Patrick Joseph Hawkins

The court issued a costs endorsement following mixed results on related motions, which included certifying a class action for intrusion upon seclusion, dismissing a motion to appoint a new representative plaintiff, granting summary judgment for the defendants on a negligence claim, and dismissing the defendants' summary judgment motion on the intrusion upon seclusion claim.

Given the mixed outcomes, the novelty of the intrusion upon seclusion tort in this context, and the potentially modest damages, the court ordered that costs of these motions shall be in the cause of the common issues trial.

The plaintiffs brought a Rule 21 motion seeking a declaration that Rouge Valley Health System was estopped from denying liability for various statutory and common law causes of action, based on an Order from the Information and Privacy Commissioner (PHIPA Order HO-013).

The court dismissed the motion, exercising its discretion under the doctrines of issue estoppel and abuse of process.

It found that applying issue estoppel would be procedurally and substantively unfair given the magnitude of the class action ($400 million) against a public institution, and the informal, discretionary nature of the administrative tribunal's proceedings, which focused on its privacy law mandate rather than complex civil law.

The court also noted that such an application would be inimical to the due administration of justice by discouraging settlements with the Commissioner.

This dental malpractice action involved two summary judgment motions based on limitation periods.

The defendant dental surgeon, Dr. Harper, argued the action was time-barred by the one-year limitation period in the Health Professions Procedural Code.

The defendant Hospital relied on the two-year limitation period in the Public Hospitals Act.

The court dismissed Dr. Harper's motion, finding a genuine issue for trial regarding the plaintiff's discoverability of biological hazards.

However, the Hospital's motion was granted, as its limitation period was not subject to discoverability and had expired years before the action was commenced.