John Ashley Friendly

The Minister of Public and Business Service Delivery, operating the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund, sought to recover pre-arbitration expenses from two insurers who had accepted priority for Statutory Accident Benefits claims without proceeding to arbitration.

The insurers argued that the Fund was required to arbitrate the dispute and that pre-arbitration expenses were not recoverable.

The Superior Court of Justice held that the 'proper case' exception allowed the Fund to seek restitution in court because there was no dispute over the payment of benefits to arbitrate.

The court found that the insurers were unjustly enriched by the Fund's investigative work and ordered them to reimburse the Fund for its pre-arbitration expenses.

This appeal concerns the interpretation of "involved in the incident" under section 268(2) of the Insurance Act, which dictates liability for statutory accident benefits.

The Court of Appeal affirmed the Superior Court's decision that an arbitrator erred in law by introducing a causation requirement into the test for "involvement" in a priority dispute between an insured snowmobile's insurer (Gore Mutual) and the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund.

The Court held that temporal, spatial, and participatory factors were sufficient to establish involvement, without requiring a direct causal link to the injuries.

This appeal concerned the interpretation of an exclusion clause (s. 1.8.2) in the standard Ontario Automobile Policy regarding uninsured motorist coverage for passengers in a stolen vehicle.

The motion judge had ruled that the exclusion applied to the plaintiff passenger, Joshua Burnham, even if he did not know the vehicle was stolen, thereby shifting liability to the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund.

The Court of Appeal reversed this decision, holding that the exclusion does not apply to innocent passengers in the insured vehicle, aligning with the policy's legislative history and purpose to expand coverage and reduce reliance on the Fund.

The plaintiff, Shobrook Corporation, was successful in its motion to amend its Statement of Claim and sought substantial indemnity costs.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs of $28,933, finding that while the defendants' conduct unnecessarily lengthened and complicated the motion, it did not meet the high threshold for reprehensible conduct required for substantial indemnity.

The court also ordered a further day of discovery and the appointment of a new Case Management Judge due to the procedural difficulties encountered.

The plaintiff, Shobrook Corporation, brought a motion to amend its Statement of Claim to increase the damages claimed from $750,000 to $8,700,000 and to limit its claim to insurance coverage, as well as to obtain leave to bring this motion after the matter had been set down for trial.

The defendants opposed the amendments, arguing they were untenable, caused non-compensable prejudice, and were brought with inordinate delay.

The court granted the plaintiff leave to bring the motion and to amend its Statement of Claim, finding that the proposed amendments did not introduce a new cause of action, did not cause non-compensable prejudice, and that any presumed prejudice due to delay was rebutted.

The court emphasized that the original claim already encompassed the nature of the increased damages.

The appellant Minister appealed an arbitrator's decision holding the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund liable to pay statutory accident benefits to a passenger injured in a snowmobile accident.

The passenger was riding on an uninsured snowmobile that crashed into a tree, followed 0.6 seconds later by an insured snowmobile crashing into the same tree.

The arbitrator found the insured snowmobile was not 'involved in the incident' because it did not cause or contribute to the injuries.

The Superior Court allowed the appeal, holding that the arbitrator erred in law by engrafting a causation requirement onto the plain meaning of 'involved in the incident' under s. 268(2)(1)(iii) of the Insurance Act.

This endorsement addresses costs following a motion where the defendant Lida Zhang successfully obtained an order staying enforcement of a judgment against him by the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund.

Zhang sought partial indemnity costs from the Fund, arguing he was the successful party.

The Fund contended success was divided and cited its statutory function.

The court found Zhang was successful against the Fund and awarded him $39,096.65 in partial indemnity costs, declining to apply Rule 49 for substantial indemnity due to issues with Zhang's settlement offer.

The moving party, an employee who drove a tour bus involved in a pedestrian collision, sought to set aside or stay a judgment entered against him.

