Julie Morgan

The appellant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder following a jury trial in which he was self-represented and frequently excluded from the courtroom due to chronic disruptive conduct.

The trial judge appointed amicus curiae partway through the trial with a limited mandate to cross-examine Crown witnesses but instructed not to advocate on behalf of the defence.

The appellant argued that the delayed and limited appointment created an appearance of unfairness rising to the level of a miscarriage of justice under s. 686(1)(a)(iii) of the Criminal Code.

The Supreme Court affirmed that amicus can perform a broad spectrum of adversarial functions, including closing argument, without essentially becoming defence counsel, provided the appointment respects the accused's right to control their own defence and the amicus's duty of loyalty to the court.

The Court held that no miscarriage of justice arose on the facts, as the trial judge's discretionary decisions were not shown to have created an irregularity of sufficient gravity to shake public confidence in the administration of justice.

The appellant was part of a group that entered an apartment and assaulted several occupants, one of whom died from a single stab wound.

The trial judge acquitted the appellant on the basis that the Crown had not proven beyond a reasonable doubt that he inflicted the fatal stab wound.

The Court of Appeal set aside the acquittal and entered a conviction, holding that the trial judge erred in law by failing to assess the appellant's culpability as a co-principal to manslaughter.

The Supreme Court dismissed the appeal, affirming that the stabbing was not a discrete act outside the scope of the group attack.

The Court also clarified that joint/co-principal liability is not automatically eliminated merely because force was applied by only a single perpetrator, and that triers of fact should focus on whether an accused's actions were a significant contributing cause of death.

Two accused appealed convictions for failing to provide the necessaries of life to their son.

The court agreed with the dissenting appellate reasons that the trial judge conflated actus reus and mens rea and inadequately explained marked departure to the jury.

The appeals were allowed, the convictions were quashed, and a new trial was ordered.

The accused appealed a sexual assault conviction, alleging unreasonable verdict and misapprehension of evidence.

The Court adopted the majority appellate reasons and held that the trial judge had properly assessed the evidentiary record.

The conviction was upheld and the appeal was dismissed.

The Court considered the legal meaning of the phrase "her mind is then disturbed" in the infanticide provision of the Criminal Code.

It held that the phrase carries its ordinary meaning, does not require proof of a defined mental disorder, and sets a broad, flexible standard tied to childbirth or lactation effects at the time of the act.

Applying that standard, the Court found no reversible legal error in the trial judge's approach and upheld the infanticide verdicts and acquittals on murder counts.

The Crown's appeal was dismissed.

The Court held that the private use exception in child pornography prosecutions has three elements: lawful sexual activity, consent to recording, and strict private use.

Exploitation is assessed within the lawfulness inquiry, not as a separate extra requirement.

Because the trial judge failed to assess exploitation holistically under s. 153, legal error materially affected the acquittals and a new trial was ordered.