Natalie Scott

This endorsement addresses the costs arising from two motions in an estates matter: one brought by Royal Trust Corporation of Canada (Estate Trustee) to appoint the Public Guardian and Trustee as Litigation Guardian for Raymonde Haddad, and a cross-motion by Doris Haddad-Bejjani seeking her own appointment.

Royal Trust's motion was granted, and Doris's motion was dismissed.

The court, applying the modern approach to costs in estates litigation, found Royal Trust, the Children's Lawyer, and Rosemary Whelan to be successful parties.

Doris Haddad-Bejjani, as the unsuccessful party whose conduct complicated the proceedings, was ordered to pay partial indemnity costs to the successful parties from her testamentary trust.

The balance of Royal Trust's and the Children's Lawyer's full indemnity costs were ordered to be paid from the capital of the Estate.

This endorsement addresses competing motions for the appointment of a litigation guardian for Raymonde Haddad, a mentally incapable beneficiary of the Estate of Paul Haddad.

Royal Trust Corporation of Canada, as Estate Trustee, sought to appoint the Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) as litigation guardian for Raymonde in ongoing estate proceedings (Interpretation Application and Passing Application).

Raymonde's daughter, Doris Haddad-Bejjani, who had been purporting to represent Raymonde under a Continuing Power of Attorney for Property, brought a cross-motion to be appointed as litigation guardian herself.

The court found Raymonde to be a party under disability based on extensive medical evidence.

Doris's motion was dismissed due to a clear conflict of interest, as her personal interests in the estate's distribution were adverse to Raymonde's.

The court granted Royal Trust's motion, appointing the PGT as Raymonde's litigation guardian, emphasizing the PGT's role as a guardian of last resort when no other proper person is willing and able to act without conflict.

The plaintiffs sold a construction business to the defendants, with a portion of the purchase price secured by a vendor take back promissory note.

The defendants refused to pay the note, claiming set-offs for intercompany debt, retained bank balances, and a bookkeeping error that overstated accounts receivable.

The court held that the purchase price was fixed and not subject to adjustment for the intercompany debt, and that the bookkeeping error did not constitute a breach of warranty.

However, the court allowed a set-off for the retained bank balance, which the plaintiffs conceded should have been transferred on closing, reducing the amount owing on the promissory note.

The applicants sought an order directing an assessment of legal accounts paid to Gowling WLG (Canada) LLP for work performed for Carolyn Brown.

Gowlings consented to the assessment but raised concerns about solicitor-client privilege over portions of its file, particularly for the period before formal counsel appointment, questioning if the applicants (Carolyn's litigation guardians) could waive this privilege.

The court ruled that the guardians, acting as guardians of property, had a legitimate purpose to obtain disclosure to ensure reasonable billing, thereby waiving the solicitor-client privilege for the assessment.

The court emphasized that while a person lacking capacity retains dignity and privacy, disclosure is permissible when necessary to protect their interests, and the assessment officer will determine the appropriate scope of production.

This supplementary costs endorsement addresses a request to reconsider a previous costs decision.

The court had initially ordered Gordon Brown to pay Christina Rudin-Brown and Jeanne Brown $150,000 in costs, which was a reduction from $200,000 due to a $50,000 payment their lawyers received from Carolyn Emily Brown's assets.

Christina Rudin-Brown and Jeanne Brown sought reconsideration, arguing the deduction effectively shifted their contribution to Gordon Brown's costs.

The court, exercising its jurisdiction to reconsider, found that while accounting for the $50,000 payment was appropriate, deducting the entire amount penalized the applicants.

To ensure fairness and avoid over-compensation, the court adjusted the deduction by 25%, reducing it to $37,500.

Consequently, Gordon Brown was ordered to pay Christina Rudin-Brown and Jeanne Brown $162,500 in substantial indemnity costs.

The court also provided direction on how these costs should be paid.

Following a trial where the court invalidated powers of attorney due to incapacity and undue influence, the successful applicants sought their costs.

The court found that the unsuccessful respondent's conduct, which included manipulating the incapable person and unnecessarily lengthening the litigation, warranted a costs award on a substantial indemnity scale.

The court ordered the respondent to pay $150,000 in costs to the applicants, rather than having the costs paid from the incapable person's assets.

