Jolaine Antonio

In a criminal appeal concerning circumstantial proof of possession of child pornography, the Court clarified that alternative inferences consistent with innocence may arise from evidence or absence of evidence, but must be reasonable rather than speculative.

The Court held there is no mandatory formula for circumstantial-evidence instructions, though juries should be cautioned against inferential gap-filling and premature conclusions.

Reading the trial reasons as a whole, the Court found no reversible legal error in the treatment of inferences, burden, or standard of proof.

The guilty verdict was held reasonable on the totality of the evidence.

The acquittal was set aside and Charter ss. 8 and 24(2) issues were remanded to the provincial appellate court.

The Court held that the private use exception in child pornography prosecutions has three elements: lawful sexual activity, consent to recording, and strict private use.

Exploitation is assessed within the lawfulness inquiry, not as a separate extra requirement.

Because the trial judge failed to assess exploitation holistically under s. 153, legal error materially affected the acquittals and a new trial was ordered.

The Court dismissed the appeal from a second degree murder conviction.

The majority held the defence of provocation lacked an air of reality on the subjective element, particularly suddenness, and should not have been left to the jury, but affirmed the conviction.

A concurring judge would have held the defence was properly left to the jury, yet also dismissed the appeal on the Court of Appeal majority’s reasoning.

In a murder appeal, the Court considered whether the trial judge improperly relied on the common sense inference on intent without first assessing all evidence bearing on the accused’s mental state.

The Court held that there was no legal error because the trial judge had reviewed the full evidentiary record relevant to intent, including alcohol consumption and surrounding circumstances, before applying the inference.

The Court also refused fresh psychiatric evidence, finding lack of due diligence and no reasonable possibility that the proposed evidence would have changed the verdict under the Palmer test.

The conviction for second degree murder therefore stood.

Media organizations challenged the constitutionality of the mandatory publication ban on bail hearing information under s. 517 of the Criminal Code, arguing it unjustifiably infringed freedom of expression under s. 2(b) of the Charter.

The Supreme Court of Canada upheld the constitutionality of the provision.

The Court found that while the mandatory ban limits freedom of expression, it is justified under s. 1 of the Charter.

The ban's objectives of safeguarding the right to a fair trial and ensuring expeditious bail hearings are pressing and substantial.

The mandatory nature of the ban is rationally connected to these objectives, minimally impairs freedom of expression given its temporary nature and limited scope, and its salutary effects outweigh its deleterious effects.

The police accepted an invitation from a high school principal to bring sniffer dogs into the school to search for drugs.

The police had no specific knowledge of drugs present and conducted a random search while students were confined to classrooms.

A sniffer dog reacted to the respondent's unattended backpack in the gymnasium.

The police opened the backpack without a warrant and found illicit drugs.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that the dog sniff constituted a search under s. 8 of the Charter.

The Court found that while police possess a common law power to use sniffer dogs based on reasonable suspicion, the search in this case was random and lacked reasonable suspicion, thus violating s. 8.

The evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, and the acquittal was upheld.

The appellant was stopped by an RCMP officer at a bus terminal based on suspicious behaviour.

The officer called for a sniffer dog, which indicated the presence of drugs in the appellant's bag.

The appellant was arrested and a search of the bag revealed cocaine and heroin.

The Supreme Court of Canada held that a dog sniff constitutes a search under s. 8 of the Charter.

While the police have a common law power to use sniffer dogs based on a standard of reasonable suspicion, the officer in this case did not have sufficient grounds to meet that standard.

The search was therefore unreasonable, and the evidence was excluded under s. 24(2) of the Charter, resulting in the appeal being allowed and the conviction set aside.

The appellant, who grew marijuana for medical purposes, was charged with unlawfully producing cannabis and elected to be tried by a judge and jury.

At trial, the judge directed the jury to return a guilty verdict and told them they were bound to abide by his direction.

The jury returned a guilty verdict, which was upheld by the Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court of Canada allowed the appeal, holding that the trial judge deprived the appellant of his constitutional right to a trial by jury under s. 11(f) of the Charter by usurping the jury's function.

The Court further held that the curative proviso in s. 686(1)(b)(iii) of the Criminal Code could not apply because there was, in effect, no jury trial at all.

A new trial was ordered.