David Murray Williams Young

The appellants commenced an action in 2017 for negligent investigation and malicious prosecution.

After years of delay and failure to comply with a timetable order, the motion judge dismissed the action for delay in 2025.

On appeal, the appellants argued the motion judge erred in finding the delay was intentional and in failing to specifically find prejudice.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, holding that the motion judge's finding of intentional delay was supported by the record and that inordinate delay can itself be prejudicial, with the burden on the appellants to disprove prejudice.

The defendants brought a motion for summary judgment to dismiss the plaintiffs' action regarding a collapsed hog barn, arguing it was barred by the 15-year ultimate limitation period under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiffs argued the limitation period was tolled due to the defendants' wilful concealment of construction deficiencies.

The court found a genuine issue requiring a trial regarding the fraudulent concealment exception for the corporate defendants and dismissed their motion.

However, the court granted summary judgment dismissing the action against the individual engineer defendants, finding they were protected by a limitation of liability clause in their employer's contract.

The moving parties (defendants) brought a motion for leave to appeal the orders of Belobaba J. dated January 6, 2022.

The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal, with costs fixed at $5,000 payable to the Foodland plaintiffs.

The plaintiffs brought a motion to strike the defendant's jury notice in a motor vehicle accident claim due to severe trial delays caused by the COVID-19 pandemic.

The court granted leave to bring the motion after the action was set down for trial, finding the pandemic constituted a substantial change in circumstances.

The court provisionally struck the jury notice to prevent prejudice to the 83-year-old plaintiff, ordering that the trial proceed by judge alone unless civil jury trials have resumed when the case is called.

This decision concerns a consent certification motion in a class action arising from a six-alarm electrical fire at 650 Parliament Street, Toronto, which displaced hundreds of tenants.

The court certified the action as a class proceeding against the core defendants, Parwell Investments Inc. and 650 Parliament (LHB) Investments Limited, on the common issue of negligence.

The certification was granted based on the parties' agreement, satisfying the requirements of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, including an identifiable class, common issues, preferability of a class proceeding, and suitable representative plaintiffs.

The order defined the class, appointed representative plaintiffs, declared negligence as the cause of action, and outlined specific common issues related to the defendants' duty and breach of care concerning the building's design, construction, operation, maintenance, and electrical systems.

No costs were awarded for the motion.

Two competing class actions were filed following a six-alarm electrical fire that displaced hundreds of tenants at 650 Parliament Street.

The court heard a carriage motion to determine which law firm should proceed.

Finding both firms equally qualified and prepared, the court awarded carriage to the Strosberg/Charney consortium in the Chu action based on their fee arrangement, which would result in a significantly larger net recovery for the class members compared to the competing firm's fixed fee and third-party funding arrangement.

Following the dismissal of two proposed class action certification motions and a Rule 21 motion regarding the unauthorized sale of hospital patient contact information to RESP sales representatives, the successful defendants sought costs totaling over $690,000.

The Law Foundation of Ontario, which had indemnified the plaintiffs, argued that no costs should be awarded due to the novelty of the legal issues and the significant public interest in the protection of health privacy.

The court agreed, finding that the case raised novel questions about commercial liability for purloined patient information and engaged important public policy issues.

Applying section 31 of the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, the court exercised its discretion to make no order as to costs.

Two proposed privacy class actions arising from hospital employees’ unauthorized extraction of patient contact information for RESP sales leads were refused certification.

The court held that, on the actual evidentiary record, the disclosure of contact information alone, without disclosure of medical records or other objectively private information, could not support the tort of intrusion on seclusion because there was intrusion but no legally sufficient seclusion and no objectively highly offensive invasion.

Although certain claims, including a PHIPA s. 65 claim and some negligence theories against the hospitals and rogue employees, were arguable at the pleadings stage, there were no viable common issues and a class proceeding was not the preferable procedure.

Small Claims Court proceedings or PHIPA-related processes were found more proportionate for any remaining individualized claims.

In a negligence appeal concerning injuries suffered after minors stole an unlocked vehicle from a commercial garage, the Court addressed whether the garage owner owed a duty of care to the injured passenger.

The majority held that while theft risk was foreseeable, the record did not establish reasonable foreseeability of personal injury from unsafe operation of the stolen vehicle in the specific circumstances.

Applying Anns/Cooper, the majority found the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie duty of care and dismissed the claim against the garage owner.

The dissent would have upheld the existing duty category for foreseeable physical injury and maintained liability findings.

