William Scott

This appeal concerned the interpretation of a comprehensive liability insurance policy regarding coverage for legal costs incurred by an insured (Houghton) in a public judicial inquiry and by the corporate insured (EPCOR) in indemnifying Houghton.

The Court of Appeal affirmed that the insurer (MEARIE) was obligated to cover Houghton's inquiry costs under Coverage G, as the inquiry constituted a "proceeding brought against the Insured... under any statute." However, the court reversed the lower court's finding that EPCOR's costs related to indemnifying Houghton were covered under Coverage E, ruling that EPCOR's liability arose from its corporate bylaw, not a "Wrongful Act" covered by the policy.

The court also upheld the costs award against the insurer due to its vague initial denial of coverage.

The moving party, an employee who drove a tour bus involved in a pedestrian collision, sought to set aside or stay a judgment entered against him.

Unbeknownst to him, his employer's vehicle was uninsured, he was never served with the statement of claim, and the Motor Vehicle Accident Claims Fund had taken over the defence and settled the action for $231,068.

The court declined to set aside the judgment due to the prejudice it would cause the plaintiff and the Fund's statutory framework.

However, the court granted a stay of execution against the employee, finding it would be unjust to enforce the judgment against him given his reasonable belief that the commercial vehicle was insured and his complete lack of knowledge of the litigation.

The appellants appealed a Master's decision that had set aside an administrative dismissal of a personal injury action.

The action was dismissed in 2011 due to the plaintiffs' counsel's delay, and the motion to set aside the dismissal was not brought for 2.5 years.

The Superior Court found that the Master erred in law by misinterpreting the statutory context of Rule 48.15 repeal, incorrectly assigning blame to the defendants for not filing a defence, and failing to adequately consider the finality principle and the growing presumption of prejudice over time.

The court re-evaluated the Reid factors, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay, did not demonstrate inadvertence, and did not move promptly.

Furthermore, actual prejudice to the defendants and intervenor was established.

The appeal was allowed, and the administrative dismissal was reinstated.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside an order dismissing his action for delay.

The action, arising from a 2004 motor vehicle accident, was administratively dismissed in December 2012 after the plaintiff failed to set it down for trial.

Applying the Reid factors, the court found the plaintiff failed to provide a reasonable explanation for the delay, did not bring the motion promptly, and failed to demonstrate an intention to proceed.

The court also found the defendants would suffer prejudice due to the passage of time and lack of medical evidence.

The motion was dismissed.

This motion for directions addressed several outstanding issues in a 15-year-long litigation, much of which was attributed to one of the plaintiffs, Ms. Valve Aloe-Gunnell, who had previously been found in contempt.

The court considered requests from both the plaintiffs (Ms. Aloe-Gunnell seeking contact with a third-party purchaser, document production, leave to commence new actions, and to strike a prior order) and the defendants (seeking approval of a revised property severance plan, an order preventing Ms. Aloe-Gunnell from contacting municipal authorities, and a direction for Ms. Aloe-Gunnell to sign a necessary document).

The court denied Ms. Aloe-Gunnell's request for contact with the third-party purchaser and deferred decisions on her requests for leave to sue and to strike an order, pending further submissions.

The court approved the defendants' revised plan for property severance and directed Ms. Aloe-Gunnell to sign a document essential for the process, rejecting her arguments against it as disingenuous.

The court declined, for now, to bar Ms. Aloe-Gunnell from contacting American municipal officials due to jurisdictional uncertainty, but issued a strong warning about potential contempt if her actions were found to thwart the sale.

The court also refused to tailor orders to promote "oblique motives" regarding the sale to an environmental group.

The parties sought directions regarding the severance and transfer of property pursuant to a 2011 consent order.

The order required the transfer of approximately 3.43 acres of commercial property, but the parties later discovered only 3.042 acres were zoned commercial.

The defendants agreed to transfer an additional 0.388 acres of residential property to make up the difference, and their counsel undertook to re-zone it to commercial.

The court held that while transferring the mixed-zoned property would substantially comply with the consent order, the defendants were still bound by their counsel's undertaking and must re-zone the 0.388 acres prior to the transfer.

Following a motion where a defendant successfully dismissed the plaintiff's claim but failed to dismiss a co-defendant's cross-claim, the court determined the costs payable.

The successful defendant sought costs against the plaintiff, which were fixed at $16,000 after considering the complexity added by the plaintiff's arguments regarding the threshold condition.

The co-defendant sought costs against the moving defendant for successfully defending the cross-claim, which were fixed at $5,155.82 on a partial indemnity basis.

The plaintiff sought to add an orthopaedic surgeon as a co-defendant to a medical malpractice action nearly ten years after the surgery, alleging that the surgeon fraudulently concealed an intraoperative event.

