The appellant was convicted of two counts of first degree murder following a jury trial in which he was self-represented and frequently excluded from the courtroom due to chronic disruptive conduct.
The trial judge appointed amicus curiae partway through the trial with a limited mandate to cross-examine Crown witnesses but instructed not to advocate on behalf of the defence.
The appellant argued that the delayed and limited appointment created an appearance of unfairness rising to the level of a miscarriage of justice under s. 686(1)(a)(iii) of the Criminal Code.
The Supreme Court affirmed that amicus can perform a broad spectrum of adversarial functions, including closing argument, without essentially becoming defence counsel, provided the appointment respects the accused's right to control their own defence and the amicus's duty of loyalty to the court.
The Court held that no miscarriage of justice arose on the facts, as the trial judge's discretionary decisions were not shown to have created an irregularity of sufficient gravity to shake public confidence in the administration of justice.