The appellant commercial garage owner appealed a jury verdict finding him 37% liable for catastrophic injuries suffered by a minor who, along with a friend, stole an unlocked car with the keys left inside from the garage lot.

The Court of Appeal conducted an Anns-Cooper analysis and upheld the finding that the garage owner owed a duty of care to the minors, as the risk of theft and joyriding by minors was reasonably foreseeable and the garage owner had a responsibility to secure the vehicles.

The court found no residual policy considerations to negate the duty, noting that the minor's illegal conduct was properly addressed through contributory negligence rather than denying a duty of care.

The appeal was dismissed.

The plaintiff, Terrace Bay Pulp Inc., moved to set aside a registrar's order dismissing its action for delay, which was the second such dismissal.

The motion was brought under Rule 37.14.

The court applied the four Reid factors (explanation for delay, inadvertence, promptness, and prejudice to defendants) contextually.

It found the plaintiff adequately explained the delay, particularly given the complex multi-party litigation, the need to add parties, and difficulties obtaining documents due to CCAA proceedings and asset sale.

The court found no presumption of prejudice arose and no actual prejudice was demonstrated by the opposing fourth party, ABB Inc. The court also considered recent amendments to Rule 48.14 as a relevant factor favoring the plaintiff.

The motion was granted, setting aside the dismissal order and establishing a new timetable.

Multiple motions arising from five civil proceedings related to the Algo Centre Mall collapse sought transfer of a certified class action to Sault Ste.

Marie, trial together or common case management of related actions, and appointment of a single motions judge.

The court held that opt-out plaintiffs in separate proceedings lacked standing under rule 13.1.02 to seek transfer of the class action, and in any event failed to show that Sault Ste.

Marie was a significantly better venue than Toronto in the interest of justice.

The court further declined relief under s. 107(1) of the Courts of Justice Act because any transfer necessary to enable common case management or trial together would impose substantial cost and inefficiency, particularly given the existing class action case management structure.

Appointment of a rule 37.15 judge was also refused.

Both sides moved for summary judgment arising from a rental vehicle dispute that led to the plaintiff being charged with theft after the defendants reported the vehicle stolen.

The court held there is no tort of negligent investigation against private informants who are not in the business of investigation, and found the malicious prosecution claim failed because the police initiated the charge, reasonable and probable grounds existed, and there was no evidence of malice.

The defamation claim also failed because communications to police were protected by qualified privilege and malice was not established.

Summary judgment was granted dismissing the action, with costs awarded to the defendants.

The appellant entered into a contract with the respondent for the storage of vaccines in a temperature-controlled warehouse.

The contract required the appellant to maintain all-risk property insurance.

After the cooling system malfunctioned and destroyed the vaccines, the appellant's insurer brought a subrogated action against the respondent and other contractors involved in the warehouse's operations.

The Court of Appeal upheld the summary judgment dismissing the action, finding that the insurance covenant barred the claim against the respondent (except for a $100,000 negligence carve-out) and that the other contractors were third-party beneficiaries of this protection.

The appellant appealed a decision dismissing her motion to add her co-plaintiff as a party defendant in a motor vehicle accident claim.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, finding that the appellant should have known of the co-plaintiff's potential liability years earlier when the statement of defence and counterclaim was delivered.

The motion to add the party was brought too late.

The appellant appealed a jury verdict finding the respondent not negligent in a snowmobile accident.

The appellant argued the trial judge erred in interpreting s. 10 of Regulation 804 under the Motorized Snow Vehicles Act and in admitting marijuana-related evidence.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, agreeing that the appellant was 'on a highway' whether on the paved portion or the shoulder.

The court found the jury was properly instructed on the respondent's potential negligence.

Because the jury found the respondent not negligent, the admissibility of the marijuana evidence relevant to the appellant's contributory negligence was moot.

In a fatal motor vehicle accident action, certain defendants moved for summary judgment dismissing the claims and crossclaim against them.

The evidence established that the moving defendant was travelling in his proper lane at a reduced speed in poor winter conditions when the opposing vehicle suddenly crossed into his lane.

The responding party argued that a jury might nevertheless infer negligence if the witnesses were examined at trial.

The court held that speculation about possible inferences did not create a genuine issue requiring a trial and applied the full appreciation test for summary judgment.

Finding no evidence that the moving defendant acted negligently, the court granted summary judgment dismissing the action and crossclaim against the moving defendants.