15 total
Anti-SLAPP motion granted dismissing conspiracy claim against journalists for publishing leaked CSIS information about foreign interference.
The plaintiff, a municipal politician, sued two journalists for unlawful means conspiracy, alleging they conspired with confidential CSIS sources to illegally leak and publish classified information portraying him as an agent of the Chinese government.
The journalists brought a motion to dismiss the action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act (s. 137.1).
The court granted the motion, finding that the articles related to matters of public interest (foreign interference).
The court held that the plaintiff failed to show the conspiracy claim had substantial merit, as there was no evidence the journalists agreed to anything beyond protecting their sources' identities, nor did they engage in unlawful conduct.
Furthermore, the public interest in protecting investigative journalism and confidential sources on matters of national security outweighed the harm suffered by the plaintiff.
The Court of Appeal dismissed a dog-sledding company's appeal of an anti-SLAPP dismissal, confirming that a finding of abuse is not required under section 137.1.
The Court of Appeal for Ontario dismissed Windrift Adventures Incorporated’s appeal from the dismissal of its defamation action under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.
The court found no error in the motion judge’s conclusion that the action lacked substantial merit and that the harm suffered was not sufficiently serious to outweigh the public interest in protecting the respondents’ expression.
The court also rejected the appellant’s argument that a finding of “abuse” is required for dismissal under s. 137.1, clarifying that the test remains as set out in Pointes Protection Association.
Defamation action against investigative journalists dismissed under anti-SLAPP legislation.
The defendants, including CTV and several journalists, brought a motion under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act to dismiss the plaintiff's defamation action arising from a W5 investigative report on dog sledding operations.
The court granted the motion, finding that the expression related to a matter of public interest.
The plaintiff failed to establish that its defamation claim had substantial merit, as the impugned broadcasts did not identify the plaintiff or lacked essential elements of defamation.
Furthermore, the plaintiff could not show that the defendants lacked valid defences of justification, fair comment, and responsible communication, nor that the harm suffered outweighed the public interest in protecting the expression.
Full indemnity costs awarded to successful defendants on anti-SLAPP motion, with minor reductions for non-active counsel.
Following the successful dismissal of the plaintiffs' defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act, the moving parties (defendants) sought full indemnity costs totalling over $1.1 million.
The court awarded full indemnity costs as requested, subject to a reduction for the costs of non-active counsel, clerks, or students.
The court also apportioned liability, finding one plaintiff jointly and severally liable only for costs related to the OMA dispute, while the other plaintiff was solely liable for costs related to the COVID-19 dispute.
Defamation action against physicians and journalists criticizing COVID-19 misinformation dismissed under anti-SLAPP legislation.
The plaintiffs, two physicians, brought a $12 million defamation action against over 20 defendants, including other physicians, journalists, and media organizations.
The claims arose from two main disputes: an internal Ontario Medical Association (OMA) dispute and public criticism of the plaintiffs' controversial tweets regarding COVID-19, in which they opposed vaccines and lockdowns and promoted hydroxychloroquine.
The defendants brought anti-SLAPP motions under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.
The court found that the defendants' expressions related to matters of public interest and that the plaintiffs failed to show their claims had substantial merit or that the defendants lacked valid defences, such as fair comment and qualified privilege.
The court also found that the public interest in protecting the defendants' expressions far outweighed any harm suffered by the plaintiffs.
The action was dismissed against all defendants.
The court struck out the plaintiffs' multimillion-dollar claims against an airline for missed flights caused by their own immigration issues.
The plaintiffs sued airlines for significant losses, including the loss of a traditional title and the death of their daughter, after Lawrence Mpamugo was denied entry to the United States, preventing them from taking their booked flights to Nigeria.
Defendant Delta Air Lines, Inc. moved to dismiss the claims for disclosing no reasonable cause of action.
The court found that the claims in contract and negligence were not supported by law, as airlines are not liable for passengers' immigration issues, and the Montreal Convention limits liability to damages occasioned by delay in carriage, not denial of entry.
The court dismissed the claims against Delta, allowing only a potential claim for a refund of unused tickets to be transferred to Small Claims Court.
The Court of Appeal awarded $8,000 in appeal costs to the appellant, distinguishing between motion and appeal costs.
This is a costs endorsement on appeal from a Superior Court decision.
The appellant, Bondfield Construction Company Limited, appealed from orders of Justice E.M. Morgan dated March 28, 2018 and May 29, 2018.
The respondents, The Globe and Mail Inc. and associated journalists, had brought a motion.
The Court of Appeal addressed whether CCAA proceedings against Bondfield precluded the court from addressing cost issues relating to the appeal.
The court found no reason to depart from the presumption in section 137.1(8) regarding costs on the motion, resulting in no order as to costs.
However, regarding costs on the appeal, the court awarded costs to Bondfield in the amount of $8,000, inclusive of disbursements and relevant taxes, noting that the jurisprudential landscape had shifted significantly between the motion and the appeal.
