Rebecca Jones

The Ontario Government moved to dismiss or stay a human rights action brought by a self-represented Crown lawyer alleging workplace discrimination and harassment based on race and gender.

The Crown argued that the plaintiff was bound by a collective agreement containing mandatory arbitration provisions.

The court dismissed the motion on two grounds: first, the plaintiff was not a unionized employee and therefore the Weber doctrine did not deprive the court of jurisdiction; and second, the Crown failed to establish on the evidence that the plaintiff was a party to the collective agreement.

The court also found that portions of the plaintiff's claim alleging systemic institutional racism fell outside the scope of the arbitration agreement's subject matter jurisdiction, even if the agreement were binding.

The plaintiff, Jean-Marie Dixon, sought to conduct Rule 39.03 examinations of three witnesses (Registrar of HRTO, former ALOC president, and Crown counsel) in preparation for a jurisdiction motion brought by His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario (HMK).

HMK, the Association of Law Officers of the Crown (ALOC), and the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal (HRTO) each moved to quash the respective summonses.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's preliminary motion to strike portions of HMK's material.

The court granted all motions to quash, finding that the evidence sought was not relevant to the jurisdiction motion, was protected by statutory privilege (for HRTO Registrar) or solicitor-client privilege (for Crown counsel), or constituted an abuse of process as a fishing expedition for the underlying claim's merits.

The University of Toronto brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to dismantle a protest encampment set up by students and others on Front Campus.

The protesters argued the encampment was a protected exercise of their rights to freedom of expression, association, and assembly.

The court granted the injunction, finding that the University established a strong prima facie case of trespass and ejectment.

The court held that the protesters' appropriation of University property to the exclusion of others constituted irreparable harm.

The balance of convenience favoured the University, as the injunction only prohibited camping and erecting structures, while allowing the protesters to continue demonstrating elsewhere on campus.

In an alternative analysis, the court found that the Charter does not apply to the University's management of its property, and even if it did, the trespass notice was a justified limit under section 1.

The defendant, Dr. Sheldon Victor Pollack, brought a motion to dismiss a certified class action for delay under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, and Rule 24.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The class action, initiated in 2003 by the representative plaintiff Anna Barbiero, alleged medical negligence and battery related to Dr. Pollack's injection of Injectable Grade Liquid Silicone (IGLS) for lip augmentation.

The court found the 21-year delay inordinate and inexcusable, with significant periods of unexplained inactivity.

The plaintiff failed to rebut the strong presumption of prejudice, and actual prejudice was established due to the loss of the IGLS sample, which was crucial for the defendant's ability to test its composition and defend against liability and causation claims.

The court granted the motion, dismissing the class action for delay, and ordered that notice be provided to class members.

The Ontario government appealed a decision finding that the Protecting a Sustainable Public Sector for Future Generations Act, 2019 (Bill 124), which imposed a 1% cap on compensation increases for broader public sector employees, violated the right to freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter.

The Court of Appeal upheld the application judge's finding that the Act substantially interfered with the respondents' collective bargaining rights and was not saved by s. 1 of the Charter, as it was not minimally impairing and its deleterious effects outweighed its salutary effects.

However, the Court allowed the appeal in part to limit the declaration of invalidity to represented employees, as non-represented employees do not benefit from the same collective bargaining protections.

Following the settlement of the main class proceeding, the defendant and third party plaintiff brought a consent motion to dismiss the third party claims against the remaining third parties.

The court granted the order dismissing the third party action with prejudice and without costs.

The plaintiffs, Bernard Finnigan and Ramon Suarez, brought a medical malpractice action against Dr. Edward Tat-Yee Lee, alleging failure to timely diagnose lymphoma and properly manage Mr. Finnigan's pain between November 2016 and January 2017.

The court found that Dr. Lee met the standard of care in his diagnosis, treatment, and pain management.

The decision emphasized that the doctor's clinical judgment was appropriately applied, that the "worst first" diagnostic principle is not the law in Ontario, and that the plaintiff's inconsistent reporting of symptoms contributed to the situation.

The action was dismissed.

The applicants, representing various public sector unions, challenged the constitutionality of the Protecting a Sustainable Public Sector for Future Generations Act, 2019 (Bill 124), which limited wage increases for broader public sector employees to 1% per year for a three-year moderation period.

The court found that the Act substantially interfered with the applicants' right to freedom of association under s. 2(d) of the Charter by preventing meaningful collective bargaining over wages and other compensation-related issues.

The court dismissed the applicants' claims under s. 2(b) (freedom of expression) and s. 15 (equality rights).

The court further held that the infringement of s. 2(d) was not saved by s. 1 of the Charter, as the government failed to demonstrate a pressing and substantial objective or that the measure was minimally impairing.

The Act was declared void and of no effect.

The appellant landowner sued a municipality alleging constructive taking of approximately 965 acres of vacant land, claiming the municipality's refusal to initiate a secondary planning process — combined with alleged encouragement of public use of the lands as a park — amounted to a de facto expropriation without compensation.

The majority (5-4) held that the CPR test for constructive taking requires only that a public authority acquire a 'beneficial interest' understood broadly as an 'advantage' (not necessarily a proprietary interest), and that the municipality's intention may be a relevant material fact.

The majority restored the motion judge's order allowing the constructive taking claim to proceed to trial, finding genuine issues of material fact.

