COURT FILE NO.: C-410/17
DATE: 2018-05-23
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
MICHAEL DAWE Plaintiff
– and –
THE EQUITABLE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA Defendant
COUNSEL: Andrew Camman and Susan Toth, Counsel for the Plaintiff Amanda Hunter and Karina Pylypczuk, Counsel for the Defendant
HEARD: February 9 and March 5, 2018
BEFORE: The Honourable Mr. Justice D.J. Gordon
Reasons for Decision
[1] Michael Dawe’s employment at The Equitable Life Insurance Company of Canada (“Equitable Life”) was terminated by the Board of Directors on October 8, 2015. He was then a Senior Vice President with 37 years of service with Equitable Life and its predecessor. Mr. Dawe was 62 years of age. Equitable Life admits the termination was without cause.
[2] Both parties seek partial summary judgment. While their positions on the issues differ, both submit partial summary judgment meets the objectives enunciated in Hryniak v. Mandin, 2014 SCC 7. I agree. The dispute is with the calculation of damages, particularly as to the appropriate notice period and entitlement under bonus plans.
Employment History
[3] Mr. Dawe commenced employment with Allstate Life Insurance Company of Canada in 1978. Allstate was acquired by Equitable Life in 1995. Mr. Dawe’s employment continued at Equitable Life, initially as the Assistant Vice President of Group Sales & Marketing.
[4] A number of promotions followed. In 1996, Mr. Dawe became the Vice President of Sales & Distribution and a member of the Senior Management Team. In 2005, he was assigned the position of Vice President of Individual Insurance, later as Senior Vice President in 2007. In 2015, Mr. Dawe was transferred to Group Insurance as its Senior Vice President.
Compensation
[5] As is common in the life insurance industry, Mr. Dawe’s compensation package consisted of salary, a variety of benefits and a cash bonus. Here, there were two bonus plans.
[6] Revenue at Equitable Life is dependant on sales of life insurance policies. Incentives are considered necessary for employees to meet production targets. The goal of such incentive programs is to retain, recruit and reward good employees in a highly competitive industry. The bonus plans are said to bring senior executive compensation at Equitable Life to the 75th percentile in the insurance industry and allow the company to remain competitive.
[7] In 2015, Mr. Dawe’s base salary was $249,000. In February 2015, he received payment of his 2014 bonus of $379,585. There were other benefits having cash value that were part of Mr. Dawe’s compensation package.
Bonus Plans
[8] Mr. Dawe has participated in various bonus plans at Equitable Life since 1995. Initially, the various compensation terms were negotiated, reduced to writing and signed by both parties. In 1998, the system changed. Equitable Life decided to make unilateral changes without consultation with Mr. Dawe. Mr. Dawe was notified as to the terms of his compensation package, including a revised bonus plan, by correspondence dated December 10, 1998. This letter also included the following provision:
… Existing parameters of the variable pay plan remain in effect. You must be in the employ of the Company at the time the variable pay is processed in order to be eligible for the payment. The determination of the payment and definition of what comprises actual earnings/profit targets is at the sole discretion of the Board of Directors. Any variable pay is subject to the Board of Directors’ approval before any payment is made.
[9] In 2006, Equitable Life introduced two bonus plans to replace the then existing programs, referred to as a Long Term Incentive Plan (“LTIP”) and Short Term Incentive Plan (“STIP”). The terms of these bonus plans are set out in the actual documents, including the following provision relevant to this case:
C. Payment Eligibility
An Eligible Participant must be employed by the Corporation on the date an award is paid in order to receive an award.
If an Eligible Participant resigns or his/her employment is terminated for cause, he/she will forfeit all rights under the Plan including any awards earned but not yet paid as at the date of resignation or termination and no award or pro-rated award shall be paid.
An award shall be determined and paid in the following circumstances subject to the following conditions:
iii) Termination without Cause: An Eligible Participant terminated without cause will be entitled to receive only Terminal Awards calculated pursuant to the terms in sub-paragraph (a) (iv) (below), pro-rated to the last day of active employment, regardless of whether notice of termination is given or not given and regardless of whether the termination is lawful or unlawful, and only if the Eligible Participant provides the Corporation with a Full and Final Release in the manner required in the Eligible Participant’s termination letter.