The Court of Appeal clarified the anti-SLAPP threshold, allowing a defamation action to proceed.
Bondfield Construction Company Limited appealed the dismissal of its defamation action against The Globe and Mail Inc. under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act (anti-SLAPP provision).
The motion judge had dismissed the action, finding that Bondfield failed to meet the requirement to show that the defendants had "no valid defence whatsoever." The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, holding that the motion judge had misinterpreted the statutory threshold.
The correct test requires the plaintiff to show only that a reasonable trier could conclude that the defendant did not have a valid defence, not that the defendant has no defence whatsoever.
The court found that Bondfield met this lower threshold regarding the defences of fair comment and responsible communication.
On the public interest balancing analysis, the court found that the case had none of the hallmarks of a classic SLAPP suit and should proceed to trial on its merits.
Defendants awarded $500,000 in substantial indemnity costs following successful anti-SLAPP dismissal of defamation action.
Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's $125 million defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act, the successful defendants sought full indemnity costs of over $650,000 pursuant to s. 137.1(7).
The plaintiff argued for no costs or modest partial indemnity costs, noting the claim had substantial merit but was dismissed because the defendants had a potentially valid defence.
Balancing the statutory presumption of full indemnity costs against the close nature of the ruling, the court awarded costs to the defendants on a substantial indemnity scale, fixed at $500,000.
The court dismissed an application by police officers for a publication ban on a presumptively open Information to Obtain.
The applicants, three police officers charged with sexual assault, sought to vary a sealing order to prohibit publication of information from an Information to Obtain (ITO) DNA warrants, arguing it was necessary to preserve trial fairness and prevent witness tainting and stigmatization.
The Crown supported the ban for consistency with a prior publication ban on conflict motion materials.
The media respondents opposed the ban.
The court dismissed the application, finding the applicants failed to provide sufficient evidence to meet the Dagenais/Mentuck test for a publication ban, which requires demonstrating a serious risk to the proper administration of justice that cannot be prevented by alternative measures, and that the salutary effects outweigh the deleterious effects on freedom of expression and public right to know.
The court emphasized the presumptive openness of warrant materials and the public interest in the investigation of police officers.
Appeal on merits dismissed but costs award varied due to lack of opportunity for submissions.
The appellant appealed a summary judgment dismissing his action against the respondent.
The Court of Appeal upheld the motion judge's finding that the statement that the appellant quit was res judicata and protected by qualified privilege.
However, the Court intervened on the costs award, finding the appellant did not have a fair opportunity to make submissions and the respondent failed to provide information about the costs of the action.
The costs award for the summary judgment motion was fixed at $15,000, with the balance of the action's costs to be assessed.
No costs were awarded for the appeal due to divided success.
Respondents awarded $125,000 in appeal costs after a reduction for duplication of counsel and divided success.
Following the dismissal of the appellant's appeal on liability and partial success on the costs appeal, the respondents sought costs of the appeal totaling $675,880.87.
The appellant argued for no costs or a significantly reduced amount due to divided success and duplication of counsel by the amalgamated municipal respondents.
The Court of Appeal awarded the respondents one set of costs, fixed at $125,000, reflecting the straightforward nature of the legal issues, the duplication of argument, and the appellant's partial success on the costs appeal.
Appeal of misfeasance claim dismissed; costs award significantly reduced due to amalgamation and scale errors.
The appellant, operator of a retirement home, appealed the dismissal of its action for misfeasance in public office against the City of Hamilton and the Regional Municipality of Hamilton-Wentworth, arising from an order to comply issued in 1994.
The appellant also appealed the trial judge's costs award of over $4 million.
The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the misfeasance claim, finding the public officials acted lawfully and in good faith to protect vulnerable residents.
However, the Court allowed the appeal on costs, reducing the award to a partial indemnity scale and adjusting for duplication of counsel after the City and Region amalgamated.
Appeal dismissed; statute prevails over Rules of Court regarding notice requirements.
The self-represented appellant appealed an order of the Superior Court of Justice.
The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding no error in the lower court's decision.
The Court held that the applicable statute prevailed over the Rules of Court regarding notice requirements, meaning notice was not required.
Consequently, there was no breach of natural justice or procedural fairness, and the judges below had jurisdiction to make their orders.
Costs of $2,500 were awarded to the respondent.
Statutory protection defeated the claim and the appeal failed.
The appellant challenged a trial judgment holding that s. 13 of the Public Hospital Act answered the claim arising from a memo written by the respondent in the course of the business of a medical education committee.
The Court of Appeal agreed that the memo was written during an investigation or other business of the committee and saw no reason to disturb the finding of good faith.
Although leave to appeal the costs aspect was granted, the court held nothing had been shown to displace the usual order for part-and-party costs.
The appeal was dismissed and appeal costs were awarded to the respondent.