Court File and Parties

COURT FILE NO.: CV-19-00614989-0000 DATE: 20241021 SUPERIOR COURT OF JUSTICE - ONTARIO

RE: Jean-Marie Dixon, Plaintiff AND: His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario and Association of Law Officers of the Crown, Defendants

BEFORE: L. Brownstone J.

COUNSEL: Plaintiff, Self-Represented Rebecca Jones and Samantha Hale, for the Defendant, His Majesty the King in Right of Ontario Geetha Philipupillai, for the Defendant, Association of Law Officers of the Crown Eli Fellman, for the Ontario Human Rights Tribunal

HEARD: September 25, 2024

Endorsement

[1] The plaintiff, Ms. Dixon, seeks relief against the defendants arising from her experiences as senior counsel with the Ministry of the Attorney General. Ms. Dixon is a member of the defendant Association of Law Officers of the Crown (“ALOC”). ALOC and the defendant His Majesty the King (“HMK”) are parties to a collective agreement.

[2] HMK takes the position that the court lacks jurisdiction to grant the plaintiff the relief she seeks. Its position is that Ms. Dixon’s claims are disputes that are within the scope of the collective agreement and, as such, are subject to mandatory arbitration. HMK has brought a motion seeking to dismiss the claim for lack of jurisdiction, in a motion often referred to as Weber motion, to which I shall refer as the jurisdiction motion.

[3] The jurisdiction motion was scheduled to be heard on December 21, 2023, by Vermette J., the prior case management judge. When Ms. Dixon received and reviewed the material contained in HMK’s reply motion record on the jurisdiction motion, Ms. Dixon determined she wished to conduct three examinations under rule 39.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure. Therefore, on December 18, 2023, Vermette J. adjourned the jurisdiction motion. Ms. Dixon was to take steps with respect to the summonses in January 2024.

[4] Ms. Dixon duly served the 3 summonses to witness on individuals from whom she seeks to obtain evidence in support of her defense of the jurisdiction motion. The individuals who received summonses are Lynn Dicaire, Registrar of the Human Rights Tribunal of Ontario (“HRTO”), Earl Dumitru, president of ALOC during the time relevant to Ms. Dixon’s claim, and George Parris, Crown counsel who represented the Crown in Ms. Dixon’s grievance and HRTO proceedings.

[5] HMK moves to quash the three summonses. ALOC, which takes no position on the jurisdiction motion, moves to quash the summons of Mr. Dumitru. The Ontario Human Rights Tribunal, which is not a party to the underlying litigation, moves to quash the summons to witness served on Ms. Dicaire.

Preliminary Issue

[6] At the return of the motion, Ms. Dixon indicated she wished to bring a motion to strike certain paragraphs of HMK’s notice of motion (paras g,h,l,j and k), affidavit (paras 7,8,9,10 and 24) and factum. Advance notice of the motion was not provided. This motion to quash the summonses has been scheduled and outstanding for some time, having been previously adjourned twice. I therefore required arguments about the materials to be made during the course of the arguments on the motion itself.

[7] Ms. Dixon objects to Ms. Bittman, counsel at the firm representing HMK, having sworn an affidavit. Although the affiant did not appear on the motion, Ms. Dixon argues that matters addressed in counsel’s affidavit were not uncontroverted. She objects to the characterization of the history of this matter, arguing that it is inflammatory and vexatious, and inaccurately casts her as responsible for much delay.

[8] Ms. Dixon also sought to strike portions of the material on the following bases: HMK is arguing the jurisdiction motion itself, some paragraphs were improperly sworn on information and belief, and other paragraphs are opinion evidence, speculative, and hearsay. Ms. Dixon argues that it is not enough to say that the court will ignore parts of the affidavit that offends the rules; the paragraphs should be struck: Paul v. The Corporation of the Township of Madawaska Valley, 2021 ONSC 4996 at para. 60-62, 69, aff’d 2022 ONCA 444.

[9] I do not find it improper for Ms. Bittman to have sworn an affidavit. The affidavit is used largely to put materials before the court, a common and accepted practice. Nor do I find anything improper in the affidavit. Ms. Dixon disagrees with the paragraphs setting out the history of the matter and the characterization of the causes of delay. She has a different view of the causes of delay, expressed in her material. The impugned paragraphs are largely factual. Some of the paragraphs contain some characterization of the facts. Disagreement with characterization is not a reason for paragraphs to be struck. Further, as will be seen below, I do not need to determine the cause of delay in this motion.

