Jennifer L. King

The applicant, Valero Energy Inc., brought a motion in its application for judicial review seeking an order to compel the respondents to produce a further record of proceedings, including internal Cabinet and Ministerial documents.

The underlying application challenges a regulation imposing domestic renewable content requirements for fuels.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the Judicial Review Procedure Act does not require a record of proceedings for a challenge to a regulation, as making a regulation is not a 'statutory power of decision'.

The court declined to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to order production, noting that judicial review of a regulation is a limited exercise in statutory interpretation and does not afford a right to documentary discovery.

Ten groups brought motions for leave to intervene in an appeal concerning whether a municipal by-law prohibiting individuals from erecting tents or living in public parks violated sections 7 and 15 of the Charter.

The motion judge granted leave to intervene to seven groups, finding they would provide unique and helpful perspectives on issues such as Charter damages, international human rights standards, and the social context of homelessness.

Leave was denied to three groups whose proposed submissions either expanded the scope of the appeal or duplicated arguments already raised by the parties.

The Court of Appeal for Ontario considered whether it could hear an appeal of two interlocutory orders together with an appeal of a final order in a Charter challenge by 14 unhoused individuals against the City of Hamilton.

The interlocutory orders excluded physician evidence and demographic data relevant to the Charter claims.

The Court held that because the interlocutory and final orders were so interrelated, leave to appeal the interlocutory orders would inevitably have been granted, and thus the appeals could be heard together.

The motion to strike the grounds relating to the interlocutory orders was dismissed.

The Ontario Human Rights Commission (OHRC) appealed a Superior Court decision denying its leave to intervene as a friend of the court in an application challenging the constitutionality of municipal by-laws related to encampments.

The Court of Appeal quashed the appeal for want of jurisdiction, holding that an order denying leave to intervene as a friend of the court is an interlocutory order, not a final order, and therefore not appealable to the Court of Appeal under the Courts of Justice Act.

The court distinguished between party interventions (which may be final orders) and friend of the court interventions (which are interlocutory).

The Corporation of the City of Windsor sought to continue an injunction against "Persons Unknown" who were blocking the Ambassador Bridge.

The court had previously granted an interim injunction.

The City argued that protesters continued to breach municipal by-laws and the prior court order, and there was a risk of continued blockades.

The court found that the City established a strong prima facie case of by-law breaches and defiance of the prior order.

Applying the test for statutory injunctions under s. 440 of the Municipal Act, 2001, the court granted a permanent injunction, emphasizing the public interest in upholding the rule of law and that Charter rights do not protect unlawful conduct.

The plaintiffs brought a motion for an order to permit them to obtain soil and groundwater samples from a neighbouring property owned by a non-party, after the action had been set down for trial.

The plaintiffs sought the samples to allow their expert to perform forensic environmental testing to respond to the defendants' expert reports regarding PCB contamination.

The court granted leave to bring the motion, finding the expert's need for additional sampling constituted an unexpected change in circumstances.

The court also granted the inspection order, concluding that the testing would be useful and probative in determining whether the contaminants on the plaintiffs' property originated from the neighbouring property.

The moving party sought an extension of time to review interlocutory rulings and a costs order made by a judge who had previously denied their motion for leave to appeal a Land Planning Appeal Tribunal decision regarding a new hospital site.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the interlocutory rulings merged with the final decision denying leave, rendering them moot.

The court held that the proposed review was an abuse of process attempting to collaterally attack a final decision, and that the costs order was well within the motions judge's discretion.

The moving party, a residents association, sought leave to appeal a decision of the Local Planning Appeal Tribunal (LPAT) that dismissed its appeals against the City of Windsor's approval of an Official Plan Amendment and Zoning By-law Amendment.

The amendments facilitated the location of a new regional acute care hospital.

The moving party argued the LPAT erred in law regarding emergency services policies, First Nations consultation, climate change impacts, and the assessment of expert evidence.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding no reason to doubt the correctness of the LPAT's decision on any question of law.

The court also ordered the moving party to pay partial indemnity costs, despite recognizing it as a public interest litigant, because the motion lacked merit and it would be unfair to shift the costs to the municipal taxpayers and the hospital.

A case management conference was held to set procedural directions for a motion for leave to appeal a Local Planning Appeal Tribunal decision.

The court ordered the hearing to proceed via video conference and provided detailed instructions for the electronic filing of documents, factums, and compendiums.

This decision addresses motions for leave to intervene and to file records in a constitutional reference concerning the Greenhouse Gas Pollution Pricing Act.

The motion judge granted leave to intervene to twelve parties, including three Attorneys General as of right and nine additional parties seeking discretionary leave.

The judge declined to grant leave to one individual applicant.

The decision also addresses the scope of factums, oral argument time allocation, and the relaxed approach to supplementing the record in constitutional references as a court of first instance.

The applicants, owners of the Glen Abbey Golf Course, brought an application to quash five municipal by-laws enacted by the respondent Town.

The by-laws aimed to preserve the property's use as a golf course following its designation as a cultural heritage property.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the application and quashed the by-laws, finding them ultra vires the Town's authority under the Municipal Act, as they improperly required the provision of services related to recreation and culture.

The court also found the by-laws were enacted in bad faith to thwart the applicants' redevelopment plans and were void for vagueness.

The Building Industry and Land Development Association (BILD) brought an application challenging the validity of several by-laws enacted by the Town of Oakville concerning cultural heritage properties.

The application was heard concurrently with a similar application by Clublink Corporation ULC.