[10] Mr. Dawe was made aware of the new programs by a memorandum from Ron Beettam, President of Equitable Life, dated March 29, 2006. This memorandum simply says “I am pleased to enclose for your reference the Plan details …”. It goes on to identify the methodology of calculating the bonus.
[11] Changes were made to both plans on a regular basis since implemented in 2006. Each year, Mr. Dawe would receive a memorandum from Mr. Beettam reporting as to his compensation package for the ensuing year, including base salary and participation in LTIP and STIP. The memorandum would routinely highlight the methodology of calculating the bonuses and would also say “details of the … plan … can be found on e.Link”, the intranet for Equitable Life.
[12] There is an evidentiary dispute as to whether Mr. Dawe was provided with copies of the LTIP and STIP documents or informed of the limitations on payment of bonuses.
[13] Since 2006, Mr. Dawe received bonus payments under both programs, save for the STIP payment in 2011 or 2012 due to a financial loss to the company resultant from fraudulent sales by certain brokers.
[14] In 2015, Mr. Dawe was transferred to the Group Insurance department as its Senior Vice-President. He was concerned with the impact on his bonus entitlement. Discussions between Mr. Dawe and Mr. Beettam followed, resulting in an agreement the 2015 STIP eligibility would be based on the higher of the Group or Individual line of business. This agreement was reduced to writing and signed by both parties on February 18 and 20, 2015.
Triggering Event
[15] While not relevant to the issues on this motion, but perhaps to the remaining claims, the event leading up to the termination of Mr. Dawe’s employment was a minor disagreement concerning the purchase of tickets to sporting events for business promotion. This is an evidentiary dispute regarding the existing protocol and approval system. It is not disputed that senior management had been using such tickets to entertain clients for some time.
[16] The dispute occurred in September 2015. Subsequently, Mr. Beettam caused an audit of entertainment or promotion expenses. Thereafter, Mr. Beettam delivered a verbal reprimand to Mr. Dawe, but not others.
[17] Matters escalated. Mr. Dawe consulted a lawyer. Mr. Dawe presented complaints of harassment by Mr. Beettam that were summarily dismissed by management.
[18] On October 8, 2015, the Board of Directors decided to terminate Mr. Dawe’s employment.
Issues
[19] The issues identified by counsel in their factums and submissions pertain to:
(a) the appropriate notice period; and
(b) Mr. Dawe’s entitlement to a bonus under the LTIP and STIP.
There are also sub-issues requiring consideration as hereafter discussed.
Positions of the Parties
[20] Briefly stated, the positions of the parties are as follows:
(a) Mr. Dawe claims entitlement to 30 months’ notice and full payment to LTIP and STIP in that notice period; and
(b) Equitable Life says the notice period should be 24 months and the LTIP and STIP payment limited to the terminal amount as calculated under the respective plans.
Discussion and Analysis
(i) Partial Summary Judgment
[21] The motion, as drafted, is for partial summary judgment limited to the issues identified above. Equitable Life concedes termination was without cause and that Mr. Dawe is entitled to compensation in some amount. Having regard to their positions on the issues, the parties have significant differing views as to the amount Mr. Dawe is entitled to receive.
[22] There are other claims that Mr. Dawe has advanced in his statement of claim, including punitive and moral damages that are not presented on this motion. Those other matters will require a trial.
[23] The evidentiary record on this motion contains reference to several events that are not relevant here but will be on the ultimate trial, namely:
(a) the triggering event;
(b) the 2011 financial loss due to fraud; and
(c) the conduct of management in its dealings with Mr. Dawe.
[24] There can be no dispute, an employer owes a duty to the employee to act fairly and reasonably. Even though the employment relationship is based on contract, the rights of employees have long been recognized due, in part, to the imbalance in the bargaining power between employers and employees.
[25] In this regard, it is difficult to understand how management allowed such a minor dispute to escalate and result in termination. The cost to Equitable Life is significant, in excess of $800,000.00 by its own admission. The shareholders would not be impressed, assuming they were made aware of this case. The triggering event did not warrant a verbal reprimand. Management could have done better.
[26] Reference was made to a financial loss in 2011 resulting from fraud. The statement of defence makes mention that such occurred under Mr. Dawe’s oversight. In his affidavit, sworn October 24, 2017, Mr. Bettam refers to “ … several red flags that Mr. Dawe should have been alerted to”. The purpose of this evidence is unclear. Near cause is not a defence. Further, if Mr. Dawe missed seeing the red flags, so did Mr. Beettam and the Board of Directors. They, too, have an oversight obligation.