[10] The paragraphs Ms. Dixon seeks to strike in the notice of motion set out HMK’s views of what the motion is about. Ms. Dixon is free to disagree with that characterization, but that does not lead to the paragraphs being struck.

[11] I do not find HMK improperly argued the jurisdiction motion and that those paragraphs should be struck. Both parties expressed, to some degree, their position on the jurisdiction motion. This is necessary to provide context for the motion to quash the summonses.

[12] I therefore dismiss Ms. Dixon’s request to strike paragraphs of HMK’s affidavit, notice of motion, and factum.

Governing Law on Rule 39.03 Examinations

[13] Rule 39.03 of the Rules of Civil Procedure permits a witness to be examined as a witness on a pending motion.

[14] The proposed witness must be in a position to provide evidence relevant to an issue raised in the motion. Rule 39.03 examinations are to adduce evidence based on the witness’s direct personal knowledge: Magnotta Winery Corporation v The Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario, 2016 ONSC 3174 at para. 9. Witnesses do not need to inform themselves of matters about which they have no personal knowledge, or to make inquiries of others: Magnotta Winery Corporation v. Ontario (The Alcohol and Gaming Commission), 2020 ONSC 561 at para. 2.

[15] The onus is on the party seeking to conduct the examination to show on a reasonable evidentiary basis that the examination would be conducted on issues relevant to the pending application and the proposed witness is in a position to offer relevant evidence: Ontario Federation of Anglers & Hunters v. Ontario (Ministry of Natural Resources), 2002 ONCA 41606 at para. 30.

[16] The onus is described in Seelster Farms Inc. v. Ontario, 2017 ONSC 4756, at para 40 as follows:

The onus on the party serving the summons to satisfy the relevance threshold is twofold:

(a) to show on a reasonable evidentiary basis that the proposed witness has evidence that is possibly relevant to the pending motion. It is not necessary for this party to show that the proposed examination will produce evidence that could be helpful to that party’s case: Airport Taxicab (Pearson Airport) v. Toronto; and

(b) to satisfy the court that the proposed examination will not be a fishing expedition, or that the requirements of the summons for the proposed witness to bring documents to the examination is not overbroad. Either instance would amount to an abuse of process: Lauzon v. Axa Insurance, 2012 ONSC 6736 (SCJ).

[17] The question is not whether the witnesses may have evidence that is relevant to the underlying claim but to the jurisdiction motion. It is the nature and grounds of the underlying motion that determine the issues the examination must aid: Elmaati at para. 65.

[18] Although the respondents point out that some cases apply a “likely relevant” standard, I will consider this case on the standard of possible relevance: has Ms. Dixon provided an evidentiary basis to demonstrate that the proposed witnesses have evidence that is possibly relevant? Elmaati v. Canada (Attorney General), 2013 ONSC 3176 at paras. 66-67.

[19] The evidentiary basis must be more than merely speculation and allegations: Cunha et. al. v. DaCunha, 2022 ONSC 930 at para. 32 citing Lauzon v. Axa Insurance (Canada), 2012 ONSC 6730.

[20] Once the party who seeks to examine establishes the requisite relevance, the onus shifts to the party who seeks to quash the summons to establish that the examination would be an abuse of process. An abuse of process will be found where an examination is being used for an improper purpose, the evidence was not necessary for the motion, the examination is sought of a solicitor to probe solicitor-client privileged information: Cunha at para. 32. Necessary evidence is related to the concept of proportionality: Cunha at para. 35.

The Jurisdiction Motion

[21] As indicated, it is the jurisdiction motion that frames the issue of relevance. The jurisdiction motion in turn occurs in the context of the underlying claim. The Fresh as Amended Statement of Claim is lengthy and detailed. It seeks significant relief against HMK, including declaratory constitutional relief and substantial damages for various tortious conduct including harassment, discrimination, negligent investigation, and intentional infliction of mental suffering. The claim also seeks punitive, moral, and aggravated damages. The claim alleges, among other things, that systems in place, including grievances, have been ineffective in addressing anti-Black racism, racial discrimination, racial harassment, racial abuse, and tortious conduct against Black employees.

