Rebecca Jones

The union filed a grievance alleging the grievor was bullied and harassed by a co-worker, and that the employer failed to properly investigate the complaints and punitively transferred the grievor.

The arbitrator found that the interactions between the grievor and her co-worker constituted a mutual personality conflict rather than workplace harassment.

The arbitrator also found the transfer was for legitimate operational reasons.

However, the employer violated the Occupational Health and Safety Act and the collective agreement by failing to investigate one of the complaints and failing to provide the grievor with written results of the investigations into the other complaints.

The grievor was awarded $4,500 in general damages for these procedural failures.

The Ontario Government moved to dismiss or stay a human rights action brought by a self-represented Crown lawyer alleging workplace discrimination and harassment based on race and gender.

The Crown argued that the plaintiff was bound by a collective agreement containing mandatory arbitration provisions.

The court dismissed the motion on two grounds: first, the plaintiff was not a unionized employee and therefore the Weber doctrine did not deprive the court of jurisdiction; and second, the Crown failed to establish on the evidence that the plaintiff was a party to the collective agreement.

The court also found that portions of the plaintiff's claim alleging systemic institutional racism fell outside the scope of the arbitration agreement's subject matter jurisdiction, even if the agreement were binding.

The union grieved the termination of the grievor's employment for alleged job abandonment.

Following mediation sessions, the parties agreed to a process for litigating the grievance using an Agreed Statement of Fact and Will-Say Statements.

The arbitrator issued a case management direction setting out the schedule for pre-hearing production, document delivery, and future hearing dates.

The parties met before the Grievance Settlement Board regarding three grievances.

As previously agreed-upon prehearing steps were not completed, the Arbitrator issued a case direction outlining a new schedule for the union to provide particulars and production requests, and for the employer to respond and advise of any preliminary motions.

The union filed a grievance following the termination of the grievor's employment.

The employer requested pre-hearing production of the grievor's medical records, but the grievor failed to sign the necessary release forms despite multiple case management decisions.

At a hearing, the parties agreed to a new case management schedule for the production of records and a subsequent mediation/arbitration date.

The arbitrator warned the grievor that further failure to participate could result in the dismissal of the grievance.

The moving party brought a motion for leave to appeal a prior decision of Brownstone J. The Divisional Court dismissed the motion for leave to appeal.

As the responding parties did not provide costs outlines, the court made no order as to costs.

The Employer raised preliminary objections to two grievances filed by the Union on behalf of the grievor, arguing they were barred by res judicata, functus officio, and disclosed no prima facie case.

The grievances alleged improper deductions, failure to provide amended T4s following retroactive WSIB payments, and harassment related to a civil claim by the benefits provider.

The arbitrator found that the financial issues raised in the grievances had either been expressly addressed in prior decisions between the parties or ought to have been raised during those proceedings.

The remaining allegation that the employment relationship was destroyed and warranted severance pay lacked a prima facie case, as the grievor remained on WSIB leave and no facts supported a Human Rights Code violation.

The preliminary objections were upheld and the grievances were dismissed.

The employer requested an order compelling the union to provide written particulars and production, as the union had not complied with a prior undertaking to do so by March 21, 2025.

The union did not oppose the request.

The Grievance Settlement Board ordered the union to provide its written particulars and full production no later than May 14, 2025.

The moving party, a provincial regulator, brought a motion to quash an application for judicial review by a waste management corporation.

The corporation sought an order of mandamus requiring the regulator to enforce the Resource Recovery and Circular Economy Act, 2016, alleging economic loss due to non-enforcement.

The Divisional Court granted the motion to quash, finding it plain and obvious the application could not succeed because mandamus is not available to compel general enforcement untethered to specific facts, and the regulator's enforcement powers are discretionary.

The plaintiff, Jean-Marie Dixon, moved to strike three affidavits sworn by a representative of the defendant, His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario, which were filed in support of a motion to dismiss the action for lack of jurisdiction.

The plaintiff argued that the affidavits contained irrelevant information, hearsay, improper legal arguments, and unqualified expert opinions.

The court rejected most of the plaintiff's objections, finding that the assertions were proper factual context or matters for cross-examination.

However, the court struck one overly broad sentence regarding the Crown's treatment of bargaining agents with leave to amend, and otherwise dismissed the motion.

The union filed a grievance after the grievor was declared to have abandoned his position and his employment was terminated.

During a conference call, union counsel reported that the grievor had not communicated with the union despite numerous attempts.

The arbitrator issued a decision strongly urging the grievor to contact the union and warning that any future failure to attend a mediation or hearing without adequate notice or explanation could lead to the dismissal of the grievance.