[27] Mr. Dawe makes reference to harassment over a period of years, particularly by Mr. Beettam. Such were dismissed by management as being of no merit.
[28] In summary, there is a body of evidence in this motion, and presumably much more, that raises serious issues regarding management’s conduct. Mr. Dawe was the only senior executive employee remaining since Mr. Beettam was hired as President. There is a suggestion in the evidence, no doubt denied by Equitable Life, that termination was a planned event over a period of time.
[29] This evidence will be relevant only to the remaining claims to be determined at trial. The events referred to have no part in this motion and are not considered in this decision.
(ii) Notice Period
[30] As a general principle, 24 months has been identified as the maximum notice period in most cases. In Lowndes v. Summit Ford Sales Ltd., 2006 CanLII 14 (ON CA), [2006] O.J. No. 13 (ONCA), Cronk J.A. expressed this view in the following manner at para. 11:
[11] Although it is true that reasonable notice of employment termination must be determined on a case-specific basis and there is no absolute upper limit or ‘cap’ on what constitutes reasonable notice, generally only exceptional circumstances will support a base notice period in excess of 24 months: see Baranowski v. Binks Manufacturing Co., [2000] O.J. No. 49 (S.C.J.) at para. 277 and Rienzo v. Washington Mills Electro Minerals Corp., [2005] O.J. No. 5126 (C.A.).
[31] Whether it is exceptional circumstances or recognizing a change in society’s attitude regarding retirement, the particular circumstances of the former employee must be considered. For many years, the usual retirement age was considered to be 65. Pension plans improved as a result of the labour movement, introducing, for example, an 80 factor for most employees in the public sector and many in large companies in the private sector. That lead to some individuals retiring between the age of 50 and 60. But many were not ready to fully retire. They sought out additional employment or simply continued to work in their existing position. Further, mandatory retirement was abolished in 2006 in Ontario to protect against age discrimination. Many employees have continued past 65. In result, it is important to recognize that each case is unique. Presumptive standards no longer apply. See, for example: Filiatrault v. Tri-County Welding Supplies Ltd., 2013 ONSC 3091, at paras. 54 and 59.
[32] The principles applicable to reasonable notice include:
(a) age of the employee;
(b) the character or nature of the employment;
(c) the length of service to the employer; and
(d) the availability of similar employment, having regard to the experience, training and qualifications of the employee.
See: Bardal v. Globe and Mail Ltd., 1960 CanLII 294 (ON SC), [1960] O.W.N. 253 (H.C.J.)
[33] Mr. Dawe was 62 at the time his employment was terminated. He had devoted his entire working career to Equitable Life and its predecessor, 37 years in total. Mr. Dawe was a senior vice-president. He was a member of the senior management team. There are no similar employment opportunities. No doubt, Mr. Dawe’s age is a significant factor. His mitigation efforts demonstrate the lack of other opportunities.
[34] Reasonable notice is often referred to as the period of time it should reasonably take the terminated employee to find comparable employment. See: Lin v. Ontario Teachers’ Pension Plan, 2016 ONCA 619, at para. 54. When there is no comparable employment available, termination without cause is tantamount to a forced retirement.
[35] Mr. Dawe had commenced the process of retirement planning, not uncommon at his age and logical given the nature and focus of the life insurance industry. Mr. Dawe had made no decision as to when retirement would occur. He says he was committed to working at Equitable Life until at least age 65. Retirement, if voluntary, may have occurred sooner or later. On the evidence, I conclude it is more likely Mr. Dawe would have worked at Equitable Life until age 65. I would add, it was more likely he would have worked there to a later age than an earlier one.
[36] Counsel referred to a number of cases as examples of a reasonable notice period. Such were helpful in my review. Mr. Dawe is at the extreme high end of each of the Bardol factors. He should have been allowed to retire on his own terms. With no comparable employment opportunities, in particular, I would have felt this case warranted a minimum 36 month notice period.
[37] Mr. Dawe’s position of a 30 month notice period is more than reasonable. I conclude he was entitled to that in this case.
