Dr. Sarazin

The applicant sought judicial review of a Licence Appeal Tribunal (LAT) decision refusing to extend the limitation period for her claim for non-earner benefits.

The LAT Act limits appeals to questions of law, but the applicant sought judicial review on issues of mixed fact and law regarding her mental capacity.

Applying the framework from Yatar, the Divisional Court declined to hear the application, finding no exceptional circumstances to justify judicial review where the legislature intended to limit recourse to the courts.

Following a trial where the court invalidated powers of attorney due to incapacity and undue influence, the successful applicants sought their costs.

The court found that the unsuccessful respondent's conduct, which included manipulating the incapable person and unnecessarily lengthening the litigation, warranted a costs award on a substantial indemnity scale.

The court ordered the respondent to pay $150,000 in costs to the applicants, rather than having the costs paid from the incapable person's assets.

The applicant sought to dispute the respondent's denial of non-earner benefits (NEBs) approximately three years after the expiry of the two-year limitation period under s. 56 of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule.

The applicant argued that the limitation period should be extended under s. 7 of the Licence Appeal Tribunal Act due to her mental incapacity during the appeal period.

The Tribunal found that the respondent's denial was clear and unequivocal.

Applying the Manuel factors, the Tribunal concluded that the applicant failed to establish a bona fide intention to appeal within the limitation period, as no medical practitioner had recommended a capacity assessment at the time.

Given the significant delay and resulting prejudice to the respondent, the Tribunal held that the justice of the case did not warrant an extension of time.

The application was dismissed as statute-barred.

A motion was brought to appoint the plaintiff's wife as his litigation guardian after he suffered a stroke and brain hemorrhage.

The court adjourned the motion, finding that the medical evidence of incapacity was insufficient because it relied on hearsay rather than a direct affidavit from the capacity assessor.

Furthermore, the court noted that the proposed litigation guardian was a co-defendant in the proceedings and may have an adverse interest, contrary to the requirement that a litigation guardian be indifferent to the outcome.

Cross-applications were brought by separated parents under the Substitute Decisions Act seeking appointment as guardian of the property and personal care of their adult daughter who had a moderate developmental disability and epilepsy and was incapable of managing property or personal care.

The court reviewed expert psychological evidence, service-provider testimony, and the daughter’s declining life skills and limited participation in developmental programs while living primarily with the mother.

Applying the statutory criteria for guardianship, the court concluded the father was better positioned to provide stimulation, structure, and access to support services necessary to maintain or improve the incapable person’s functioning.

The court therefore appointed the father as sole guardian of property and personal care, with detailed conditions governing finances, services, residence, and the mother’s ongoing contact.

The appellant appealed a decision of the Consent and Capacity Board confirming her incapacity to make decisions regarding admission to a care facility.

The appellant argued the Board misapprehended evidence about her medication levels, ignored helpful evidence, and improperly focused on her best interests rather than her capacity.

The Divisional Court applied a reasonableness standard of review and dismissed the appeal, finding that the Board properly applied the statutory test for capacity.

The court held that the appellant's inability to understand the need for medication and supervision, and her lack of insight into her condition, supported the Board's finding of incapacity.