Michele Valentini

The applicants, a First Nation and its former Chief, brought an application under Rule 14.05(3)(d) and (h) seeking declaratory relief regarding the interpretation of the Environmental Assessment Act and the Crown's Duty to Consult and Accommodate.

The application arose in the context of the proposed Marten Falls Community Access Road in the Ring of Fire region.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding it lacked jurisdiction to rewrite legislation or provide a de facto reference on how the Crown should discharge its duty in the future without a live factual dispute.

The court held that the application did not raise a justiciable issue and was not properly brought under the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The appellants sought to consolidate two leave to appeal proceedings before the Court of Appeal, arising from regulatory action by the Chief Animal Welfare Inspector concerning sled dogs.

The first leave application related to the legality of dog removal and compliance orders, while the second concerned a statement of account for dog care costs.

The court applied Rule 6.01(1) of the Rules of Civil Procedure, finding a common factual origin but distinct legal questions.

The motion judge dismissed the consolidation request, concluding that the balance of convenience did not favour consolidation, as there was little efficiency to be gained in written leave applications and the potential prejudice to the respondent outweighed marginal benefits.

This case involved an application seeking various forms of relief, including access to an apartment and personal protection, which the court found to be without legal merit and an abuse of process under Rule 2.1.01.

The court determined that the primary relief sought, related to residential tenancy, fell under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Landlord and Tenant Board.

The application was dismissed as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process, with no costs awarded.

The defendants/plaintiffs by counterclaim brought an urgent motion for an interim injunction to restrain the plaintiffs/defendants to the counterclaim from publishing defamatory statements and images on Instagram and other internet platforms, and from contacting them.

The court found that the moving parties met the stringent test for an interlocutory injunction in a defamation context, noting the extensive and vitriolic nature of the posts, which included threats and the improper use of information obtained through ex parte Anton Piller and Mareva orders.

The motion was granted.

Following the dismissal of the plaintiff's claim for a real estate commission after a mini-trial, the defendants sought costs.

The defendants had made a Rule 49 offer to settle for $10,000, which the plaintiff rejected.

The court found that the plaintiff's decision to proceed to trial despite the clear evidence and the settlement offer justified the costs claimed.

The court awarded the defendants $143,931.31 in costs, representing partial indemnity up to the date of the offer and substantial indemnity thereafter.

The defendants (plaintiffs by counterclaim) brought an urgent motion for interim injunctive relief to stop the plaintiffs and their principals from engaging in a relentless campaign of online harassment and defamation via Instagram.

The dispute originated from a failed transaction involving luxury handbags and watches, which previously led to ex parte Mareva and Anton Piller orders against the defendants.

The court found that the principals of the plaintiff corporation had posted highly defamatory statements, threats, and images obtained from the execution of the court orders.

Applying the stringent test for defamation injunctions, the court granted the requested relief, ordering the removal of the posts and restraining further contact and publication.

The plaintiff real estate brokerage sought commission from the corporate defendants after an initial agreement of purchase and sale was terminated during the due diligence period, and a subsequent agreement was entered into by a different corporate entity.

The court held a mini-trial to determine the ownership of the corporations, the intentionality of terminating the first agreement, and the circumstances of the second agreement.

The court found that the two corporations were separate legal entities with different investors, the first agreement was terminated legitimately due to unsatisfactory due diligence, and there was no basis to pierce the corporate veil.

The plaintiff's action was dismissed.

A pedestrian struck by a vehicle in 2008 received statutory accident benefits for attendant care and housekeeping until the insurer terminated them in 2010.

In 2015, after receiving a catastrophic impairment designation, the claimant reapplied for benefits.

The Tribunal and Divisional Court found the claim was out of time based on a two-year limitation period.

The Court of Appeal allowed the appeal, finding that the limitation period was subject to the rule of discoverability and was not a hard limitation period.

The court held that applying a hard limitation period would be contrary to the consumer protection purposes of the Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule and would produce an absurd result by barring claims before the claimant was eligible to make them.