Thomas Slade

The Crown appealed from the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal's decision acquitting the respondent of refusing to comply with a breath demand.

Police had entered a private driveway to investigate an impaired driving complaint, found the accused asleep in a running truck, knocked on the window without response, then opened the truck door and detected a strong odour of alcohol.

The majority held that police had an implied licence to enter the driveway and knock on the truck window, but exceeded that licence by opening the door, constituting an unreasonable search under s. 8 of the Charter.

However, the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2) given society's strong interest in prosecuting the serious offence.

Four justices dissented, finding that the police exceeded the implied licence from the moment they entered the property with the intent to gather evidence, and that the evidence should be excluded.

The appellant, a school board trustee, appealed the dismissal of his judicial review application challenging sanctions imposed by the Toronto Catholic District School Board for breaching its code of conduct.

The trustee had made inflammatory remarks equating LGBTQ+ individuals with criminals during a public meeting.

The appeal court upheld the Divisional Court's decision, finding that the Board had the authority to reconsider its initial decision (which had not found a breach), that re-litigation doctrines did not apply to the administrative process, and that the Board's decisions reasonably balanced the trustee's Charter rights with its statutory mandate to promote an inclusive school climate.

The appellant mother appealed orders from a motion to change, challenging findings on material change in parenting time, child and spousal support variations due to income changes, and credit for matrimonial home expenses.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the motion judge's findings, emphasizing deference to factual conclusions and proper application of the Federal Child Support Guidelines.

The appellant, a lawyer, sought declarations and mandamus to compel the production of aggregated civil trial data from the Ontario Ministry of the Attorney General (MAG) for research purposes, after his initial requests were denied by MAG and the Chief Justice of the Superior Court.

The application judge denied the requests, finding that declaratory relief would serve no practical purpose and that the open court principle did not extend to requiring the aggregation of bulk data.

On appeal, the Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, upholding the application judge's discretionary decision to deny the declarations on the basis that they would serve no practical purpose.

The court emphasized that control over judicial information rests with the judiciary, not MAG, rendering declarations against MAG ineffective.

The Attorney General of Canada was initially named as a respondent but the application against it was abandoned.

The appellants, members of the Blood Tribe, appealed a Federal Court of Appeal decision holding that their treaty land entitlement (TLE) claim under Treaty No. 7 was statute-barred under Alberta's six-year limitation period.

The Blood Tribe argued that no actionable cause of action for breach of treaty rights existed until s. 35(1) of the Constitution Act, 1982 came into force.

The Supreme Court held that s. 35(1) did not create a cause of action for breach of treaty rights — treaty rights flow from the treaty itself and were enforceable at common law from the date of execution.

Accordingly, the TLE claim was statute-barred.

However, the Court exercised its discretion to grant declaratory relief, finding that the Crown's dishonourable breach of Treaty No. 7 warranted a declaration to promote reconciliation, identify the Crown's misconduct, and assist in restoring the nation-to-nation relationship.

The appellants appealed a motion judge's decision regarding a fee-sharing agreement between two law firms.

The appellants raised three issues: (1) the calculation of net fees under the agreement; (2) the imposition of liability on the corporate appellant based on a constructive trust; and (3) the costs award.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's findings on all three issues, dismissing the appeal with costs awarded to the respondent.

On appeal from a damages award of $532,000 in a trespass and nuisance case, the appellants challenged the trial judge's quantification of damages, arguing the respondents failed to establish a reasonable and reliable basis for the award and should receive only nominal damages.

The Court of Appeal upheld the trial judge's decision, finding no error in her approach to damages assessment despite imperfect record-keeping by the respondent.

The trial judge properly considered gaps in evidence, the impact of the recession, and made reasonable inferences about lost productivity caused by the appellants' conduct.

The appellant, J.P.1, appealed convictions for sexual interference and invitation to sexual touching.

The appeal court found that the trial judge committed an error of law by engaging in circular reasoning when assessing credibility, effectively presuming the appellant's guilt before adequately considering the third branch of the R. v. W.(D.) analysis.

The trial judge's rejection of the appellant's evidence was based on a "common sense" conclusion that required first accepting the complainant's evidence as true.

The appeal was allowed, convictions set aside, and a new trial ordered.

The Court held that the private use exception in child pornography prosecutions has three elements: lawful sexual activity, consent to recording, and strict private use.

Exploitation is assessed within the lawfulness inquiry, not as a separate extra requirement.

Because the trial judge failed to assess exploitation holistically under s. 153, legal error materially affected the acquittals and a new trial was ordered.

An association representing justices of the peace brought an application seeking a declaration that existing pension arrangements—under which justices of the peace participate in the provincial public servants’ pension plan—violate the constitutional principle of judicial independence.

The respondent argued that the application should not proceed because the issue was currently before the Justice of the Peace Remuneration Commission.

The court held that although it possessed inherent jurisdiction to determine constitutional questions, courts should ordinarily refrain from intervening before specialized administrative processes are completed.

Given that the Commission was actively considering the same issue and could provide an informed report, the court found the application premature.

The application was therefore adjourned pending the Commission’s report.