Rocco Galati

The plaintiffs, comprising 473 individuals, brought an action against the Ontario government and 54 non-governmental healthcare entities, challenging COVID-19 vaccination policies and public health measures.

The defendants moved to strike the statement of claim.

The court granted the motion, finding it lacked jurisdiction over unionized employees and physicians whose claims were subject to exclusive statutory regimes.

The court also found the action to be an abuse of process due to its prejudicial scope and frivolous pleadings.

Furthermore, the court held that the statement of claim failed to disclose a reasonable cause of action for conspiracy, intimidation, intentional infliction of mental anguish, and Charter breaches.

The claim was struck in its entirety, with leave to amend.

This is a costs endorsement following the successful dismissal of a Strategic Lawsuit Against Public Participation (SLAPP) action against media defendants (Corus and JNN defendants) under section 137.1(3) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court determined that the successful defendants were entitled to full indemnity costs, as per the statutory presumption in section 137.1(7) of the CJA, finding no factors to displace this presumption.

The plaintiff failed to file responding costs submissions.

The court awarded the Corus defendants $92,820.00 in legal fees plus HST and disbursements, and the JNN defendants $66,402.00 in legal fees plus HST and disbursements, totaling $79,443.78.

The decision emphasizes the complexity and length of anti-SLAPP motions in justifying the quantum of costs.

This case involves two anti-SLAPP motions brought by media defendants (Global News, Corus Entertainment, and Jornal North News) to dismiss a defamation lawsuit filed by a former immigration lawyer.

The lawyer alleged defamation stemming from reports about his involvement in an alleged "Pilot Project" for undocumented workers, which government officials denied existed.

The court dismissed the defamation claims, finding that the media expressions related to a matter of public interest, the plaintiff failed to show substantial merit to his claim, and the defendants had valid defenses of truth/justification and responsible communication.

The court also found that any harm suffered by the plaintiff did not outweigh the public interest in protecting freedom of expression.

The plaintiffs, two physicians, brought a $12 million defamation action against over 20 defendants, including other physicians, journalists, and media organizations.

The claims arose from two main disputes: an internal Ontario Medical Association (OMA) dispute and public criticism of the plaintiffs' controversial tweets regarding COVID-19, in which they opposed vaccines and lockdowns and promoted hydroxychloroquine.

The defendants brought anti-SLAPP motions under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found that the defendants' expressions related to matters of public interest and that the plaintiffs failed to show their claims had substantial merit or that the defendants lacked valid defences, such as fair comment and qualified privilege.

The court also found that the public interest in protecting the defendants' expressions far outweighed any harm suffered by the plaintiffs.

The action was dismissed against all defendants.

The appellant, Annabelle Maritza Edgeworth, appealed an order which dismissed most of the claims in her action.

Her action alleged that the respondents (lawyers, an insurer, and a medical assessor) conspired to suppress a defence medical report in a prior personal injury case, leading to claims for unlawful means conspiracy, intrusion on seclusion, conspiracy to injure, and misrepresentation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's decision, finding that a failure to comply with a procedural rule (r. 33.06) was not a "wrongful act" for unlawful means conspiracy, and the intrusion on seclusion claim failed as the medical examination was consented to.

The court also affirmed the removal of the appellant's counsel due to a conflict of interest.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

The Attorney General of Ontario requested in writing that the applicants' Charter challenge against various COVID-19 public health measures be dismissed as frivolous and vexatious under Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court declined to dismiss the application at this stage, noting that Rule 2.1 is a blunt instrument reserved for the clearest of cases.

Without a full record and legal argument, the court could not conclude that the application was plainly frivolous or vexatious on its face, and directed the parties to schedule a case conference.

Following a motion to strike portions of an amended counterclaim where the moving party achieved mixed but overall greater success, the parties made written submissions on costs.

The moving party sought $7,784.53 on a partial indemnity basis, while the responding party argued for no costs or costs in the cause.

The court found the moving party's claimed fees excessive given the motion's lack of complexity and short duration.

Costs were fixed at $4,235 inclusive of disbursements and HST, payable by the responding party within 30 days.

This motion concerned an application to strike portions of an amended counterclaim pursuant to Rules 21 and 25 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The moving party sought to strike paragraphs alleging punitive damages, narrative context, and various torts, arguing no reasonable cause of action was disclosed, or that the pleading was frivolous, vexatious, or pleaded evidence.

The court granted the motion in part, striking several paragraphs for failing to concisely plead material facts or for ambiguity regarding the causes of action, with leave to amend.

Claims for punitive damages and certain allegations related to abuse of process were allowed to stand.

An extension of time to file a statement of defence was also granted.

A lawyer appealed the dismissal of an application for a declaration that sections 267.5(1) and 280 of the Insurance Act violate the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms.

The application judge found the appellant lacked both private and public interest standing to bring the application.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding that the appellant failed to demonstrate that the impugned provisions affected him personally and directly, and that his scholarly contributions and representation of affected clients did not establish a genuine interest in the outcome or demonstrate that the application was a reasonable and effective way to bring the issue before the courts.