(ii) Bonus Plans
[38] Equitable Life takes objection to the reference of the provisions in dispute in the LTIP and STIP as a “forfeiture” clause. In my view, this is an appropriate description as, if valid, the provision takes away a benefit otherwise payable to the employee.
[39] The starting point with respect to damages was identified by van Rensburg J.A. in Lin, at para. 84, as follows:
[84] Although the trial judge gave the appellant’s argument on this issue short shrift, he correctly recognized that it is settled law that damages in lieu of reasonable notice should place an employee in the same financial position he or she would have been in had such notice been given and the employee had worked to the end of the period of reasonable notice: Sylvester v. British Columbia, 1997 CanLII 353 (SCC), [1997] 2 S.C.R. 315, at para. 1. Further, “[d]amages for wrongful dismissal may include an amount for a bonus the employee would have received had he continued in his employment during the notice period, or damages for the lost opportunity to earn a bonus. This is generally the case where the bonus is an integral part of the employee’s compensation package”: Paquette v. TeraGo, 2016 ONCA 618, at para. 17, and the cases cited therein.
[40] On that basis, Mr. Dawe would be entitled to full compensation under the STIP and LTIP during the notice period. There is an additional compelling argument that favours such, namely Mr. Dawe’s contribution by his efforts to these plans. If he is denied compensation, other employees will derive a benefit from his past work.
[41] There is also a considerable inconsistency in Equitable Life’s strategy. They say, quite appropriately, the goal of these incentive plans is to retain, recruit and reward good employees. However, in their attempt to limit compensation to the terminal period, Equitable Life goes in the opposite direction. Why would a prospective employee consider a position with the company if he or she is made aware termination without cause would result in a significant loss of expected compensation?
[42] Nevertheless, at issue here is whether Equitable Life has successfully excluded Mr. Dawe’s common law entitlement to the bonus in the notice period by the terms of the bonus plans. See: Taggart v. Canada Life Assurance Co. (2006), 50 C.C.P.B. 163, at para. 20.
(a) Communication of Terms
[43] An employer is required to communicate conditions of employment, such as the requirement to be on the payroll as of the date of payment for a bonus, to the employee. See: Grace v. Reader’s Diges Assn. (Canada) Ltd., 1995 CanLII 7287 (ON SC), [1995] O.J. No. 2671 (Ont. Gen. Div.), at para. 64. Posting on the intranet is insufficient: See: Poole v. Whirlpool Corporation, 2011 ONSC 4100, at para. 33.
[44] Mr. Beettam, in his affidavit, reports delivering copies of the LTIP and STIP to Mr. Dawe. There is neither an electronic record nor a memorandum confirming such occurred. This method of delivery of such a significant document is inconsistent with good corporate governance in general and Equitable Life’s practice in particular. Mr. Dawe claims he was not provided with the plan documents or, at least, he has no recollection of any such event.
[45] I find it was more likely than not that the plan documents were delivered to Mr. Dawe. There are some memorandums referring to other paragraphs in the LTIP or STIP. This suggests delivery had previously occurred.
[46] However, the uncontradicted evidence is that Mr. Beettam, and others at Equitable made no effort to bring the forfeiture provisions to Mr. Dawe’s attention. The various memorandums referred to only identify the positive aspects of the bonus plan, in particular the calculation that would result in payment in that particular year.
[47] As described in Grace, the requirement is communication of the term the employer seeks to rely on. I am not persuaded simply providing a copy of the plan document meets this standard. In essence, providing only a copy of the document transfers the onus to the employee of finding any negative terms of employment. These are complex documents, drafted by lawyers, and most difficult to read and understand. In my view, an employer has a duty to inform the employee of all expected terms of employment. That is particularly the case here as Equitable Life had changed the method of establishing bonus plans and was attempting to introduce a forfeiture clause that was not part of the prior system.
[48] In result, I conclude Equitable Life has not met its obligation to communicate the terms of employment. On this issue, the forfeiture clause is unenforceable.
(b) Discretionary Bonus or Integral to Compensation
[49] The payment of a bonus under LTIP and STIP are said to be discretionary, always subject to approval of the Board of Directors. The practice of Equitable Life says otherwise. During the period of these plans, and before under a different system, Mr. Dawe received a bonus every year. Only the 2012 bonus was reduced in amount and resultant from a unique situation occurring in 2011.
