Patrick Joseph Hawkins

The self-represented plaintiff brought a $200 million action against the provincial Crown, the Secretary of the Cabinet, a hospital, and various physicians, alleging medical malpractice and abuse of power.

The Crown requested a dismissal under Rule 2.1.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The court found the claim against the government defendants lacked any legal basis or material facts, and the claim against the other defendants was an abuse of process as it duplicated an existing action.

The court dismissed the action in its entirety as frivolous, vexatious, and an abuse of process.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the Health Professionals Appeal and Review Board (HPARB) upholding the suspension of his privileges and revocation of his hospital appointment for failing to comply with a mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that HPARB reasonably applied the Matangi test to uphold the policy, properly admitted expert evidence on infectious diseases, and correctly restricted its evidentiary review to the information available at the time the hospital made its decision.

The court found no procedural unfairness or bias that would vitiate the decision.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal an unreported order dated April 11, 2022.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal without costs.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board (HPARB) confirming the respondent hospitals' decision not to renew his hospital privileges.

The non-renewal was based on a long-standing pattern of disruptive behaviour and an inability to maintain collegial relationships with colleagues and staff, which jeopardized patient safety.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding no palpable and overriding error in the HPARB's conclusion that the appellant's conduct led to a complete breakdown of trust and confidence.

The court also dismissed the appellant's late motions to amend his notice of appeal and adduce fresh evidence.

The defendants appealed a decision certifying a class action for intrusion upon seclusion.

The claim arose after a hospital nurse improperly accessed thousands of patient records to steal narcotics from an automated dispensing unit.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal and set aside the certification order, finding that the nurse's fleeting access to limited health information for the sole purpose of stealing drugs did not meet the 'highly offensive' threshold required for the tort of intrusion upon seclusion.

The moving parties, Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario and Joel Breault, brought a motion for leave to appeal an order of Croll J. dated September 24, 2021.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

Costs were fixed at $2,500 for the Landry plaintiffs and $2,500 for the Davies defendants, payable by the moving parties.

The defendants brought motions for leave to appeal an order regarding Rule 20 summary judgment motions and a class action certification motion.

The Divisional Court granted leave to appeal with respect to the Rule 20 motions and the certification criteria under section 5(1)(a) of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992.

Costs of the leave motions were fixed at $2,500 to the successful party on the appeal.

The court issued a costs endorsement following mixed results on related motions, which included certifying a class action for intrusion upon seclusion, dismissing a motion to appoint a new representative plaintiff, granting summary judgment for the defendants on a negligence claim, and dismissing the defendants' summary judgment motion on the intrusion upon seclusion claim.

Given the mixed outcomes, the novelty of the intrusion upon seclusion tort in this context, and the potentially modest damages, the court ordered that costs of these motions shall be in the cause of the common issues trial.

The plaintiff sought to certify a class action against a hospital and a former nurse who improperly accessed thousands of patient records to steal Percocet.

The defendants opposed certification and moved for summary judgment, arguing the privacy breach was fleeting and caused no compensable harm.

The court certified the class action for the tort of intrusion upon seclusion, finding that even a minimal intrusion into highly private health records could be considered 'highly offensive'.

However, the court granted summary judgment dismissing the negligence claim, as the plaintiffs suffered no actual compensable harm.

The plaintiff's motion to substitute a new representative plaintiff was also dismissed due to the proposed representative's unsuitability.

Following the dismissal of two proposed class action certification motions and a Rule 21 motion regarding the unauthorized sale of hospital patient contact information to RESP sales representatives, the successful defendants sought costs totaling over $690,000.

The Law Foundation of Ontario, which had indemnified the plaintiffs, argued that no costs should be awarded due to the novelty of the legal issues and the significant public interest in the protection of health privacy.

The court agreed, finding that the case raised novel questions about commercial liability for purloined patient information and engaged important public policy issues.

Applying section 31 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, the court exercised its discretion to make no order as to costs.

The plaintiffs brought a Rule 21 motion seeking a declaration that Rouge Valley Health System was estopped from denying liability for various statutory and common law causes of action, based on an Order from the Information and Privacy Commissioner (PHIPA Order HO-013).