[22] In the jurisdiction motion, HMK will argue that all of the issues raised within the action are within the exclusive jurisdiction of an arbitrator appointed under the collective agreement. Ms. Dixon disagrees.

[23] The jurisdiction motion is brought under rule 21.01(3)(a). While evidence is not prohibited under that provision, the evidence should be relevant to the question of jurisdiction, not the underlying claim. The merits of the claim are not being adjudicated in the jurisdiction motion.

[24] HMK’s overarching position is that the summonses are an abuse of process in that the evidence sought is not relevant to the jurisdiction motion, in any event the witnesses cannot provide the information sought, and the summonses are for collateral purposes and will result in further delay.

[25] Ms. Dixon argues that she has provided an evidentiary basis to establish that the summonses seek evidence that is possibly relevant to the jurisdiction motion. She argues that she requires the sought-after evidence to establish that the grievance/arbitration process leaves her without an adequate remedy on a practical basis, due to the discriminatory environment in which she finds herself: Rivers v. Waterloo Regional Police Services Board, 2019 ONCA 267 at para. 7.

[26] I will turn to each summons issued in the context of the jurisdiction motion.

Summons of Ms. Dicaire

[27] Ms. Dicaire is the Registrar of the HRTO. The summons in issue requires her to produce at examination 22 types of documents, which can be bundled into the following categories:

• Written, and notes of oral, communications between the HRTO registrar, employees, representatives and/or agents and any of the respondents related to Ms. Dixon’s 2017 Human Rights Tribunal Application, her workplace grievances, civil lawsuit, human rights matter and/or Ms. Dixon more generally;
• Written, and notes of oral, communications between the HRTO registrar, employees, representatives and/or agents and Ms. Angela Oh, the Crown’s human resources manager (who is HMK’s affiant in the jurisdiction motion);
• Documents setting out the nature of the relationship between Ms. Oh and the HRTO
• Internal HRTO communications, whether written communications or notes of oral communications, about Ms. Dixon’s grievances, civil suit, human rights matter or Ms. Dixon more generally, and about the deferral of Ms. Dixon’s 2017 human rights application’s deferral and dismissal.
• Documents about Ms. Dixon and WSIB
• Policy directives, training materials or similar documents regarding HRTO’s processes and procedures for dealing with errors made in the administration of a human rights application and its processes and procedures for dealing with anti-Black racism
• Names and titles of HRTO employees who have, or have had, carriage of or access to Ms. Dixon’s HRTO file and her 2017 human rights application.

[28] Ms. Dixon commenced applications before the HRTO in 2010 and 2017. The 2017 application was held in abeyance pending the grievance proceedings. In May 2022, the parties received notice from the HRTO that the HRTO had not received an update since 2019 as to whether the other proceedings (referred to, seemingly in error, as the WSIB proceeding), and required Ms. Dixon to update it within a certain period of time, failing which it would be dismissed as abandoned. Ms. Dixon’s evidence indicates that she responded to the HRTO, advising that the outstanding procedures were grievances, not WSIB applications, that the grievance procedure was controlled by ALOC and the Crown, and that she could not succeed in getting them to proceed with the grievances which had been outstanding for five and six years. She advised that she would inform HRTO when those procedures had concluded. On March 27, 2023, the HRTO dismissed Ms. Dixon’s application as abandoned, advising that it had not received an update since 2019. Some subsequent correspondence occurred between Ms. Dixon and the HRTO, but the matter remains dismissed as abandoned.

[29] Ms. Dixon points out that all communications with the HRTO are to be filed through the registrar; therefore Ms. Dicaire is the relevant and appropriate HRTO witness to be summoned.

[30] Section 32(10) of the Human Rights Code provides:

32(10) A member or employee of the Tribunal shall not be required to give testimony in a civil suit or any proceeding as to information obtained in the course of a proceeding before the Tribunal.

[31] A similar provision in a different context has been considered in light of its purpose, described as “to insulate board officials from the distraction, the expenditure of time, and the potential intimidation associated with testifying about their board-related activities in other legal proceedings” Ellis-Don Ltd. v. Ontario Labour Relations Board, 1994 ONSC 10531, 16 O.R. (3d) 698. Other cases refer to the “chilling effect” that would occur if these provisions did not exist or were not respected by the courts.

