Susan A. Toth

Following the successful dismissal of the plaintiffs' defamation action under the anti-SLAPP provisions of the Courts of Justice Act, the moving parties (defendants) sought full indemnity costs totalling over $1.1 million.

The court awarded full indemnity costs as requested, subject to a reduction for the costs of non-active counsel, clerks, or students.

The court also apportioned liability, finding one plaintiff jointly and severally liable only for costs related to the OMA dispute, while the other plaintiff was solely liable for costs related to the COVID-19 dispute.

The plaintiffs, two physicians, brought a $12 million defamation action against over 20 defendants, including other physicians, journalists, and media organizations.

The claims arose from two main disputes: an internal Ontario Medical Association (OMA) dispute and public criticism of the plaintiffs' controversial tweets regarding COVID-19, in which they opposed vaccines and lockdowns and promoted hydroxychloroquine.

The defendants brought anti-SLAPP motions under s. 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The court found that the defendants' expressions related to matters of public interest and that the plaintiffs failed to show their claims had substantial merit or that the defendants lacked valid defences, such as fair comment and qualified privilege.

The court also found that the public interest in protecting the defendants' expressions far outweighed any harm suffered by the plaintiffs.

The action was dismissed against all defendants.

The defendant brought a motion to quash two summonses to witness issued by the plaintiffs, which sought to examine two of the defendant's lawyers on pending interlocutory motions regarding the sale of jointly owned property.

The court quashed the summonses on three grounds: failure to comply with service requirements under the Rules of Civil Procedure, failure to demonstrate that the lawyers' evidence was relevant and necessary, and abuse of process.

The court found the summonses were issued for ulterior purposes, including gathering evidence for a separate action against the lawyers and attempting to create a conflict of interest to preclude them from acting as counsel.

This was a costs decision following the plaintiff's unsuccessful motion to certify a proposed class proceeding alleging breach of fiduciary duty, knowing assistance, knowing receipt, breach of contract, and oppression.

The court reviewed the general costs principles under s. 131 of the Courts of Justice Act, rule 57.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, and the specific principles governing class proceedings costs, emphasizing fairness, reasonableness, and access to justice.

Although the successful defendants sought substantial indemnity costs based on serious unproven allegations and the continued pursuit of non-certifiable claims, the court held the action was not frivolous or vexatious and declined punitive costs.

Partial indemnity costs were awarded in the amounts claimed by the successful defendants.

The plaintiff brought a motion to certify a class action against her investment advisors and related corporations, alleging breach of fiduciary duty, knowing assistance, knowing receipt, breach of contract, and oppression in relation to the sale of promissory notes.

The court dismissed the certification motion, finding that the claims did not satisfy the cause of action, common issues, and preferable procedure criteria under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

The court held that the existence of a fiduciary duty and any breach thereof would require individualized assessments, and that the secondary claims for knowing assistance and knowing receipt were similarly flawed and lacked a basis in fact.

This is a costs endorsement following the Court of Appeal's decision on an appeal of a wrongful dismissal case.

The appellant insurance company sought to reduce the respondent employee's damages by challenging the reasonable notice period and bonus entitlements.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal in part, reducing the notice period but dismissing other arguments.

The respondent sought clarification on bonus entitlements and the parties exchanged submissions on costs.

The Court declined to entertain new arguments raised by the appellant at the costs stage and awarded costs to the respondent.

A senior vice president with 37 years of service was terminated without cause following a minor dispute over promotional sporting event tickets.

The motion judge awarded 30 months' notice and full bonus entitlements during the notice period.

On appeal, the employer challenged both the notice period and the bonus entitlement.

The Court of Appeal reduced the notice period to 24 months, finding no exceptional circumstances warranting a longer period.

However, the court upheld the bonus entitlement, finding that while the termination provision in the bonus plans was unambiguous and would have limited the employee's entitlement, the provision was unenforceable because it was not properly communicated to the employee by the employer.

An incumbent city councillor sued his political opponent and members of her campaign team, along with a local radio station, for defamation arising from statements made during a municipal election campaign.

The defendant candidate had referenced the plaintiff's dated sexual assault conviction and characterized it as consistent with a pattern of bullying and intimidation.

The motion judge dismissed the defendants' motion to dismiss under section 137.1 of the Courts of Justice Act.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal and dismissed all claims, finding that the defendants' expressions related to a matter of public interest and that the plaintiff failed to demonstrate sufficient harm to outweigh the public interest in protecting freedom of expression during an election campaign.

The plaintiff, Pattison Outdoor Advertising Ltd., sought reimbursement of $45,332 plus HST from the defendants, Winchester Real Estate Investment Trust Limited and 1096966 Ontario Ltd., alleging payments were made under a mistake of fact for billboards removed from the Simcoe Property in 2003.

The defendants contended they were entitled to the payments under a valid and unteminated lease.

The court found no bad faith on the part of the defendants, interpreted the lease as granting an exclusive right to erect signage for a fixed rent, and concluded that the defendants had a legal right to receive the payments as the lease was never formally terminated by the plaintiff.

The action was dismissed.

The plaintiff, a 62-year-old senior vice-president with 37 years of service, was terminated without cause.

On a motion for partial summary judgment, the court awarded a 30-month notice period, finding exceptional circumstances due to his age, tenure, and lack of comparable employment opportunities.

The court also held that the plaintiff was entitled to full bonus payments under the company's Long Term and Short Term Incentive Plans during the notice period, as the forfeiture clauses were not properly communicated, were ambiguous, and violated the Employment Standards Act.

The corporate respondent and a personal respondent requested a summary hearing to determine if the application should be dismissed for having no reasonable prospect of success.

The Tribunal denied the request, finding that evidence was required to resolve factual disputes and clarify the impact of an arbitrator's findings.

The Tribunal also granted the York Regional Police Association's request to intervene, noting its typical practice of allowing union intervention in applications arising from unionized workplaces.

The plaintiff corporation brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaration that an associate dentist breached an Associate Agreement and a permanent injunction.

The dispute arose from the termination of the associate's arrangement with the plaintiff and another principal dentist at a dental clinic, and the associate's subsequent agreement to purchase the other principal dentist's practice.

The responding parties argued that the Associate Agreement was subject to an overarching Practice Agreement and that the plaintiff's termination was not in good faith.

The court dismissed the motion for summary judgment, finding genuine issues requiring a trial, particularly regarding the common law duty of honest performance in contracts and the advisability of partial summary judgment in the context of the litigation as a whole.

The plaintiff sued his former employer and a disability insurer for long-term disability benefits after suffering a stroke shortly after his termination.

In his reply to the employer's statement of defence, the plaintiff claimed wrongful dismissal.

The employer moved for summary judgment, arguing the reply raised a new, statute-barred cause of action.

The motion judge dismissed the motion, finding the statement of claim's factual matrix provided sufficient notice of the wrongful dismissal claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the employer's appeal, agreeing that the wrongful dismissal claim was not a new cause of action and came as no surprise to the employer.

The defendant employer moved for summary judgment seeking to strike portions of the reply, bar amendment of the statement of claim, and dismiss the action on the basis that the reply advanced a new wrongful dismissal cause of action outside the limitation period.

The court applied the broader, factually-oriented and purposive approach to whether a pleading asserts a new cause of action, focusing on whether the original statement of claim gave notice of the factual matrix.

The court held that the claim for loss of disability benefits arising from termination was already grounded in the pleaded employment relationship, termination, disability, and alleged breach of the employment contract.

The reply merely answered the defence allegation of termination for misconduct and did not take the employer by surprise.

The summary judgment motion was dismissed.