the Crown's misconduct, and assist in restoring the nation-to-nation relationship.

In multiple applications for judicial review challenging the 2020 firearms ban regulations, the applicants sought documentary disclosure from the Governor in Council under Rule 317 of the Federal Courts Rules.

The respondent objected on the basis of Cabinet confidentiality but failed to issue a certificate under section 39 of the Canada Evidence Act.

The Court held that without a valid certificate, the statutory absolute protection from review was not triggered.

Instead, the common law applied, requiring the Court to review the documents to balance the public interest in disclosure against confidentiality.

The Court ordered the respondent to file the materials under seal for the Court's review.

The Applicants sought leave under Rule 302 of the Federal Courts Rules to pursue judicial review of multiple decisions in respect of which relief is sought, specifically challenging up to 600 individual technical opinions made by the RCMP adding firearms to the Firearms Reference Table.

The Court dismissed the motions, finding the Applicants failed to specify which technical opinions they wanted to review, thereby running afoul of Rule 301(c)(ii) and preventing the Court from determining the matters under review or exercising its discretion to make a Rule 302 exception.

The applicant, Laurentian University, brought a motion within its CCAA proceedings to extend the stay of proceedings, approve an amendment to its DIP facility increasing the available funds by $10 million, and approve settlement agreements with its faculty association, staff union, and Huntington University.

The court found that the applicant had acted in good faith and with due diligence, making significant progress in its restructuring.

Despite opposition from Thorneloe University and the University of Sudbury regarding the DIP amendment, the court approved the requested relief, finding the DIP conditions reasonable and the extension necessary for the applicant's continued operations and restructuring efforts.

Thorneloe University brought a motion under section 32(2) of the CCAA to prohibit Laurentian University from disclaiming their Federation Agreement and Financial Distribution Notice.

Laurentian argued the disclaimer was necessary to achieve financial sustainability and present a viable restructuring plan, saving approximately $7.7 million annually.

Thorneloe argued the disclaimer would cause it significant financial hardship and force it into insolvency.

The court balanced the competing interests, giving significant weight to the Monitor's recommendation, and concluded that upholding the disclaimer was the least undesirable choice to prevent the potential collapse of Laurentian University.

The motion was dismissed.

Thorneloe University brought a motion under section 32(2) of the CCAA seeking an order that its Federation Agreement and Financial Distribution Notice with Laurentian University not be disclaimed or resiliated, and to amend the DIP Amendment Agreement.

The court dismissed the motion, with reasons to follow.

Appeal of a Divisional Court decision upholding College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario policies requiring physicians who object to providing certain medical procedures on religious grounds to provide effective referrals to non-objecting providers.

The appellants, individual physicians and physician organizations, challenged the policies as violating their freedom of conscience and religion under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and their equality rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the policies infringe freedom of religion, the infringement is justified under s. 1 of the Charter as a reasonable limit demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.

The court emphasized the importance of equitable patient access to health care services, particularly for vulnerable populations, and the role of family physicians as gatekeepers in the health care system.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal in a proposed privacy class proceeding against Facebook arising from Sponsored Stories.

A majority held the forum selection clause requiring litigation in California should not be enforced in this consumer context, emphasizing gross inequality of bargaining power and the quasi-constitutional significance of privacy rights under British Columbia legislation.

The Court restored the chambers judge’s order refusing a stay so the action could proceed in British Columbia.

An employee was terminated after eight years and four months of employment when her employer sold its assets.

The employment agreement contained a termination clause providing two weeks' notice per year of employment or pay in lieu thereof, stated to be inclusive of all statutory entitlements under the Employment Standards Act, 2000.

The employer paid the employee thirteen weeks' working notice plus a lump sum equivalent to eight weeks' pay, and made benefit contributions during the notice period.

The employee sought damages equivalent to twelve months' notice, arguing the termination clause was unenforceable.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding the clause enforceable but determining that if wrong, reasonable notice would be nine months.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the termination clause unenforceable because it excluded the employer's statutory obligation to contribute to the employee's benefit plans during the notice period and did not clearly satisfy the employer's statutory obligation to pay severance pay.

In a builders’ risk insurance appeal, the appellants sought coverage for replacing windows scratched during post-installation cleaning performed by a contractor.

The insurers relied on an exclusion for the cost of making good faulty workmanship.