[32] The HRTO argues that s. 32(10) is sufficient to dispose of the motion in its favour and quash the summons to Ms. Dicaire. It further argues that the principle of adjudicative immunity prohibits Ms. Dicaire from giving evidence sought by the summons, and further that Ms. Dicaire has no evidence to give that is relevant to the jurisdiction motion. Additionally, the summons amounts to a collateral attack on the HRTO decision, which could properly be subject to a request for reconsideration or application for judicial review.

[33] Ms. Dixon argues that the HRTO motion record does not contain an affidavit from Ms. Dicaire and does not state that Ms. Dicaire does not have personal knowledge of or access to the information sought in the summons. Ms. Dixon states that she is not seeking Ms. Dicaire’s examination, simply the production of documents. She argues that s. 32(10) does not apply because she should have received all communications in the HRTO file as a party to the application, and the information was not information “obtained in the course of a proceeding”. Ms. Dixon suggests there are communications to other parties on which she was not copied. Ms. Dixon denies this is a collateral attack or attempt at re-litigation, and argues that the principle of deliberative secrecy does not apply. If that principle does apply, it should be lifted since the HRTO did not comply with the rules of natural justice. She relies on Ellis-Don Ltd. v. Ontario (Labour Relations Board), 2001 SCC 4 in support of this submission.

[34] The summons to Ms. Dicaire must be quashed. Much, but not all, of the information sought comes within s. 32(10). The correspondence or other documentation sought that is specifically related to Ms. Dixon’s application is protected by s. 32(10) and those categories of documents are not producible.

[35] The two other fatal problems with the summons are this: even assuming that Ms. Dixon’s interactions with the HRTO, as described in her affidavit, were problematic, the requested information can shed no light on HMK’s jurisdiction motion. That motion will consider whether the matters raised fall within the exclusive jurisdiction of an arbitrator or whether this court has jurisdiction over some or all of the matters raised.

[36] Ms. Dixon wishes to argue that the grievance/arbitration process leaves her without an adequate remedy: Northern Regional Health Authority v. Horrocks, 2021 SCC 42, [2021] 3 SCR 107 at para. 23.

[37] The issue of whether the HRTO has or had concurrent jurisdiction, or how it exercised jurisdiction, is not raised in the motion. The propriety of the HRTO conduct is not in issue. The actions of the HRTO have no bearing on the jurisdictional issue. Further, I agree with the HRTO that the summons appears to collaterally attack the actions of the HRTO, which is improper.

[38] Ms. Dicaire’s summons to witness is quashed.

Summons of Mr. Dumitru

[39] Mr. Dumitru was president of ALOC in the years that Ms. Dixon’s grievances were filed and was subsequently the ALOC Board member assigned to Ms. Dixon’s case. Mr. Dumitru’s summons requires him to produce at examination 18 types of documents, which can be bundled into the following categories:

• Written, and notes of oral, communications between anyone at ALOC or who is an agent of ALOC, including ALOC’s counsel. and the HRTO regarding Ms. Dixon’s 2017 human rights application
• Written, and notes of oral, communications between anyone at ALOC or who is an agent of ALOC, including ALOC’s counsel, and HMK relating to Ms. Dixon’s grievances, civil suit, human rights matter, or herself more generally
• Written communications about the status of grievances made on June 14, 2016, November 14, 2016, and February 14, 2017
• Financial and general ALOC information, including ALOC’s financial statements for 2022 and 2023, the amount of money it has spent litigation against Ms. Dixon, and on representing Ms. Dixon in her grievances, the number of ALOC members, the number of ALOC members who are Black lawyers, the number who are Black female lawyers and information about the latter’s’ year of call and ALOC membership commencement date
• Communications with Ms. Oh, including notes of oral communications, about the three grievances referred to above,
• Documents setting out the procedure for bringing a duty of fair representation proceeding against ALOC.

[40] During the time of Mr. Dumitru’s presidency, ALOC brought several grievances on behalf of Ms. Dixon, the first in June 2016. In November 2016 Ms. Dixon was suspended from the OPS, and ALOC filed a second grievance. On February 14, 2017, ALOC filed a third grievance regarding Ontario’s denial of approval form Ms. Dixon’s attendance at a human rights course.