The plaintiff, Jean-Marie Dixon, sought to conduct Rule 39.03 examinations of three witnesses (Registrar of HRTO, former ALOC president, and Crown counsel) in preparation for a jurisdiction motion brought by His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario (HMK).

HMK, the Association of Law Officers of the Crown (ALOC), and the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal (HRTO) each moved to quash the respective summonses.

The court dismissed the plaintiff's preliminary motion to strike portions of HMK's material.

The court granted all motions to quash, finding that the evidence sought was not relevant to the jurisdiction motion, was protected by statutory privilege (for HRTO Registrar) or solicitor-client privilege (for Crown counsel), or constituted an abuse of process as a fishing expedition for the underlying claim's merits.

The parties mediated a grievance alleging a violation of Appendix COR 14 of the OPSEU Correctional Bargaining Unit Collective Agreement regarding the implementation of an Occupational Stress Injury module within a training program.

The parties agreed to a consent order wherein the employer acknowledged contravening the collective agreement by failing to provide the OSI Sub-Committee an opportunity to review the training content and provide feedback prior to implementation.

The consent order requires the employer to comply with the collective agreement for any future modifications to the module.

The University of Toronto brought a motion for an interlocutory injunction to dismantle a protest encampment set up by students and others on Front Campus.

The protesters argued the encampment was a protected exercise of their rights to freedom of expression, association, and assembly.

The court granted the injunction, finding that the University established a strong prima facie case of trespass and ejectment.

The court held that the protesters' appropriation of University property to the exclusion of others constituted irreparable harm.

The balance of convenience favoured the University, as the injunction only prohibited camping and erecting structures, while allowing the protesters to continue demonstrating elsewhere on campus.

In an alternative analysis, the court found that the Charter does not apply to the University's management of its property, and even if it did, the trespass notice was a justified limit under section 1.

The parties met to mediate a settlement of a termination grievance but determined that prehearing production was necessary.

The arbitrator issued a case direction outlining the agreed-upon schedule for prehearing production, exchange of documents, and a subsequent mediation date.

The grievor, a correctional officer, was terminated for using excessive force on an inmate during an escort and for failing to wear a Ministry-approved face mask.

The arbitrator found that the employer had condoned the mask violation, but upheld the termination based on the use of force.

The arbitrator concluded that the grievor used an unnecessary and dangerous takedown technique contrary to his training, and unnecessarily struck the inmate in the face with a closed fist.

Given the grievor's prior disciplinary record for excessive use of force and lack of insight, the grievance was dismissed.

The union filed a grievance on behalf of the grievor.

During the course of the proceedings, the parties devoted considerable time to addressing production issues to ensure an effective and efficient hearing on the merits.

The parties requested a consent order to address all outstanding production issues.

The arbitrator issued the consent order, setting deadlines for the employer's response to the union's production request, the identification of any outstanding production issues, and the finalization of an Agreed Statement of Facts.

The Union filed grievances alleging that the grievors were temporarily assigned to perform the duties of a higher-rated Community Re-Integration Officer position, seeking compensation under the collective agreement.

The Employer raised a preliminary objection, arguing that the grievances were disguised classification grievances over which the Grievance Settlement Board lacks jurisdiction under the Crown Employees Collective Bargaining Act.

The Arbitrator upheld the preliminary objection, finding that the core issue was an assertion that the duties of the higher-rated position duplicated the grievors' current duties, which requires an analysis of classification.

The grievances were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

The employer requested particulars for two grievances.

The arbitrator found that emails attached to the first grievance served as sufficient particulars.

However, the second grievance lacked a coherent explanation.

The arbitrator ordered the grievor to provide coherent particulars for the second grievance by April 12, 2024, failing which it would be dismissed for lack of arbitrability.

The defendant, Dr. Sheldon Victor Pollack, brought a motion to dismiss a certified class action for delay under the Class Proceedings Act, 1992, and Rule 24.01 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The class action, initiated in 2003 by the representative plaintiff Anna Barbiero, alleged medical negligence and battery related to Dr. Pollack's injection of Injectable Grade Liquid Silicone (IGLS) for lip augmentation.

The court found the 21-year delay inordinate and inexcusable, with significant periods of unexplained inactivity.

The plaintiff failed to rebut the strong presumption of prejudice, and actual prejudice was established due to the loss of the IGLS sample, which was crucial for the defendant's ability to test its composition and defend against liability and causation claims.

The court granted the motion, dismissing the class action for delay, and ordered that notice be provided to class members.