Valerie Cohl Crystal

The applicant, Valero Energy Inc., brought a motion in its application for judicial review seeking an order to compel the respondents to produce a further record of proceedings, including internal Cabinet and Ministerial documents.

The underlying application challenges a regulation imposing domestic renewable content requirements for fuels.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion, finding that the Judicial Review Procedure Act does not require a record of proceedings for a challenge to a regulation, as making a regulation is not a 'statutory power of decision'.

The court declined to exercise its inherent jurisdiction to order production, noting that judicial review of a regulation is a limited exercise in statutory interpretation and does not afford a right to documentary discovery.

The appellant sought judicial review and appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal decision finding that her application for statutory accident benefits was time-barred.

The appellant argued the insurer's notice of refusal did not comply with s. 54 of the SABS because it failed to detail all levels of appeal and misleadingly stated a hard two-year limitation period without explaining discoverability.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that s. 54 only requires notice of the right to dispute the refusal at the Tribunal, not subsequent appeal rights.

The Court also found the notice was not misleading, as detailing discoverability principles could detract from the clarity of the warning and confuse claimants.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a Divisional Court order dismissing an application for judicial review of an Ontario Special Education Tribunal decision, and a motion to reopen a previous Court of Appeal decision.

The Court of Appeal dismissed both motions pursuant to Rule 2.1 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding them to be frivolous, vexatious, or otherwise an abuse of process.

The judicial review application was premature as the Tribunal proceedings were ongoing, and the moving party failed to meet the high standard required to reopen a previous decision.

Following the allowance of the appeal, the Court of Appeal requested submissions on costs for the motion, which had not been addressed at the hearing.

The parties reached an agreement on costs.

The court ordered the plaintiffs to pay the appellant $4,000 all-inclusive, in accordance with the parties' agreement.

The plaintiffs brought a constitutional challenge against provisions of the Insurance Act, alleging the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) lacked adjudicative independence.

They obtained a motion judge's order under Rule 30.10 requiring the LAT to produce hundreds of internal records.

The LAT appealed.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding the motion judge erred in her application of Rule 30.10.

The records were not relevant to a material issue because adjudicative independence in a specific case does not impact the constitutional validity of the tribunal's jurisdiction under s. 96 of the Constitution Act, 1867, nor does it engage s. 7 or s. 15 of the Charter.

The Court also clarified that deliberative secrecy applies to administrative tribunals to the same extent as courts.

The moving party sought reconsideration of a single judge's order dismissing a motion to stay Divisional Court proceedings.

The stay was sought to prevent the Divisional Court from issuing a publication ban and anonymization order regarding the moving party's child.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion for reconsideration as moot, noting that the Divisional Court had already granted the publication ban and anonymization order.

The Court declined to exercise its discretion to hear the moot issue, finding no matter of public importance that extended beyond the interests of the parties.

The applicant sought judicial review of a Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (HRTO) decision refusing to reconsider its dismissal of his complaint against Meta Platforms Inc. for lack of jurisdiction.

The HRTO had concluded that Meta is a federally regulated undertaking.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application, finding that the HRTO's jurisdictional decision was correct.

Applying the doctrine of interjurisdictional immunity and division of powers principles, the Court confirmed that Meta provides services over the internet, constituting an interprovincial telecommunications undertaking subject to exclusive federal jurisdiction.

The applicant sought judicial review of a decision by the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario dismissing his discrimination claim.

The respondents raised the issue of prematurity because the applicant did not seek reconsideration at the Tribunal.

The prematurity issue was bifurcated for a separate hearing.

The Divisional Court concluded it was not advisable to separate the prematurity issue from the rest of the application and adjourned it to be decided by the panel hearing the full application for judicial review.

The appellant tenant appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision finding she persistently paid rent late and ordering her to pay rent in full and on time for a year.

The tenant argued she paid partial rent on time because she was disputing a rent increase and self-abating.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that under the Residential Tenancies Act, rent means the entire amount due, and any shortfall constitutes late payment.

The Court confirmed that tenants are not permitted to self-abate rent and must pay in full pending LTB adjudication of any abatement claims.

The tenants appealed a Landlord and Tenant Board decision dismissing their application for substantial interference related to bed bugs in their rental unit.

The tenants argued the Board breached procedural fairness and made an unreasonable decision.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board afforded sufficient procedural fairness and properly controlled its own process.

Furthermore, the Court held that appeals from the Board are restricted to questions of law, making reasonableness review inapplicable, and found no error in the Board's application of the law regarding the landlord's maintenance obligations.

The applicant sought judicial review of an interim decision by the Ontario Special Education Tribunal refusing to recuse its adjudicators for alleged bias.

The court issued a notice under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, raising concerns that the application was an abuse of process because the tribunal proceedings were ongoing.

Finding no exceptional circumstances to justify interfering with an ongoing administrative proceeding, the court dismissed the application as patently premature.

The self-represented applicant sought judicial review of a Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) decision denying his claim for income replacement benefits and dismissing his bad faith claim against the insurer.