[50] The relevant factors on this issue are whether:
(a) the bonus is received each year although in different amounts;
(b) bonuses are required to remain competitive with other employers;
(c) bonuses were historically awarded and the employer never exercised its discretion against the employee; and
(d) the bonus constituted a significant component of the employee’s overall compensation.
See: Wolfman v. Rocktenn-Container Canada, L.P., 2015 ONSC 1432, followed in Bain v. UBS, 2016 ONSC 5326 at para. 83.
[51] These factors all favour the bonus being identified as integral to Mr. Dawe’s compensation. Equitable Life has made use of experts in assembling a compensation package to meet the goals previously mentioned and placing the company in the 75th percentile in the industry. The LTIP and STIP assist in meeting those goals and that target, while providing the incentive for the employee to produce. The bonus payments normally exceed the base salary. Of further interest are the words used by Equitable Life in describing the “Purpose of the Plan” in the LTIP as “ … an integral component of Equitable’s executive cash compensation strategy consisting of a base salary program, short term (annual) incentives and long term incentives”. Similar words are used in the STIP.
[52] I conclude the payment of a bonus under LTIP and STIP was an integral component of Mr. Dawe’s compensation.
[53] In Schumacher v. Toronto Dominion Bank (1997), 1997 CanLII 12329 (ON SC), 147 D.L.R. (4th) 128 (Ont. Gen. Div.), aff’d (1999), 1999 CanLII 3727 (ON CA), 173 D.L.R. (4th) 577 (O.C.A.), leave refused [1999] S.C.C.A., at para. 225, Kiteley J., in addressing a similar issue, said:
Where the bonus was promoted as an integral part of the employee’s cash compensation, it would be inappropriate and unfair to the employee to be deprived of the bonus by reason of the unilateral action of the employer … Schumacher remains entitled to consideration of a bonus, both for the period he worked and the notice period.
See, also: Bain, at para. 84.
[54] I arrive at the same conclusion in this case on this issue.
(c) Unilateral Changes to Bonus Plans
[55] In 1998, Equitable Life unilaterally changed the bonus plans. Prior to that year, the compensation terms were negotiated and agreed to with their senior employees. The forfeiture, and other, provisions were added to the plans. The initial forfeiture clause was unenforceable as it required the employee to be in the employ of the company at the time the bonus was processed to be eligible for payment. The current forfeiture clause replaced it in 2006.
[56] In general terms, an employer may unilaterally determine terms of employment. But, there are conditions. Here, the forfeiture clause was a fundamental change, entitling employees to claim constructive dismissal if Equitable Life implemented the change unilaterally. In Wronko v. Western Inventory Service Ltd., 2008 ONCA 327, Winkler C.J.O. spoke of the options available to employees in those circumstances:
(i) accept the change either expressly or implicitly through acquiescence, thereby continuing employment under the new terms;
(ii) reject the change and sue for damages if the employer insists on enforcing the new terms; or
(iii) make it clear to the employer the new term is rejected, in which case the employer may respond by terminating the employee with proper notice and offering re-employment on the new terms.
See: Lin, at paras. 73-75.
[57] In Lin, the employer sought the agreement of the employees as to changes to the bonus plans. Such were rejected. In the case at bar, Equitable Life did not seek approval from the employees regarding the forfeiture clause. Nevertheless, I read Lin as requiring the employee’s acceptance of the forfeiture clause, expressly or by acquiescence, as it was a fundamental change to the terms of employment. There was no express agreement. There could be no acquiescence as Equitable Life had failed to communicate the proposed new terms to the employees.
[58] Mr. Dawe did accept the positive changes to his compensation package, namely the increase in bonus from the prior system. However, there is no “package deal” and Mr. Dawe cannot be said to have accepted all changes. See: Lin, at paras. 76-80.
(d) Unambiguous Alteration of Employer’s Common Law Rights
[59] The bonus payments were an integral part of Mr. Dawe’s compensation. He would have been entitled to receive those bonuses had he been given working notice. The issue here is whether the wording of the LTIP and STIP unambiguously alters or removes that common law right of payment. See: Taggart, at paras. 12 and 20; and Paquette v. TeraGo Networks Inc., 2016 ONCA 618, at para. 31.
[60] There are three provisions in the agreement on this issue, namely:
(i) An Eligible Participant must be employed by the Corporation on the date an award is paid in order to receive an award.