The applicants sought to invalidate 2016 powers of attorney executed by their 91-year-old mother/sister-in-law in favour of her son, who lived with her.

The son brought a competing application to validate the 2016 powers of attorney and be appointed guardian.

The court found the 2016 powers of attorney were executed under suspicious circumstances and the son failed to prove the mother had the requisite capacity to execute them.

The court also found the son exercised undue influence over the mother.

The 2016 powers of attorney were declared invalid, the 2009 power of attorney for property was declared operative, and the applicants were appointed joint guardians of the person.

This decision addresses a costs dispute arising from the plaintiff's initiation of multiple proceedings that were subsequently consolidated.

The defendants, Carleton University and Urban Security and Resilience Corp., sought costs thrown away due to the duplicative actions, arguing the plaintiff could have avoided multiplicity by adding parties to the initial action under Rule 5.04(2).

The plaintiff contended that the defendants' claims for costs were unsubstantiated and that the role of one defendant was an ongoing issue.

The court found that the plaintiff's multiple proceedings were avoidable and awarded each defendant $500 in costs thrown away, payable in any event of the cause, noting that the duplicative nature might also be considered by a Master in future costs assessments.

The defendants, Carleton University and the Steering Committee, brought motions for security for costs against the plaintiff, Wilson, Young & Associates Inc., under Rule 56.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court dismissed both motions.

Carleton failed to establish "good reason to believe" the plaintiff had insufficient assets.

While the Steering Committee satisfied the condition of multiple proceedings for the same relief, its motion was dismissed due to undue delay and resulting prejudice to the plaintiff, and lack of a reasonable explanation for the delay.

The applicant filed a human rights application alleging discrimination in employment based on disability, gender identity, and age.

The respondent requested the application be deferred because the applicant had previously filed a civil claim in the Superior Court regarding her termination.

The Tribunal found that deferral was the most fair and expeditious way to proceed, as both proceedings dealt with the termination of the applicant's employment, creating a risk of duplicate evidence and inconsistent findings.

The application was deferred pending the conclusion of the civil proceeding.

The respondents requested to dismiss the human rights application under section 34(11) of the Human Rights Code, arguing the applicant had filed a civil claim seeking a remedy for an alleged Code breach.

The Tribunal found that the applicant's civil counterclaim for intrusion upon seclusion and constructive dismissal did not claim a remedy for a Code breach.

The request to dismiss was denied, and the parties were directed to provide submissions on whether the application should be deferred pending the civil claim.

Michael Beaton, a chiropractor, was tried without a jury on 10 counts of indecent assault, assault with intent to commit indecent assault, and assault (later amended to sexual assault) involving five male complainants.

The court considered expert testimony on chiropractic practice standards and the admissibility of similar fact evidence.

The judge dismissed the Crown's motion to consider "across the counts similar fact evidence," opting for individual consideration of each count.

Beaton was found not guilty on counts 1 and 2 (JM), guilty on count 3 (RD), guilty on count 5 (AV), not guilty on counts 7-9 (GO), and guilty on amended count 10 (JP).

The plaintiff, an American citizen residing in Georgia and unable to enter Canada due to a criminal record, brought a motion for examinations for discovery to be conducted by video conference.

The defendant opposed, arguing for in-person examination to assess credibility or, alternatively, for plaintiff's counsel to participate by video while defendant's counsel attended in person.

The court granted the plaintiff's motion, finding that video conferencing was the most just, cost-effective, and expeditious method, consistent with the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court emphasized that the defendant failed to provide evidence of the plaintiff's lack of credibility or any disadvantage from a video examination.

The insurer brought a motion to compel the insured to attend an independent medical examination (IME) with a psychologist and to stay the arbitration pending the examination.

The insured had submitted reports from a psychologist and a psychiatrist supporting her claim for catastrophic impairment.

The insurer had previously obtained reports from a psychiatrist and an occupational therapist who opined that the insured's complaints were not accident-related, but the insurer had not obtained a psychological assessment.

After receiving an updated report from the insured's psychologist, the insurer requested a psychological IME.

The Arbitrator found the request reasonable and necessary to allow the insurer to assess the catastrophic impairment claim and ensure a fair hearing.

The motion to compel the IME was granted, but the request for a stay was dismissed as there was ample time before the hearing.