Eugene Meehan

The appellants, members of the Blood Tribe, appealed a Federal Court of Appeal decision holding that their treaty land entitlement (TLE) claim under Treaty No. 7 was statute-barred under Alberta's six-year limitation period.

The Blood Tribe argued that no actionable cause of action for breach of treaty rights existed until s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 came into force.

The Supreme Court held that s. 35(1) did not create a cause of action for breach of treaty rights — treaty rights flow from the treaty itself and were enforceable at common law from the date of execution.

Accordingly, the TLE claim was statute-barred.

However, the Court exercised its discretion to grant declaratory relief, finding that the Crown's dishonourable breach of Treaty No. 7 warranted a declaration to promote reconciliation, identify the Crown's misconduct, and assist in restoring the nation-to-nation relationship.

The applicant, Laurentian University, brought a motion within its CCAA proceedings to extend the stay of proceedings, approve an amendment to its DIP facility increasing the available funds by $10 million, and approve settlement agreements with its faculty association, staff union, and Huntington University.

The court found that the applicant had acted in good faith and with due diligence, making significant progress in its restructuring.

Despite opposition from Thorneloe University and the University of Sudbury regarding the DIP amendment, the court approved the requested relief, finding the DIP conditions reasonable and the extension necessary for the applicant's continued operations and restructuring efforts.

Thorneloe University brought a motion under section 32(2) of the CCAA to prohibit Laurentian University from disclaiming their Federation Agreement and Financial Distribution Notice.

Laurentian argued the disclaimer was necessary to achieve financial sustainability and present a viable restructuring plan, saving approximately $7.7 million annually.

Thorneloe argued the disclaimer would cause it significant financial hardship and force it into insolvency.

The court balanced the competing interests, giving significant weight to the Monitor's recommendation, and concluded that upholding the disclaimer was the least undesirable choice to prevent the potential collapse of Laurentian University.

The motion was dismissed.

Thorneloe University brought a motion under section 32(2) of the CCAA seeking an order that its Federation Agreement and Financial Distribution Notice with Laurentian University not be disclaimed or resiliated, and to amend the DIP Amendment Agreement.

The court dismissed the motion, with reasons to follow.

Appeal of a Divisional Court decision upholding College of Physicians and Surgeons of Ontario policies requiring physicians who object to providing certain medical procedures on religious grounds to provide effective referrals to non-objecting providers.

The appellants, individual physicians and physician organizations, challenged the policies as violating their freedom of conscience and religion under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms and their equality rights.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that while the policies infringe freedom of religion, the infringement is justified under s. 1 of the Charter as a reasonable limit demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.

The court emphasized the importance of equitable patient access to health care services, particularly for vulnerable populations, and the role of family physicians as gatekeepers in the health care system.

An employee was terminated after eight years and four months of employment when her employer sold its assets.

The employment agreement contained a termination clause providing two weeks' notice per year of employment or pay in lieu thereof, stated to be inclusive of all statutory entitlements under the Employment Standards Act, 2000.

The employer paid the employee thirteen weeks' working notice plus a lump sum equivalent to eight weeks' pay, and made benefit contributions during the notice period.

The employee sought damages equivalent to twelve months' notice, arguing the termination clause was unenforceable.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding the clause enforceable but determining that if wrong, reasonable notice would be nine months.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the termination clause unenforceable because it excluded the employer's statutory obligation to contribute to the employee's benefit plans during the notice period and did not clearly satisfy the employer's statutory obligation to pay severance pay.

In a builders’ risk insurance appeal, the appellants sought coverage for replacing windows scratched during post-installation cleaning performed by a contractor.

The insurers relied on an exclusion for the cost of making good faulty workmanship.

The Court held that, in this context, the exclusion removes only the cost of redoing the faulty work itself, while resulting physical damage remains covered.

The Court also held that interpretation of this standard form contract was reviewable for correctness in the circumstances.

The appeals were allowed with costs and the trial judgment was restored.

The Court allowed the appeal and restored the Federal Court decision dismissing the constitutional challenge to a First Nation election rule requiring Grade 12 education for candidates.

The claimant failed to show that the requirement had a disproportionate discriminatory impact on an enumerated or analogous ground, including age or residence on reserve, because the evidentiary record was insufficient.

This appeal concerns priority for statutory accident benefits under Ontario's no-fault automobile insurance regime after a claimant declined optional rental-counter coverage and was injured in a single-vehicle accident.

The core issue was whether the insurer had a sufficient nexus to the claimant to qualify as an insurer obliged to respond under s. 268 of the Insurance Act and the inter-insurer priority framework.

The Court accepted the appellate reasons below that the arbitrator erred in excluding the insurer from the statutory scheme.

The appeal was allowed and costs were awarded to the appellant.