The four dissenting justices would have dismissed the appeal, holding that CPR requires acquisition of a proprietary interest and that intention is irrelevant to the de facto taking analysis.

In a costs decision following a professional liability trial, the court determined that the defendants were the successful parties despite findings that they breached their fiduciary duties.

The plaintiffs had sought over $16 million in damages but were only awarded $2,000 in nominal damages.

The court found the defendants' claimed costs of $1,261,235 to be reasonable, but reduced the award by 25% to reflect the court's finding of breach of fiduciary duty.

The plaintiffs were ordered to pay $925,000 in partial indemnity costs.

This decision addresses the issue of costs following a professional liability claim where the plaintiffs sought over $16 million in damages but were ultimately awarded only $2,000 in nominal damages for breaches of fiduciary duty by the defendants.

The court determined that the defendants were the successful parties, having largely resisted the substantial monetary claim.

Despite findings of serious fiduciary duty breaches against the defendants (a law firm and a former in-house counsel), the court awarded costs to the defendants, but reduced the quantum by over 25% to $925,000 to reflect the seriousness of their misconduct.

The plaintiffs sued their former law firm and former in-house counsel for professional negligence and breach of fiduciary duty arising from a commercial transaction and subsequent settlement.

The court found that the former in-house counsel breached his fiduciary duty by acting for the opposing party at a mediation, and that the law firm breached its standard of care by failing to warn the plaintiffs of this conflict.

The court also found the law firm breached its fiduciary duty by obtaining an ineffective conflict waiver.

However, the court concluded that these breaches did not cause the plaintiffs' claimed business losses, as the plaintiffs would have settled regardless and suffered no loss of chance.

The court awarded nominal damages of $2,000.

This is an appeal from a Superior Court decision.

The appellants sought to appeal an order of Justice Edward M. Morgan dated June 6, 2018.

The respondents were successful on the appeal.

The court determined costs payable to the successful respondents.

The appellants made a one-million-dollar charitable donation to a mental health hospital for a designated workplace mental health program over three years.

When dissatisfied with the program's progress and reporting, the donor sought an investigation by the Public Guardian and Trustee under the Charities Accounting Act.

The motion judge dismissed the application, finding no evidence of mismanagement or misuse of funds.

The Court of Appeal upheld this decision, finding no error in the motion judge's findings that the funds were properly spent on the designated program and that no public interest was served by ordering an investigation.

The plaintiffs moved to add Dr. Peter Law as a defendant in a medical negligence action after the expiration of the applicable limitation period, alleging negligent misreading of x-rays.

The court considered the doctrines of "Special Circumstances" and "Fraudulent Concealment." While the discoverability principle did not apply to the Trustee Act limitation period, the court found that the plaintiffs successfully rebutted the presumption of prejudice against Dr. Law and established exceptional "special circumstances" due to the late, critical, and unexplained disclosure of x-ray imaging and interpretation notes by Southlake Regional Health Centre years after the limitation period expired.

The court rejected the argument of fraudulent concealment.

The motion to add Dr. Law as a defendant and amend the statement of claim was granted.

The applicant donor pledged $1 million to the respondent charity to develop a workplace mental health program, payable in three installments.

After paying the first installment, the applicant became dissatisfied with the program's direction, withheld the second installment, and demanded a refund.

The applicant then applied under section 6 of the Charities Accounting Act for an order directing the Public Guardian and Trustee to investigate the charity's use of the funds.

The Superior Court of Justice dismissed the application, finding that the applicant's concerns regarding the program's vision and timeline constituted a private interest rather than a public interest.

The court noted there was no evidence of financial mismanagement to justify the costly and disruptive investigation.

The applicants requested that the judge recuse himself from the present application, arguing that an endorsement he made in a motion four years ago involving the individual applicant demonstrated an apprehension of bias.

The judge reviewed the prior endorsement and the test for apprehension of bias, noting that the reasonable person is vested with knowledge of the judicial process.

The judge concluded that a reasonably informed reader would not find an adverse view had been formed, as the prior endorsement explicitly stated no fault was found with either side.

The recusal request was dismissed.

This is a motion to vary the Court of Appeal's decision in a solicitor's negligence case.

The moving party sought to clarify the trial judge's discretion regarding the final quantification of damages and the process for calculating the damages award, subject to a ceiling of $36.9 million.

The respondent opposed the motion.

The Court of Appeal dismissed the motion, finding that the moving party could not bring itself within the applicable rules permitting reconsideration of appellate decisions, and that it was not in the interests of justice to invoke the court's narrow jurisdiction to reconsider.

This appeal concerns a class action by General Motors of Canada Limited (GMCL) dealers against the law firm Cassels Brock & Blackwell LLP for breach of fiduciary and contractual duties.

During the 2009 financial crisis, Cassels represented three potentially conflicting clients: the Saturn Dealers, Industry Canada (regarding GMCL bailout financing), and GMCL dealers generally regarding a potential restructuring or insolvency.

The trial judge found that Cassels breached its duties by failing to disclose the conflict of interest with Industry Canada to the dealers and by failing to provide proper advice regarding Wind-Down Agreements (WDAs) offered by GMCL.

The dealers lost the opportunity to negotiate collectively for better compensation.

The Court of Appeal upheld the liability findings but reduced the damages award from $45 million to approximately $41 million (subject to further calculation regarding class composition).