The Court held that, in this context, the exclusion removes only the cost of redoing the faulty work itself, while resulting physical damage remains covered.

The Court also held that interpretation of this standard form contract was reviewable for correctness in the circumstances.

The appeals were allowed with costs and the trial judgment was restored.

The appellant, a lawyer, appealed a finding of professional misconduct by the Law Society Appeal Panel related to his uncivil in-court conduct during a lengthy securities fraud trial.

The appellant argued that trial judges, not the Law Society, should oversee in-court conduct and that the Appeal Panel's test for incivility failed to protect zealous advocacy.

The Court of Appeal held that the reasonableness standard of review applied to the Appeal Panel's decision.

The Court found that the Law Society has the statutory authority to discipline lawyers for in-court incivility, independent of a trial judge's actions.

The Court upheld the Appeal Panel's test for incivility and its finding that the appellant's repeated, unfounded allegations of prosecutorial misconduct constituted professional misconduct.

The appeal was dismissed.

The Court allowed the appeal and restored the Federal Court decision dismissing the constitutional challenge to a First Nation election rule requiring Grade 12 education for candidates.

The claimant failed to show that the requirement had a disproportionate discriminatory impact on an enumerated or analogous ground, including age or residence on reserve, because the evidentiary record was insufficient.

This appeal concerns priority for statutory accident benefits under Ontario's no-fault automobile insurance regime after a claimant declined optional rental-counter coverage and was injured in a single-vehicle accident.

The core issue was whether the insurer had a sufficient nexus to the claimant to qualify as an insurer obliged to respond under s. 268 of the Insurance Act and the inter-insurer priority framework.

The Court accepted the appellate reasons below that the arbitrator erred in excluding the insurer from the statutory scheme.

The appeal was allowed and costs were awarded to the appellant.

The appellant was wrongfully dismissed from his position as a union business agent without notice.

During negotiations, the employer offered him the opportunity to return to work to serve out a 24-month working notice period.

The appellant refused to return to work unless certain conditions were met, including the rescission of his termination letter.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a wrongfully dismissed employee may be required to mitigate their damages by returning to work for the same employer, provided the salary and working conditions are substantially the same and the personal relationships are not acrimonious.

The Court found that the appellant's refusal to return to work was objectively unreasonable and constituted a failure to mitigate his damages.

The plaintiffs, claiming to be descendants of the Papaschase Indian Band, brought an action against the Crown for breach of fiduciary duty, fraud, and treaty breach relating to the 1889 surrender of their reserve.

The Crown applied for summary dismissal.

The Supreme Court of Canada restored the chambers judge's order dismissing the action, finding that there was no genuine issue for trial because the claims were barred by the Limitation of Actions Act.

The evidence established that the causes of action were discoverable by the plaintiffs in the 1970s, well beyond the limitation period.

The appellants challenged the province's policy of seeking compensation for fire services fees from individuals involved in motor vehicle accidents, arguing it violated section 7 of the Charter by potentially deterring people from calling for essential services.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that there was no evidence to support this assertion.

The Court also affirmed that section 7 does not protect purely economic interests and that the province's process of establishing liability through the courts accords with fundamental justice.

The appellant religious order operated a residential school and held a claims-made comprehensive general liability policy.

During the policy period, the appellant became aware of allegations of abuse at the school and notified the insurer of potential future claims.

After the policy expired, numerous former students brought actions.

The insurer denied a duty to defend, arguing the claims were not made during the policy period.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the policy was unambiguously a claims-made policy.

Because a 'claim' requires the communication of an intention to hold the insured responsible for damages, and no such intention was communicated by the subsequent plaintiffs during the policy period, the insurer had no duty to defend those actions.

The appellant sued the federal government for sexual battery committed by an employee at a student residence 20 years earlier.

The trial judge awarded pecuniary and non-pecuniary damages, finding the abuse caused the appellant's alcoholism and subsequent loss of earnings.

The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal set aside the pecuniary damages, applying a 'rehearing' standard of review to substitute its own view of the facts.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal in part, holding that the standard of review for findings of fact in Saskatchewan is 'palpable and overriding error', consistent with the rest of Canada.

The Court restored the past loss of earnings award but ordered it reduced for time spent in prison and social assistance received, and upheld the dismissal of the future loss of earnings award.