Thomas Rounthwaite Lipton

Batchewana First Nation sought to be joined as a necessary party plaintiff or, alternatively, for leave to intervene as an added party plaintiff in the Robinson Superior Treaty action, which concerns claims for augmented annuities.

The motion was dismissed.

The court found that Batchewana, a beneficiary of the Robinson Huron Treaty, was not a necessary party to the Superior action, as its claim for augmented annuities based on "just claims" to lands within the Superior Territory was inconsistent with its prior position in the Huron action and did not directly relate to the Superior Treaty's interpretation or compensation.

The court also found that Batchewana did not meet the criteria for intervention and that its proposed intervention would cause undue delay and prejudice to the complex, multi-stage litigation.

Namaygoosisagagun Ojibway Nation sought leave to intervene in the Robinson Superior Treaty action under Rule 13.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The plaintiffs and Gull Bay First Nation opposed the intervention, arguing that Namaygoosisagagun was not a recognized band and lacked a collective interest.

The Crown defendants consented with provisos to prevent litigation of Namaygoosisagagun's band status or s. 35 rights within this proceeding.

The court granted leave to intervene, finding that Namaygoosisagagun had a contingent collective interest that met the low threshold for intervention, but imposed strict conditions prohibiting them from seeking to prove or determine issues related to their band status, s. 35 rights, or beneficiary status under the Treaty, and from making submissions conflicting with the plaintiffs' position on distribution.

Teme-Augama Anishnabai and Temagami First Nation (TAA) sought leave to intervene as added party plaintiffs in the Restoule action, a case concerning the Robinson Huron Treaty of 1850.

While the original plaintiffs and Canada consented to the intervention, Ontario opposed a specific condition that would allow TAA to seek leave to file reply reports to Ontario's reports, even if TAA had not previously filed principal reports.

TAA argued this condition was necessary due to unique interests stemming from a prior Supreme Court decision and ongoing negotiations regarding their s. 35 rights.

The court granted the intervention with the disputed condition, finding Ontario's perceived risk of case splitting speculative and emphasizing the potential prejudice to TAA if denied the ability to respond to evidence on critical treaty boundary issues.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered a reference question regarding the constitutionality of the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act, Part 5 of the Budget Implementation Act, 2018, No. 1.

The Act establishes a federal carbon pricing scheme applicable to provinces that have not adopted sufficiently stringent carbon pricing mechanisms.

The majority held that the Act is constitutional under the national concern branch of the Peace, Order, and Good Government power, as establishing minimum national standards to reduce greenhouse gas emissions is a matter of national concern.

The fuel charge and excess emissions charge were found to be valid regulatory charges, not taxes.

Justice Huscroft dissented, arguing that the Act improperly expands federal jurisdiction over greenhouse gas emissions, which are generated by virtually all provincial activities.

The court dismissed the applicant's proceeding under Rule 2.1 and subsequently addressed the respondent's request for costs.

Given the applicant's history of vexatious litigation seeking the same relief, including multiple prior Rule 2.1 dismissals and a struck appeal, the court deemed the current proceeding vexatious.

Costs were awarded to the respondent on a partial indemnity basis to emphasize the consequences of frivolous or vexatious legal actions and to prevent abuse of process.

The applicant sought compensation from the Province of Ontario for alleged violations of his equality rights under s. 15 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, claiming systemic racism in prior unsuccessful litigation spanning 31 years and seeking over $100 million.

The respondent requested the court consider dismissing the application under Rule 2.1.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found the application plainly frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, noting that the claims had been repeatedly litigated and dismissed, and that judicial immunity bars claims for compensation against judges for their decisions.

The application was dismissed, and the applicant's fee waiver for this and future similar proceedings was revoked.

This decision addresses motions for leave to intervene and to file records in a constitutional reference concerning the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act.

The motion judge granted leave to intervene to twelve parties, including three Attorneys General as of right and nine additional parties seeking discretionary leave.

The judge declined to grant leave to one individual applicant.

The decision also addresses the scope of factums, oral argument time allocation, and the relaxed approach to supplementing the record in constitutional references as a court of first instance.