Unbeknownst to him, his employer's vehicle was uninsured, he was never served with the statement of claim, and the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund had taken over the defence and settled the action for $231,068.

The court declined to set aside the judgment due to the prejudice it would cause the plaintiff and the Fund's statutory framework.

However, the court granted a stay of execution against the employee, finding it would be unjust to enforce the judgment against him given his reasonable belief that the commercial vehicle was insured and his complete lack of knowledge of the litigation.

The Minister of Finance appealed an arbitration award that found the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund, not Echelon General Insurance Company, liable for statutory accident benefits (SABs) to an injured pedestrian.

The arbitrator had concluded that the insured's email constituted a valid request to terminate his automobile insurance policy, thereby absolving Echelon of liability.

The Minister argued the arbitrator's decision was unreasonable, contending the email was not a clear request, the context of Echelon's prior ineffective cancellation was ignored, and the decision frustrated consumer protection policies.

The court dismissed the Minister's appeal, finding the arbitrator's interpretation of "request" under the Statutory Conditions was reasonable and consistent with case law, which imposes no formal requirements on an insured's termination request.

This appeal concerned an arbitrator's decision regarding priority for statutory accident benefits following a motor vehicle accident.

The dispute was between State Farm Mutual Insurance Company and Her Majesty the Queen in Right of Ontario (representing the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund) over whether two claimants, Latchman Sanichar and Asha Basdeo, were 'principally dependent' on State Farm's insured, Prakash Doodram, for financial support.

The court reviewed the arbitrator's decision on a reasonableness standard.

The appeal was granted in part: the arbitrator's finding that Asha was not principally dependent on Prakash was deemed unreasonable and set aside, making State Farm the priority insurer for Asha.

However, the arbitrator's finding that Latchman was not principally dependent on Prakash was affirmed as reasonable, meaning State Farm was not the priority insurer for Latchman.

The appeal on costs was also granted, with no costs awarded due to divided success.

In a negligence appeal concerning injuries suffered after minors stole an unlocked vehicle from a commercial garage, the Court addressed whether the garage owner owed a duty of care to the injured passenger.

The majority held that while theft risk was foreseeable, the record did not establish reasonable foreseeability of personal injury from unsafe operation of the stolen vehicle in the specific circumstances.

Applying Anns/Cooper, the majority found the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie duty of care and dismissed the claim against the garage owner.

The dissent would have upheld the existing duty category for foreseeable physical injury and maintained liability findings.

Farmers' Mutual Insurance Company (Lindsay) appealed an arbitration decision that found its commercial umbrella liability policy covered Statutory Accident Benefits Schedule (SABS) benefits for an all-terrain vehicle (ATV) accident.

The court, reviewing for reasonableness, found the arbitrator erred in interpreting the definition of 'automobile' within the Umbrella policy.

However, the court concluded that the ATV was covered under Farmers' standard Ontario Automobile Policy (OAP) via the 'Newly Acquired Automobiles' provision, due to the Umbrella policy's effect on the OAP's prerequisite that the insurer insure all automobiles owned by the insured.

Consequently, Farmers' appeal was dismissed, and the Minister of Finance's cross-appeal was allowed, affirming Farmers as the priority insurer responsible for SABS benefits.

The appellant, an undocumented immigrant living in Ontario, was struck by an unidentified motorist and sought compensation from the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund.

The Superintendent denied the claim under s. 25(1) of the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Act, arguing the appellant was not ordinarily resident in Ontario.

The motion judge granted summary judgment to the Superintendent, finding the appellant's presence was illegal and deceptive.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the appeal, confirming that the Superintendent only needed to prove the appellant was not ordinarily resident in Ontario, not his specific foreign jurisdiction of residence.

The Minister of Finance appealed an arbitrator's preliminary award concerning an automobile insurance policy.

Echelon General Insurance Company had attempted to cancel a six-month policy for non-payment, but the cancellation was invalid due to non-compliance with the notice requirements of s. 236 of the Insurance Act.