The Master granted the motion to add the surgeon with leave to plead a limitation period defence.

On appeal, the Superior Court of Justice set aside the Master's order, finding that the plaintiff and his counsel knew or ought to have known of the potential claim against the surgeon shortly after the surgery.

The court held that there was no fraudulent concealment and that the claim against the surgeon was statute-barred.

The moving party sought summary judgment dismissing a personal injury action arising from a motor vehicle accident on the basis that the claim was statute‑barred under the Limitations Act, 2002.

The plaintiff argued that the limitation period began either when a police report disclosed the identity of the moving party or when a medical expert later confirmed that the plaintiff’s injuries met the statutory threshold for non‑pecuniary damages under the Insurance Act.

The court held that the plaintiff knew or ought to have known the identity of the moving party at the time of the accident and failed to act with due diligence in pursuing the claim.

The court also rejected the argument that discovery occurred only upon a later medical diagnosis, finding the plaintiff had sufficient information earlier to investigate and pursue the claim.

The action against the moving party was therefore statute‑barred, while a co‑defendant’s crossclaim for contribution and indemnity was found to be timely.

The plaintiff brought a motion for summary judgment arising from a solicitor’s breach of undertaking to repay loans advanced to a client from settlement proceeds of litigation.

The solicitor conceded breach but argued liability was limited to the $40,000 expressly covered by written undertakings.

The court held that additional losses were a reasonably foreseeable consequence of the breach because the lender relied on the undertaking and continued advancing funds while unaware of settlements.

Documentary evidence including cheques and a promissory note constituted sufficient corroboration under s. 13 of the Evidence Act.

Summary judgment was granted for $100,000 plus pre‑judgment interest.

The defendant franchisor brought a motion for further documentary production from the plaintiff franchisee in an $11 million dispute over dealership construction and a competing franchise.

The defendant sought construction files, financial records of related non-party corporations, and documents from the plaintiff's accountants to assess the plaintiff's damages claims.

The court ordered the plaintiff to produce additional construction documents, disclose relevant inter-company agreements, and request the voluntary production of financial statements from related non-party corporations, with leave for the defendant to bring Rule 30.10 motions if refused.

Following reasons granting a motion to restore an action to the trial list, the court determined the issue of costs.

Although the moving party had succeeded on the motion, the court considered that the relief sought constituted an indulgence and that the responding party’s opposition was reasonable and helpful to the court.

Applying the factors under Rule 57.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure, the principle of proportionality, and the guidance from appellate authority that costs must be fair and reasonable, the court exercised its discretion to depart from the usual rule that costs follow the event.

The responding party was ordered to pay the moving party partial indemnity costs of the motion.

The defendants, DaimlerChrysler Services Canada Inc. and Daimler Chrysler Financial Services Canada Inc., brought four motions for summary judgment in four related actions arising from a fatal motor vehicle accident.

They argued the actions against them were statute-barred because they were commenced outside the applicable limitation periods under the Limitations Act, 2002 and the Trustee Act.

The plaintiffs had initially sued the driver as the owner based on a police accident report, only discovering later that DaimlerChrysler was the true owner.

The court dismissed the motions for summary judgment, finding that the plaintiffs exercised reasonable diligence in relying on the police report and the driver's statement of defence admitting ownership.

For the Trustee Act claims, the court found special circumstances existed to allow the claims to proceed despite the expiration of the limitation period, noting the lack of prejudice to DaimlerChrysler.

The plaintiff moved under rules 1.04, 2.01, and 48.11 of the Rules of Civil Procedure for leave to restore an action to the trial list after it had been struck off at a pre‑trial conference.

The underlying claim alleged wrongful dismissal and bad faith following the plaintiff’s termination as an auto body technician.

The court applied the test from appellate authority requiring the plaintiff to provide an acceptable explanation for delay and demonstrate that the defendant would suffer no non‑compensable prejudice if the action were restored.

Considering the litigation history, including the attempt to pursue additional defendants and the absence of a status notice from the registrar, the court found the explanation for delay acceptable.

As the defendants had participated extensively in the litigation and suffered no non‑compensable prejudice, the action was restored to the trial list.

The plaintiff brought a motion to set aside a registrar’s order dismissing a personal injury action as abandoned under Rule 48.15 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The action arose from a motor vehicle accident but had been dismissed after no statement of defence was delivered and service issues arose due to a misnomer in the defendant’s name.

Applying the contextual approach endorsed in appellate authority, the court considered factors including the explanation for delay, inadvertence, promptness of the motion, and prejudice to the defendant.

The court found the delay was not inordinate, the error was inadvertent, the motion was brought reasonably promptly, and the defendant had not demonstrated prejudice.

The registrar’s dismissal order was set aside, the statement of claim was amended to correct the defendant’s name, and the time for service was extended.