Pouria Tabrizi-Reardigan

The Crown appealed from the Saskatchewan Court of Appeal's decision acquitting the respondent of refusing to comply with a breath demand.

Police had entered a private driveway to investigate an impaired driving complaint, found the accused asleep in a running truck, knocked on the window without response, then opened the truck door and detected a strong odour of alcohol.

The majority held that police had an implied licence to enter the driveway and knock on the truck window, but exceeded that licence by opening the door, constituting an unreasonable search under s. 8 of the Charter.

However, the evidence should not be excluded under s. 24(2) given society's strong interest in prosecuting the serious offence.

Four justices dissented, finding that the police exceeded the implied licence from the moment they entered the property with the intent to gather evidence, and that the evidence should be excluded.

The appellant was convicted of criminal negligence causing death and criminal negligence causing bodily harm following a head-on collision.

The sentencing judge imposed discretionary driving prohibition orders under s. 320.24(4) of the Criminal Code.

The central issue was whether s. 320.24(4), enacted by Bill C-46, authorizes a driving prohibition upon conviction for criminal negligence offences (ss. 220 and 221), which are not enumerated in that provision.

The majority held that driving prohibitions imposed were unlawful because the criminal negligence offences are not enumerated in s. 320.24(4), the included offence machinery does not extend to imply punishments, and Parliament's deliberate textual evolution of the provision supports exclusion of general criminal negligence offences.

Four judges dissented, holding that a finding of guilt for a principal offence necessarily entails findings of guilt for all lesser included offences and that the exclusion produces an absurd result.

The Crown appealed a Court of Appeal decision that set aside the respondent's jury convictions for unlawful act manslaughter and unlawfully causing bodily harm in relation to two foster children who suffered severe malnutrition and dehydration in the respondent's care.

The Court of Appeal majority had found errors in the trial judge's mens rea instructions for the predicate offence of failing to provide necessaries of life under s. 215 of the Criminal Code, specifically regarding intermingling of foreseeability standards and failure to address the accused's circumstances as a secondary caregiver.

The Supreme Court majority held that the functional approach to jury charge review was not met for intervention, as the charge as a whole properly conveyed the requisite mens rea despite imperfections.

A concurring minority would have found the charge deficient but applied the curative proviso on the basis that no substantial wrong or miscarriage of justice resulted.

The appeal was allowed and convictions restored.

The appellant was acquitted of armed robbery at trial after the trial judge concluded the Crown failed to prove both that the appellant was a principal offender and that two specifically named individuals were the principal offenders, which the judge held was a prerequisite to party liability.

The Saskatchewan Court of Appeal allowed the Crown's appeal, finding the trial judge erred in requiring proof of the identity of specific principals as a prerequisite for party liability, but limited the new trial to the party liability theory only.

The majority of the Supreme Court agreed the trial judge erred in law in assessing party liability, as the Crown need not identify specific principals when prosecuting an accused as an abettor or counsellor.

The Court dismissed the appellant's appeal but allowed the Crown's appeal, holding that the Court of Appeal exceeded its powers under s. 686(8) of the Criminal Code by restricting the new trial to a single theory of liability on a single charge.

A full new trial was ordered on the armed robbery charge, and the doctrine of issue estoppel was found inapplicable where the acquittal was set aside in its entirety.