Donna Aileen Polgar

The Ontario Court of Justice delivered a sentencing decision for Christopher Judge, who was found guilty after trial of multiple offences including assaulting a police officer, resisting arrest, dangerous operation of a conveyance, and failing to stop at the scene of an accident and while pursued by police.

The court rejected the defence's argument for a conditional stay based on the Kienapple rule, finding no legal nexus between the assault charges.

Considering the seriousness of the offences, the offender's high moral blameworthiness, and lack of remorse, the court determined that a conditional sentence would compromise community safety.

The defendant was sentenced to an effective six months in jail, followed by one year of probation with substance abuse counseling, a three-year driving prohibition, a 10-year weapons prohibition, and a DNA order.

The defendant was charged with accessing, possessing, and making available child pornography.

The defence sought to exclude evidence (computer data and statements) due to alleged Charter violations (ss. 9, 10(a), 10(b)).

The court found a violation of s. 10(b) regarding the defendant's statements, both at his home and the police station, and excluded them under s. 24(2) of the Charter, finding their admission would bring the administration of justice into disrepute.

However, the court found no causal or contextual connection between the Charter breach and the discovery of child pornography on the computer, as the computer was found and searched independently.

The compelling admissible evidence from the computer was sufficient to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.

The defendant was found guilty.

The defendant, Guled Mohamed, was charged with possession of crack cocaine for the purpose of trafficking and possession of the proceeds of crime following a police investigation and search of a residence.

The court found that Mohamed did not have standing to challenge the search of the residence.

Based on circumstantial evidence, including his association with other drug traffickers, surveillance observations, and presence at the residence where drugs were found, the court found him guilty of possession of cocaine for the purpose of trafficking.

However, he was acquitted of the possession of proceeds of crime charge due to insufficient evidence regarding the amount of cash found.

This is a bail review application under s.520 of the Criminal Code, seeking to overturn a detention order.

The applicant argued for a material change in circumstances based on a proposed change in suretyship, an increased surety commitment, and the addition of electronic monitoring.

The court found that the electronic monitoring was not a material change and that the proposed new surety, despite being more senior, was not in a better position to supervise than previous sureties.

The court concluded that the changes did not address the original reason for detention, which was a loss of public confidence in the administration of justice due to the applicant's repeated breaches of release conditions.

The application was dismissed.

This bail review application concerned David Firth, who was detained on multiple criminal charges.

Firth sought release, alleging errors in the initial bail decision and citing material changes in circumstances: the COVID-19 pandemic and the availability of a new, suitable surety.

The court found no errors of law in the Justice of the Peace's initial decision but accepted the new evidence as a material change, warranting a de novo bail hearing.

Considering Firth's Aboriginal heritage, the heightened risks of COVID-19 in detention, and the robust release plan proposed with a strong surety, the court determined that Firth had met his reverse onus on all three grounds for release.

Consequently, Firth was ordered released on a recognizance with a surety and strict conditions, including house arrest and counselling.

The accused, Derek Horth, sought a review of a detention order issued by a Justice of the Peace.

Horth argued for release based on alleged material changes in circumstances, including an improved surety plan with increased financial commitment and electronic monitoring, and the public health risks posed by the COVID-19 pandemic in custodial facilities.

He also claimed the Justice of the Peace made four errors of law during the initial bail hearing.

The Superior Court found no material changes in circumstances, noting the continued unsuitability of the proposed sureties due to their lack of oversight and understanding of the accused's criminal history.

The court also dismissed the alleged errors of law, affirming the Justice of the Peace's assessment of the Crown's strong case and the necessity of detention on tertiary grounds to maintain confidence in the administration of justice.

The application for review was dismissed, and the detention order was upheld.

The plaintiffs moved to add Dr. Peter Law as a defendant in a medical negligence action after the expiration of the applicable limitation period, alleging negligent misreading of x-rays.

The court considered the doctrines of "Special Circumstances" and "Fraudulent Concealment." While the discoverability principle did not apply to the Trustee Act limitation period, the court found that the plaintiffs successfully rebutted the presumption of prejudice against Dr. Law and established exceptional "special circumstances" due to the late, critical, and unexplained disclosure of x-ray imaging and interpretation notes by Southlake Regional Health Centre years after the limitation period expired.

The court rejected the argument of fraudulent concealment.

The motion to add Dr. Law as a defendant and amend the statement of claim was granted.

The appellants appealed a Master's decision that had set aside an administrative dismissal of a personal injury action.

The action was dismissed in 2011 due to the plaintiffs' counsel's delay, and the motion to set aside the dismissal was not brought for 2.5 years.

The Superior Court found that the Master erred in law by misinterpreting the statutory context of Rule 48.15 repeal, incorrectly assigning blame to the defendants for not filing a defence, and failing to adequately consider the finality principle and the growing presumption of prejudice over time.

The court re-evaluated the Reid factors, concluding that the plaintiffs failed to provide a satisfactory explanation for the delay, did not demonstrate inadvertence, and did not move promptly.

Furthermore, actual prejudice to the defendants and intervenor was established.

The appeal was allowed, and the administrative dismissal was reinstated.

The defendant brought a motion for summary judgment dismissing a personal injury action arising from a hot drink spill in a restaurant.

The plaintiff, a minor represented by a litigation guardian, alleged negligence in failing to supervise the service counter and maintain safe premises after a customer spilled hot liquid near the plaintiff.

Surveillance video captured the entire incident and showed another customer losing balance of a tray and spilling a drink, with no involvement by restaurant staff.

The plaintiff provided no responding evidence, medical documentation, or participation in the litigation process.

The court found no genuine issue requiring a trial and held that the evidence demonstrated no negligence on the part of the defendant.

The applicants brought a motion to quash a search warrant and exclude evidence seized from their residence at 39 Patricia Avenue, North York, on the grounds that their Charter rights under section 8 were violated.

The applicants challenged both the sufficiency of the Information to Obtain (ITO) and the use of a telewarrant procedure.

The court found that the ITO was carelessly drafted, materially misleading, and factually inaccurate.

The court also found that the telewarrant process was not justified under section 487.1 of the Criminal Code, as it was not impracticable for the officer to appear in person.

Additionally, the court found that a supervisory officer had made an undisclosed telephone call to the Justice of the Peace that influenced the issuance of the warrant.

The court concluded that the evidence should be excluded under section 24(2) of the Charter as the search warrant application fell far below constitutional standards.