[41] In Ms. Dixon’s view, all three grievances were unsatisfactory in scope. She states that none of the grievances dealt with the substantive issues relating to her experiences of anti-Black racism tortious conduct, racial discrimination, or racial harassment in the OPS. She states that ALOC has refused to amend the grievances to include the substantive issues. Further, she alleges that ALOC has refused to advance the arbitration despite her repeated requests that they do so, resulting in “an almost ten-year limbo”.

[42] ALOC argues that Mr. Dumitru has no relevant evidence to give, that the summons seeks information outside of his personal knowledge, and that the summons seeks solicitor-client privileged communications. The summons should therefore be quashed as an abuse of process and fishing expedition.

[43] As with respect to Ms. Dicaire, Ms. Dixon argues that Mr Dumitru did not file an affidavit on the motion indicating he does not have personal knowledge of the matters in issue. Ms. Dixon argues that Mr. Dumitru was not ALOC’s counsel; therefore, the information sought is not solicitor-client privileged. She argues that she has met her onus to indicate that the evidence sought is possibly relevant, so the onus has shifted to ALOC to establish the summons is an abuse of process. It has not done so.

[44] As noted above, rule 39.03 examinations are to adduce evidence based on the witness’s direct personal knowledge: Magnotta Winery Corporation v The Alcohol and Gaming Commission of Ontario, 2016 ONSC 3174 at para. 9. Witnesses do not need to inform themselves of matters about which they have no personal knowledge, or to make inquiries of others: Magnotta Winery Corporation v. Ontario (The Alcohol and Gaming Commission), 2020 ONSC 561 at para. 2. It is Ms. Dixon’s burden to show that the proposed witness is in a position to offer possibly relevant evidence: Elmaati; Seelster Farms.

[45] Relevance is determined with regard to the jurisdiction motion, where the court’s primary task is to determine whether the essential character of Ms. Dixon’s claim is a workplace dispute over which an arbitrator has exclusive jurisdiction.

[46] I have already determined that the HRTO matter is irrelevant to the jurisdiction motion. I also find that the materials sought that relate to communications between ALOC and the HRTO are irrelevant.

[47] Much of the information sought from Mr. Dumitru relates to communications about Ms. Dixon’s grievances, including communications with HMK about the grievances, communications about the status of the grievances, and communications with Ms. Oh about the grievances.

[48] Certainly, the materials before the court on this motion clearly indicate that Ms. Dixon is dissatisfied with the actions, or inactions, of ALOC. Ms. Dixon’s claims about ALOC’s unsatisfactory and unacceptable actions ground much of her request for production in the summons to Mr. Dumitru. Ms. Dixon argues that the court will need to decide, at the jurisdiction motion, information about the practicality of the grievance/arbitration process and whether a remedy is required that the arbitrator is not empowered to grant: Weber v. Ontario Hydro, 1995 SCC 108, [1995] 2 SCR 929 at para. 57. She also argues that the information is required so that she is not criticized for a failure to adduce relevant evidence: Rivers.

[49] However, it appears to be common ground between the parties that the grievances themselves, and the collective agreements, will be before the court on the jurisdiction motion. It must be remembered that the jurisdiction motion is not an adjudication of the underlying claim.

[50] As Copeland J. (as she then was) noted, dissatisfaction with a union’s actions, or its choice not to pursue a grievance, “is not a factor that clothes this court with jurisdiction over a dispute that is, in its essential character, a workplace dispute”: De Montigny v. Roy, 2018 ONSC 858 at paras 45-49, aff;’d 2018 ONCA 858. This is not to pre-determine the jurisdiction motion in any way. I refer to this case to illustrate the scope of the question the court will have to determine on the jurisdiction motion - whether Ms. Dixon’s claim is, in its essential character, a workplace dispute over which an arbitrator has exclusive jurisdiction. Ms. Dixon’s satisfaction or dissatisfaction with actions taken by ALOC or the HRTO are irrelevant to a determination of jurisdiction. The information sought from ALOC and Mr. Dumitru about the grievances will not shed light on the jurisdiction issue. This is true with respect to the request of correspondence about the civil suit, as well.

[51] Nor do I find that Ms. Dixon has established that general information about ALOC (its financial statements, the amount of money it has spent litigation against Ms. Dixon, and on representing Ms. Dixon in her grievances, the number of ALOC members, the number of ALOC members who are Black lawyers, the number who are Black female lawyers and information about the latter’s’ year of call and ALOC membership commencement date) is possibly relevant to the jurisdiction motion. These productions speak to issues that may well be relevant to the underlying claim – whether that claim is ultimately properly before the court or is within the exclusive jurisdiction of an arbitrator – but are not relevant to the issue before the court on the jurisdiction motion.