Foreign nationals released from immigration detention on terms amounting to virtual house arrest sought habeas corpus relief when their application to modify the conditions was rejected.

The application judge dismissed the application, finding that habeas corpus was unavailable because the applicants were not held in custody.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that habeas corpus applies to any deprivation of liberty, not merely incarceration in a custodial facility.

The court remitted the matter to the Superior Court of Justice to determine whether the remaining requirements for habeas corpus were satisfied.

The appellants, Chinese and Dominican citizens detained by the Canada Border Services Agency in immigration proceedings, appealed a Superior Court order dismissing their application for a writ of habeas corpus.

The lower court found no deprivation of liberty and dismissed the application.

The Court of Appeal addressed a jurisdictional issue regarding whether the appeal should proceed to the Divisional Court under section 8(1) of the Habeas Corpus Act or to the Court of Appeal under section 6(1)(b) of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court held that because the lower court's dismissal was based on a finding of no deprivation of liberty, the statutory criteria in section 8(1) of the Habeas Corpus Act were not met, and therefore the appeal properly lay to the Court of Appeal.

This decision concerns a costs award following the dismissal of the applicant's constitutional challenge to sections of the Insurance Act.

The court had previously found the applicant lacked standing and that the challenge failed on its merits.

The applicant argued for no costs, citing public interest, or a reduced award based on public sector salaries of Crown counsel.

The court rejected both arguments, stating that the litigation was speculative and without merit, and that costs for Crown lawyers are not reduced due to their salaried status.

The court fixed costs at $50,000, payable by the applicant to the Province of Ontario, which represented approximately one-third of a reasonable claim.

The applicant, a personal injury lawyer, challenged the constitutionality of sections 267.5(1) and 280 of the Insurance Act, which limit pre-trial recovery of lost income and grant sole jurisdiction to the Licence Appeal Tribunal for Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule disputes, respectively.

The court dismissed the application, finding the applicant lacked both private and public interest standing.

On the merits, the court found no breach of sections 15(1) or 7 of the Charter of Rights and Freedoms, nor a violation of section 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867, as the impugned provisions did not create distinctions based on prohibited grounds, deprive individuals of life, liberty, or security of the person, or usurp superior court jurisdiction for a novel area of law.

The applicants, foreign nationals under house arrest due to immigration proceedings, sought a writ of habeas corpus or modification of their release terms.

The Attorney General of Canada opposed and brought a preliminary motion for a stay based on lack of jurisdiction, arguing that house arrest does not constitute "detention" for habeas corpus purposes.

The court dismissed the application, finding that house arrest, while restrictive, does not amount to detention or a deprivation of liberty in the context of habeas corpus, distinguishing it from jail or imprisonment.

The court noted that the applicants had alternative remedies through the Immigration Division and Federal Court for modifying release terms.

The plaintiffs, former employees of an automobile dealership, sued police and others for damages after a criminal investigation led to the dealership's closure and their job loss.

The defendants moved for an order striking out the plaintiffs’ Statements of Claim.

The court dismissed the negligent investigation claim, finding no private law duty of care owed by police to employees of a suspect.

It granted leave to amend for civil conspiracy and misfeasance in public office claims, but struck other intentional tort claims without leave.

Following a successful summary judgment motion and a related failed consolidation motion across two related civil actions, the court determined the appropriate costs awards.

The successful plaintiffs sought substantial costs exceeding $670,000 based on partial indemnity prior to an offer to settle and substantial indemnity thereafter under Rule 49 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court accepted that the offer to settle triggered substantial indemnity costs but found the overall request disproportionate to the complexity and expectations of the losing party.

The requested amount was reduced by half while still recognizing the Rule 49 consequences.

In the related action, defendants resisting consolidation were awarded substantial indemnity costs due to litigation tactics that unnecessarily increased complexity.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for summary judgment to recover unpaid fees under a consulting agreement and returns under a letter of credit agreement related to a wind power project.

The defendants resisted, arguing there were credibility issues requiring a trial and challenging the constitutionality of Rule 20 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found no genuine issues of credibility, as the defendants' assertions contradicted the clear documentary evidence.

The court also dismissed the constitutional challenge, holding that Rule 20 does not violate section 7 of the Charter or unwritten constitutional principles of judicial independence.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiffs.

On an appeal concerning judicial appointment eligibility under s. 98 of the Constitution Act, 1867, the appellants challenged the interpretation adopted by the Quebec Court of Appeal.

The Supreme Court held that the appellants failed to demonstrate any interpretive error in the lower court's analysis of s. 98.

Arguments relying on the prior reference regarding ss. 5 and 6 of the Supreme Court Act were rejected as inapplicable because the constitutional and statutory contexts differed.

The appeal was dismissed for essentially the reasons given by the Quebec Court of Appeal.