The Divisional Court exercised its discretion to hear the application but dismissed it on the merits, finding the LAT's conclusions regarding insufficient medical evidence and procedural choices were reasonable.

The court also held that punitive damages are unavailable on judicial review of LAT decisions.

The application was dismissed with costs of $5,000 awarded to the insurer.

The applicant commenced a second application to the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) seeking over $100 million in damages against her insurer, adjusters, and health professionals for alleged tortious conduct related to her statutory accident benefits (SABS) claim.

The LAT declined to process the application, finding it lacked jurisdiction to award damages or make orders against non-insurer parties.

The applicant sought judicial review and appealed to the Divisional Court.

The Court dismissed the proceedings under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, holding that the LAT is a statutory body without jurisdiction to award general or non-compensatory damages, and that the proceedings constituted an abuse of process and an impermissible collateral attack on a prior final LAT decision regarding her SABS.

The applicant sought judicial review of decisions by a children's aid society and the Child and Family Services Review Board.

The applicant had alleged that the child was physically abused by school staff.

The society conducted a community caregiver investigation and concluded the allegations were not verified.

The Board reviewed the society's handling of the complaint and ordered the society to provide better written reasons, but otherwise dismissed the applicant's procedural complaints.

The Divisional Court dismissed the application for judicial review, finding that both the society and the Board afforded the applicant procedural fairness and that their decisions were reasonable.

The applicant, acting as litigation guardian for his child, brought three preliminary motions within an application for judicial review of decisions by the Children's Aid Society and the Child and Family Services Review Board.

The applicant sought unredacted disclosure of the Society's investigation records, the production of a hearing transcript by the Board, and the disqualification of the Board's counsel for an alleged conflict of interest.

The court dismissed the request for unredacted records and the motion to disqualify counsel, finding no basis for either.

The court ordered the Board to release an informal audio recording of the hearing to the applicant so he could arrange for his own transcript, subject to strict confidentiality conditions.

This appeal concerns the interpretation of Ontario's Statutory Accident Benefits Schedules regarding attendant care benefits (ACBs) for a catastrophically injured individual.

The key issues were whether an applicant for ACBs must demonstrate "urgency, impossibility, or impracticability" to claim retroactive benefits under s. 42(5) of the 2010 Schedule, and whether the definition of "incurred" from s. 3(7)(e) of the 2010 Schedule applies to claims arising from accidents predating its enactment (specifically, the 1996 Schedule).

The Court of Appeal found that s. 42(5) relates to the timing of payment, not eligibility, and does not impose a "urgency" test for retroactive claims.

It further held that the definition of "incurred" in the 2010 Schedule does not apply to claims governed by the 1996 Schedule, based on a careful reading of the transitional provisions.

The appeal was allowed, entitling the applicant to retroactive ACBs without substantiation under the 2010 Schedule's "incurred" definition.

The tenant appealed two Landlord and Tenant Board (LTB) eviction orders resulting from hearings he did not attend.

In 2019, the tenant missed the hearing due to a flat tire.

In 2022, the tenant, who suffers from depression, was unaware of the video hearing.

The LTB denied his requests for review in both instances.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeals, finding that the tenant was not reasonably able to participate in either proceeding.

Applying a broad interpretation of natural justice, the Court set aside the review orders and remitted the matters back to the LTB for new hearings.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) declining to add a claim for punitive damages to a dispute over Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule (SABS) claims.

Relying on its concurrent decision in Keulen v. Allstate Insurance Company, the Divisional Court held that the LAT does not have the authority to award punitive damages.

The appeal was dismissed with costs awarded to the respondent insurer.

The appellant appealed a Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) decision finding it lacked jurisdiction to award punitive damages for statutory accident benefits claims.

The appellant argued the LAT had jurisdiction or, alternatively, that section 280 of the Insurance Act was unconstitutional for eliminating punitive damages claims.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, holding that the LAT's jurisdiction is strictly statutory and does not include punitive damages, as established by binding Court of Appeal precedent.

The court also rejected the constitutional challenge, finding the legislature clearly and validly removed jurisdiction over these claims from the courts to the LAT.

The appellant contested the denial of statutory accident benefits following a 2010 automobile accident, bringing simultaneous proceedings before the Divisional Court by way of statutory appeal on questions of law and judicial review on questions of fact and mixed fact and law.

The courts below held that, where there is a limited statutory right of appeal, judicial review should only be exercised in exceptional or rare cases.

The Supreme Court of Canada held this was an error: a circumscribed statutory right of appeal on questions of law does not restrict the availability of judicial review on questions of fact or mixed fact and law, and the Strickland framework does not support imposing a heightened threshold for judicial review in such circumstances.

The Court further found that the LAT adjudicator's reconsideration decision was unreasonable because he failed to consider the effect of the reinstatement of income replacement benefits on the validity of the initial denial and failed to have regard to relevant tribunal jurisprudence on the point.

The appeal was allowed and the matter remitted to the LAT adjudicator for reconsideration.