Michael Eugene Cassone

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for summary judgment in London regarding credit card debt.

On his own initiative, the judge directed a case management conference to consider whether the proceeding should be transferred, noting the matter had no rational connection to Middlesex County.

Applying the factors under Rule 13.1.02(2)(b) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the court found that the plaintiff engaged in improper forum shopping by commencing the action in London solely because its counsel was located there.

The court exercised its new jurisdiction under Rule 13.1.02(4) to transfer the proceeding to Brampton, where the underlying contract was formed and the defendant formerly resided.

The plaintiff bank brought a motion for summary judgment to collect the $69,090.92 balance of an unpaid loan used by the defendant to purchase securities.

The defendant counterclaimed, alleging the bank was responsible for the fraudulent actions of her investment advisor and breached a fiduciary duty.

The court granted summary judgment for the bank and dismissed the counterclaim, finding no evidence that the bank was responsible for the advisor's actions and affirming that a standard debtor-creditor relationship does not create a fiduciary duty.

The plaintiffs, an investment corporation and its principals, suffered losses from a failed real estate development and sought to recover their unsecured investment in priority to secured creditors.

The secured creditors (defendants) brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' claims.

The court dismissed the summary judgment motions, finding complex factual issues, multiple credibility assessments, and a risk of inconsistent findings if partial summary judgment were granted.

The court concluded that the current record was not appropriate for summary judgment and that a full trial was required to resolve the intertwined issues, including allegations of knowing receipt of trust property and conspiracy.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment regarding a defaulted commercial loan and mortgage.

The defendants failed to appear and relied on Organized Pseudolegal Commercial Arguments (OPCA), claiming indigenous status and that the land was unceded.

The court found these defences to be nonsense, noting the defendants received the funds and defaulted on their obligations.

Summary judgment was granted in favour of the plaintiff for the debt owing, possession of the property, and substantial indemnity costs.

The plaintiff brought an action for mortgage default against the defendants.

The defendants filed a counterclaim using organized pseudo-legal commercial arguments (OPCA), naming the provincial and federal Crowns, and issued summonses to the Chief Justice of Canada and a former registrar of the Supreme Court of Canada.

The court dismissed the counterclaim under Rule 2.1.01 as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The court also quashed the summonses to witness as an abuse of process and adjourned the plaintiff's motion for summary judgment to allow the defendants to file responding material.

The moving parties brought a motion for leave to appeal and a motion to stay the decision of Sweeny R.S.J. The Divisional Court directed the moving parties to file their materials electronically and advised that motions for leave to appeal are considered in writing under Rule 62.02.

After reviewing the moving parties' materials without requiring responding materials, the panel dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, rendering the motion for a stay moot.

No costs were ordered.

The plaintiff corporation brought a motion for summary judgment seeking a declaration that an associate dentist breached an Associate Agreement and a permanent injunction.

The dispute arose from the termination of the associate's arrangement with the plaintiff and another principal dentist at a dental clinic, and the associate's subsequent agreement to purchase the other principal dentist's practice.

The responding parties argued that the Associate Agreement was subject to an overarching Practice Agreement and that the plaintiff's termination was not in good faith.

The court dismissed the motion for summary judgment, finding genuine issues requiring a trial, particularly regarding the common law duty of honest performance in contracts and the advisability of partial summary judgment in the context of the litigation as a whole.

The plaintiff subcontractor brought an action against the defendant owner for $12,500, representing the statutory holdback the owner failed to retain from the general contractor.

The central issue was whether the plaintiff's construction lien was preserved within the 45-day statutory time limit.

The plaintiff claimed the last date of service was March 26, 2013, while the defendant argued it was March 8, 2013.

The court found the plaintiff's evidence regarding the March 26 date lacked credibility and reliability, concluding the last date of service was likely March 8.

As a result, the lien was not preserved in time, and the action was dismissed.

The moving party, the successful bidder on a police towing services Request for Proposal, brought a motion to be added as a party to an application for judicial review challenging the RFP.

The applicants conceded the moving party should participate but argued it should bear its own costs.

The court found the moving party was an essential party with a direct economic interest and relevant evidence to offer regarding allegations of collusion.

The motion was granted, and the moving party was added as a party respondent with full exposure and entitlement to costs.

In insolvency proceedings involving a corporate plaintiff in receivership, the defendant moved to dismiss the related civil action for delay, relying primarily on Rule 11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure and alleging prejudice arising from the receiver’s failure to obtain an order to continue following the appointment of a receiver.

After issuing an earlier endorsement approving the receiver’s conduct and the assignment of the claim, the court clarified that the defendant had intended to maintain its Rule 11 motion despite abandoning its Rule 24 delay motion.

The court held that the receiver had acted reasonably during the stay period and that the time taken to assess and assign the claim did not constitute unacceptable delay.

Allegations of prejudice, including the death of a witness and departure of employees, were unsupported by evidence and did not establish real prejudice.

The motion to dismiss was therefore formally dismissed.

The court-appointed receiver for an insolvent boat manufacturing company sought approval to assign the company's $20 million lawsuit against a supplier to the daughter of the company's deceased principal.

The supplier opposed the assignment, arguing the receiver failed to obtain an Order to Continue under Rule 11 and that the process was unfair because the supplier was not given an opportunity to submit a competing offer.

The court approved the assignment, applying the Soundair principles, finding that the receiver acted reasonably and commercially sensibly in accepting the offer after the supplier had repeatedly indicated it would only settle for a dismissal without costs.

The court also ordered that the financial details of the offers remain sealed to prevent prejudice in the ongoing litigation.

The appellants appealed an order regarding rental arrears.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing with the motion judge that any offset or deduction of rental arrears must be addressed in the related mortgage action, potentially requiring the addition of a party to that action.

The appellant appealed a decision regarding her bankruptcy discharge, arguing she was entitled to an automatic discharge because the trustee in bankruptcy failed to include a recommendation on her discharge in his report.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant had failed to perform several duties and tender required funds, and that the trustee's actions did not invalidate the procedure.