The arbitrator ruled the policy expired at the end of its term, not extended by s. 236.

The Superior Court of Justice allowed the appeal, holding that s. 236(5) unambiguously states a contract of insurance remains in force until the statutory notice provisions for renewal or non-renewal are complied with.

The court found that Echelon's policy was not properly cancelled and therefore remained in force at the time of the accident, overriding common law contract principles regarding policy expiry.

The plaintiff, Igal Shapiro, claimed insurance benefits from Economical Mutual Insurance Company (his father's insurer) or compensation from the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund after being hit by an unidentified driver.

Economical and the Superintendent of Financial Services brought motions for summary judgment to dismiss the claim, arguing that the plaintiff failed to prove he was hit by an "unidentified automobile" as defined by the Insurance Act and the MVAC Act, and did not make reasonable efforts to identify the driver.

The court found that the plaintiff did not meet his burden of proving injury by an "unidentified motorist" and that the evidence presented was insufficient to raise a genuine issue for trial.

The motions for summary judgment were granted, dismissing the plaintiff's action against Economical and implicitly against the Superintendent.

The plaintiffs were entirely successful on a motion to add a proposed defendant after the expiry of the limitation period.

Both sides sought costs of the motion.

The proposed defendant argued that the plaintiffs' conscious decision not to add him within the limitation period caused the motion.

The court found that the proposed defendant's insurer chose to oppose the motion rather than pleading the limitation period and bringing a summary judgment motion, effectively giving itself two chances to defeat the claim.

The court awarded partial indemnity costs to the plaintiffs, fixed at the exact amount the proposed defendant had claimed as reasonable costs if he had been successful.

The appellant Minister appealed a motion judge's order regarding the interpretation of a previous costs order made by a deceased judge.

The previous order required the respondent to pay costs to the Minister from proceeds received from her insurer.

The motion judge interpreted this to mean costs were only payable if the matter proceeded to trial, not if it settled.

The Divisional Court allowed the appeal, finding no logical basis for the motion judge's interpretation, and ordered the respondent to pay the costs from her settlement proceeds.

The plaintiff moved to set aside a registrar’s order dismissing a personal injury action as abandoned following a motor vehicle accident involving an unidentified driver.

Applying the contextual approach endorsed in appellate authority, the court treated the Reid criteria as central but not rigid prerequisites.

Although the plaintiff’s counsel did not fully explain every delay and the motion was not brought promptly, the court found the plaintiff intended to prosecute the action and that the responding insurer bore greater responsibility for the dismissal because it obtained indulgences yet failed to file even a notice of intent to defend.

In the absence of evidence of actual prejudice, the balance of justice favoured reinstating the action.

The defendant, the Superintendent of Financial Services, brought a motion for security for costs against the plaintiff, who was ordinarily resident in Brazil.

The plaintiff opposed the motion, arguing impecuniosity and that his claim against the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund was not barred despite his illegal residency status in Canada at the time of the accident.

The court found the plaintiff failed to establish impecuniosity, as he had a brother in Ontario with income and unexplained post-accident earnings.

The court deemed the merits of the claim a neutral factor, leaving the statutory interpretation issue for a pending summary judgment motion.

The motion was granted, and the plaintiff was ordered to post $25,000 in security for costs in installments.

The Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund commenced an action against an insurer seeking reimbursement of accident benefits after serving a Notice of Dispute under the inter‑insurer arbitration regime created by Ontario Regulation 283/95 under the Insurance Act.

The insurer moved for summary judgment arguing that once the Fund initiated the statutory arbitration process it could not abandon that process and instead pursue restitution through litigation.

The court held that the Fund had sufficient information to commence arbitration within the one‑year time limit but failed to follow up and allowed the limitation period to expire.

The “proper case” exception permitting a restitution action outside the arbitration regime did not apply where the Fund’s inability to arbitrate arose from its own inaction.

Summary judgment was therefore granted dismissing the action.