The court dismissed the motion, exercising its discretion under the doctrines of issue estoppel and abuse of process.

It found that applying issue estoppel would be procedurally and substantively unfair given the magnitude of the class action ($400 million) against a public institution, and the informal, discretionary nature of the administrative tribunal's proceedings, which focused on its privacy law mandate rather than complex civil law.

The court also noted that such an application would be inimical to the due administration of justice by discouraging settlements with the Commissioner.

Two proposed privacy class actions arising from hospital employees’ unauthorized extraction of patient contact information for RESP sales leads were refused certification.

The court held that, on the actual evidentiary record, the disclosure of contact information alone, without disclosure of medical records or other objectively private information, could not support the tort of intrusion on seclusion because there was intrusion but no legally sufficient seclusion and no objectively highly offensive invasion.

Although certain claims, including a PHIPA s. 65 claim and some negligence theories against the hospitals and rogue employees, were arguable at the pleadings stage, there were no viable common issues and a class proceeding was not the preferable procedure.

Small Claims Court proceedings or PHIPA-related processes were found more proportionate for any remaining individualized claims.

This dental malpractice action involved two summary judgment motions based on limitation periods.

The defendant dental surgeon, Dr. Harper, argued the action was time-barred by the one-year limitation period in the Health Professions Procedural Code.

The defendant Hospital relied on the two-year limitation period in the Public Hospitals Act.

The court dismissed Dr. Harper's motion, finding a genuine issue for trial regarding the plaintiff's discoverability of biological hazards.

However, the Hospital's motion was granted, as its limitation period was not subject to discoverability and had expired years before the action was commenced.

The appellant physician appealed a decision of the Health Professions Appeal and Review Board upholding the revocation of his hospital privileges.

The revocation followed a series of incidents involving workplace harassment of a nurse and unauthorized access to her personal health records.

The Divisional Court dismissed the appeal, finding that the Appeal Board applied the correct test under the Public Hospitals Act, did not improperly reverse the burden of proof regarding the appellant's mental health claims, and reached a reasonable and proportionate decision given the egregious nature of the past misconduct.

The plaintiff brought a proposed class action for the common law tort of intrusion upon seclusion after hospital staff improperly accessed patient records.

The defendants moved to strike the claim, arguing that the Personal Health Information Protection Act (PHIPA) constitutes an exhaustive code that ousts the Superior Court's jurisdiction.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that PHIPA does not create an exhaustive code.

The Act's language, its highly discretionary review procedure tailored for systemic issues, and its explicit contemplation of other proceedings indicate that the legislature did not intend to preclude common law claims for breach of privacy.

The moving parties (plaintiffs in a proposed class proceeding for privacy breach) brought a motion to quash the defendant hospital's appeal to the Court of Appeal.

They argued the motion judge's order refusing to strike their claim for lack of jurisdiction under the Personal Health Information Protection Act was interlocutory, meaning the appeal should go to the Divisional Court.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion to quash, holding that an order refusing to dismiss or stay an action based on lack of jurisdiction over the subject matter is a final order, as it precludes the defendant from continuing to dispute jurisdiction.

Therefore, the appeal was properly before the Court of Appeal.

The plaintiff brought a class action against Health Canada for negligent regulation of a jaw implant device, limiting her claim to damages attributable to Health Canada's proportionate degree of fault.

The defendant brought a third-party claim against the dental surgeon and hospital for contribution and indemnity.

The Court of Appeal upheld the dismissal of the third-party claim, confirming that because the plaintiff limited her claim to the defendant's several liability, the defendant had no right to contribution.

The Court also clarified that fault can be apportioned against non-parties under the Negligence Act.

The Attorney General applied for judicial review of a Consent and Capacity Board decision which held that the Board had jurisdiction to determine the constitutional validity of the community treatment order (CTO) provisions of the Mental Health Act.

The Divisional Court applied the Martin test and concluded that the Board's mandate involves applying facts to prescribed statutory criteria, not deciding questions of law.

Furthermore, the strict statutory timelines for Board hearings rebut any presumption of jurisdiction to hear complex Charter challenges.

The application for judicial review was allowed and the Board's decision on jurisdiction was quashed.