The court addressed BILD's standing to bring the application, considering both private and public interest standing.

The court found that BILD lacked private interest standing as it was not directly impacted by the by-laws, and its primary identified member (Clublink's parent company) was already challenging the same by-laws.

The court also denied public interest standing, concluding that BILD's challenge was not a reasonable and effective means of bringing the matter before the court, given that the Clublink application already provided a suitable context for adversarial determination with a proper evidentiary record.

Consequently, BILD's application was dismissed.

The Town of Oakville designated the Glen Abbey Golf Course as a heritage site under the Ontario Heritage Act (OHA).

Clublink, the owner, sought to demolish and redevelop the property, applying under s. 34(1) of the OHA.

The Town refused to process this application, arguing that the golf course features were not "buildings or structures" within the meaning of s. 34, and that Clublink should instead apply under s. 33, which provides for a non-binding appeal route.

The court was asked to determine the correct procedural route for Clublink's proposed changes.

The court found that the Glen Abbey Golf Course, including its engineered features such as tees, greens, sand traps, and irrigation systems, constitutes "structures" for the purposes of s. 34 of the OHA.

Consequently, Clublink has the right to make an application to the Town under s. 34(1), and the Town was ordered to process Clublink’s application.

Clublink sought leave to admit a supplementary affidavit after cross-examinations concluded, arguing it supported their claim of bad faith in Oakville's by-law enactment.

Oakville moved to strike the affidavit, arguing it was late-filed and irrelevant.

The court applied the four-part test for admitting late-filed evidence under Rule 39.02(2), finding the evidence either irrelevant or available prior to cross-examinations.

Clublink's motion for leave was dismissed, and Oakville's motion to strike was granted, rendering the supplementary affidavit inadmissible.

The applicant, the Town of Oakville, brought a motion to compel the respondents, Clublink Corporation ULC and Clublink Holdings Limited, to answer certain questions and produce documents refused during cross-examinations of their expert witnesses.

The motion concerned the interpretation of section 34 of the Ontario Heritage Act in the context of the Glen Abbey golf course redevelopment.

The court dismissed most of the applicant's requests, finding the documents irrelevant to the narrow issues or the expert's independence.

However, it ordered the production of any separate written retainer agreement for a heritage impact assessment, if such an agreement existed, deeming it marginally relevant to the expert's independence.

The court also addressed and admonished counsel for an improper ex parte communication made after the motion hearing concluded.

Following earlier rulings quashing garnishment notices issued against diplomatic bank accounts of a foreign state, the court determined the appropriate costs award.

The proceedings involved complex and novel issues of diplomatic immunity, state immunity, and international law relating to enforcement of a judgment against a foreign state.

Although the foreign state was the successful party, the court declined to award substantial indemnity costs due to the absence of improper litigation conduct and the novelty of the issues.

A third‑party bank that participated extensively in the litigation was found not to be a necessary party and was denied costs.

The creditor was ordered to pay the foreign state partial indemnity costs fixed at $100,000 inclusive of disbursements and HST.

A judgment creditor sought to enforce an international arbitration award by garnishing bank accounts held by a foreign state’s embassy in Canada.

The foreign state moved to quash the notices of garnishment, asserting diplomatic immunity over the embassy accounts.

The court held that assurances from the ambassador created a strong presumption that the accounts were used for diplomatic purposes under customary international law and the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations.

The creditor’s evidence, including payments of litigation costs and scholarship funds to students, did not demonstrate non‑diplomatic or commercial use sufficient to rebut the presumption.

The garnishment notices were therefore quashed and further enforcement against the accounts was prohibited.

The plaintiffs sought injunctive relief restraining a shareholder from selling shares of her holding company that indirectly owned shares in a family‑controlled corporation, and from disclosing corporate financial information.

The defendants brought a cross‑motion for summary judgment dismissing the claim and sought partial summary judgment on a counterclaim seeking various corporate governance orders under the Ontario Business Corporations Act.

The court held that although the separation agreement did not expressly restrict sales of the holding company shares, an implied term prevented either party from disposing of their interests in the holding companies without the other’s consent.

A permanent injunction was granted preventing the sale of the holding company shares without consent.

The court rejected restrictions on the shareholder’s access to financial statements but granted limited corporate governance relief including annual meetings, financial statement delivery, and a trust accounting.

In garnishment proceedings to enforce an arbitral award against a foreign state, the moving party sought cross-examinations and broad document production relating to embassy bank accounts said to be immune from execution.

The court applied the previously established framework recognizing a strong but rebuttable presumption of diplomatic immunity once a competent authority provided due assurances that the accounts were used for sovereign or diplomatic purposes.

The court held that compelling the ambassador, the bank, or third parties to disclose records or submit to questioning would unduly interfere with the affairs of the diplomatic mission and was not justified on the evidentiary record.

The motion to strike the moving party’s affidavit was also dismissed.

All production and cross-examination requests were denied.

The applicant judgment creditor sought to enforce a foreign arbitral award by garnishing embassy-related bank accounts in Canada.

The court held that customary international law governs immunity over embassy bank accounts through a restrictive immunity framework requiring proof of diplomatic relations, assurances of diplomatic purpose, and an opportunity for the creditor to rebut immunity by proving a commercial or other non-diplomatic use.

A Foreign Relations Certificate from the Minister of Foreign Affairs was conclusive only as to the existence of diplomatic relations between the states.

It did not confer absolute immunity or bar further inquiry into whether the accounts fell within an exception.