Amanda Genevieve Machado Bettencourt

This endorsement addresses the costs arising from two motions in an estates matter: one brought by Royal Trust Corporation of Canada (Estate Trustee) to appoint the Public Guardian and Trustee as Litigation Guardian for Raymonde Haddad, and a cross-motion by Doris Haddad-Bejjani seeking her own appointment.

Royal Trust's motion was granted, and Doris's motion was dismissed.

The court, applying the modern approach to costs in estates litigation, found Royal Trust, the Children's Lawyer, and Rosemary Whelan to be successful parties.

Doris Haddad-Bejjani, as the unsuccessful party whose conduct complicated the proceedings, was ordered to pay partial indemnity costs to the successful parties from her testamentary trust.

The balance of Royal Trust's and the Children's Lawyer's full indemnity costs were ordered to be paid from the capital of the Estate.

This endorsement addresses competing motions for the appointment of a litigation guardian for Raymonde Haddad, a mentally incapable beneficiary of the Estate of Paul Haddad.

Royal Trust Corporation of Canada, as Estate Trustee, sought to appoint the Public Guardian and Trustee (PGT) as litigation guardian for Raymonde in ongoing estate proceedings (Interpretation Application and Passing Application).

Raymonde's daughter, Doris Haddad-Bejjani, who had been purporting to represent Raymonde under a Continuing Power of Attorney for Property, brought a cross-motion to be appointed as litigation guardian herself.

The court found Raymonde to be a party under disability based on extensive medical evidence.

Doris's motion was dismissed due to a clear conflict of interest, as her personal interests in the estate's distribution were adverse to Raymonde's.

The court granted Royal Trust's motion, appointing the PGT as Raymonde's litigation guardian, emphasizing the PGT's role as a guardian of last resort when no other proper person is willing and able to act without conflict.

This is an appeal from a Superior Court of Justice order concerning an estate trustee's conflict of interest and a claim for compensation.

The appellant argued that the application judge made palpable or overriding errors in her findings of fact and application of law.

The Court of Appeal found no such errors, affirming the lower court's determination that a conflict of interest prevented the appellant from continuing as estate trustee and upholding the decision on the appellant's compensation claim.

The appeal was dismissed with costs.

This protracted estate litigation involved an application by Richard Belanger seeking to refer various estate administration issues, including those related to a "butterfly transaction," to a retired judge, Mr. McGarry, for arbitration or reference.

A responding motion by Judith Olivastri sought to dismiss Belanger's application.

The court found that the "Agreement in Principle" between the siblings contemplated a court-directed reference, not arbitration, and that the condition precedent for this agreement (CRA approval of the butterfly transaction) had not been met.

Furthermore, the agreement to refer issues to Mr. McGarry was limited to "outstanding applications and motions" at the time of the agreement, which did not include disputes about the butterfly transaction itself.

The court also clarified that a motion for summary judgment (Rule 20) or to stay/dismiss an action (Rule 21.01(3)(c)) is not applicable to applications.

Belanger's application was dismissed.

The appellant challenged her father's will and an inter vivos transfer of his house to the respondent, alleging undue influence.

The trial judge rejected the claim.

On appeal, the appellant argued that the relationship between the testator and respondent gave rise to a presumption of undue influence that the respondent failed to rebut.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the rebuttable presumption of undue influence applies only to inter vivos transactions, not testamentary gifts.

In testamentary matters, the party attacking the will bears the onus of proving undue influence on a balance of probabilities.

Although the trial judge erred in conflating the two tests, this error did not affect the reasonableness of his conclusion that no undue influence occurred, as his findings were firmly rooted in the evidence.