(ii) An award shall be determined and paid in the following circumstances subject to the following conditions:
Termination without Cause: An Eligible Participant terminated without cause will be entitled to receive only Terminal Awards calculated pursuant to the terms in sub-paragraph (a) (iv) (below), pro-rated to the last day of active employment, regardless of whether notice of termination is given or not given and regardless of whether the termination is lawful or unlawful, and only if the Eligible Participant provides the Corporation with a Full and Final Release in the manner required in the Eligible Participant’s termination letter.
(iii) (a) Awards earned and awards actually paid shall not be considered in determining any entitlement to termination, severance or common law notice or payments in lieu of notice. Upon termination without cause and with or without notice, the Eligible Participant’s only entitlements under this Plan shall be the Terminal Awards set out in section IX C. (a) (iv) (above).
(b) Awards earned and awards actually paid shall not be considered in determining pensionable earnings.
[61] The first clause is unenforceable. See: Paquette, paras. 28 and 32-35. Presumably, the second provision is meant to qualify the first. However, it adds to the confusion by using language that is not clear. There is, as well, no reference to the statutory notice period. See, for example: Kielb v. National Money Mart Company, 2017 ONCA 356, at para. 2. There is no reference to the employee’s common law entitlement. The requirement of a Release compounds the problem when it appears to address the whole of the employee’s claim when only part is covered by the plan. The third clause does not assist in correcting the second.
[62] I conclude the language used in the LTIP and STIP does not meet the requirement of unambiguous alteration of Mr. Dawe’s common law entitlement. Simply put, the wording is unclear and confusing.
(e) Employment Standards Act
[63] The forfeiture clause in the LTIP and STIP required the employee to provide a Release “in the manner required in the Eligible Participant’s termination letter”. Although the Release is limited to the terminal payment by the language in the plans, Equitable Life, in its termination letter dated October 8, 2015, demanded a comprehensive Release of all claims. At this point, Equitable Life had not yet calculated the terminal payment.
[64] Following termination, Mr. Dawe’s salary was continued for 34 weeks, the minimum period required under the Act.
[65] Mr. Dawe refused to sign the Release. Equitable Life, in response, decline to pay even a pro-rated bonus.
[66] Obtaining a Release is said to be a “wise corporate practice”. See: McNevan v. AmeriCredit Corp., 2008 ONCA 846. However, if the proposed compensation by the employer, and the Release, result in a contravention of the Act, requiring a Release is not a proper corporate practice. The provision cannot stand. It must be struck. See: Machtinger v. HOJ Industries Ltd., 1992 CanLII 102 (SCC), [1992] 1 S.C.R. 986.
[67] In this case, the requirement of a Release went too far. It demanded Mr. Dawe to give up his common law rights to receive his statutory rights. It also did not meet the minimum requirements under 60 and 62 of the Act as Equitable Life refused to pay the bonus in the notice period. The bonus was an integral part of Mr. Dawe’s compensation. As such, it was a term of employment and Equitable Life was prohibited, under Section 60, from reducing, even withdrawing, the bonus. See: Sandhu v. Solutions 2 Go Inc., 2012 ONSC 2073, at paras. 34-35.
[68] Hence, I conclude the requirement by Equitable Life was prohibited by the Act and it must be struck. In result, Mr. Dawe is entitled to a bonus for the whole of the notice period.
Summary
[69] For these reasons, partial summary judgment is granted in favour of Mr. Dawe for a notice period of 30 months and for entitlement to LTIP and STIP payments in full during that notice period. The remaining claims are yet to be tried. I expect counsel to calculate the amounts owing as a result of this decision.
[70] I also expect counsel to resolve the issue of costs; failing which, brief written submissions are to be delivered to my chambers in Kitchener within 30 days of the release of this decision. If submissions are not received by that date, the issue of costs will be considered settled.
D.J. Gordon J.
Released: May 23, 2018
COURT FILE NO.: C-410/17
DATE: 2018-05-23
ONTARIO SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE
BETWEEN:
MICHAEL DAWE Plaintiff
– and –
THE EQUITABLE LIFE INSURANCE COMPANY OF CANADA Defendant
REASONS FOR JUDGMENT
D.J. Gordon J.
Released: May 23, 2018