[52] Ms. Dixon also seeks documents setting out the procedure for bringing a duty of fair representation proceeding against ALOC. While not directly relevant to this motion and therefore not ordered to be produced, I would hope that ALOC would furnish this information to Ms. Dixon.

[53] Some of the information sought is privileged – communications between ALOC’s counsel and ALOC – and I would disallow these portions of the summons on this ground as well. A summons should not amount to an effort to probe solicitor-client communications: Jackson v. Corp. of City of Vaughan and Campese, 2010 ONSC 909 at para. 33.

[54] The summons of Mr. Dumitru is quashed.

Summons of George Parris

[55] Mr. Parris is counsel to the Crown and represented the Crown in Ms. Dixon’s grievance and HRTO proceedings.

[56] Mr. Parris is required to produce at his examination 19 types of documents, which can be bundled into the following categories:

• Written, and notes of oral, communications between Mr. Parris, the Crown or its employees, representatives, or agents, including counsel, and the HRTO about Ms. Dixon’s 2017 human rights applications, grievances, civil suit, human rights matter, or Ms. Dixon more generally, including communications between the HRTO and any of the respondents to the 2017 application and its dismissal,
• Written, and notes of oral, communications between Ms. Oh and the HRTO regarding Ms. Dixon’s grievances, civil suit, human rights matter, including the deferral of the 2017 application, and/or Ms. Dixon more generally;
• Documents referring to the nature of the relationship between Ms. Oh and the HRTO;
• Ms. Oh’s job description, and information about the person to whom Ms. Oh reported and/or reports at various times;
• The job description of Lawrence Helpert when he swore his Affidavit dated August 28, 2019, referenced in Angela Oh's Affidavit sworn on May 20, 2022
• The number of Black employees in the OPS
• Documents detailing concrete actions taken by the Crown to address Steven Davidson’ apology letter "for the harm caused to Black employees by the prevalence and severity of anti-Black racism in the workplace" dated June 3, 2021, and to address three reports commission by the OPS as they relate to anti-Black racism in the workplace.

[57] HMK argues that the evidence sought is not relevant to the jurisdiction argument. It further argues that where documentary requests in a summons are overly broad, the court can infer the summons is a fishing expedition: Coburn v. Barber, 2010 ONSC 3342 at para. 101. An attempt to commence discovery prematurely is improper: Derenzis v. Scoburgh, 2021 ONSC 3286 at para.60.

[58] HMK argues that much of the information sought would not be expected to be in the personal knowledge of Mr. Parris. As examples, it refers to documents relating to the relationship between Ms. Oh and the HRTO, and the job description of Lawrence Helpert. HMK also argues that the summonses are issued for a collateral purpose (general discovery, use in the grievance or HRTO processes), and will cause further delay.

[59] Further, it notes that a summons of counsel should be the exception, to be avoided whenever possible Opara v. Opara, 2014 ONSC 5579 at para. 11. Much of the information sought is privileged. An attempt to examine on privileged information is an abuse of process: Jackson at para. 33.

[60] Ms. Dixon acknowledges that Mr. Parris attended the arbitration in May 2019, but states that no submissions were made on that date, and that Mr. Parris is not counsel in this civil action. She argues, relying on Redhead Equipment v. Canada (Attorney General), 2016 SKCA 115, that there is no automatic attachment of solicitor-client privilege to documents, which are not otherwise privileged, simply because they come into the hands of a party’s lawyer. Rather, the lawyer must be acting as counsel giving legal advice to a client for privilege to attach.

[61] Applying these principles, I find that some of the information sought is privileged. Mr. Parris was counsel for HMK in the arbitration process, regardless of whether submissions were made to the arbitrator. The summons also seeks information to and from HMK’s current counsel in this action.

[62] Further, most of the information in the Parris summons relates to information about other people, including Ms. Oh. Ms. Oh is currently HMK’s affiant in the jurisdiction motion. Either Ms. Dixon will succeed on her pending motion to strike Ms. Oh’s affidavit, in which case the information about Ms. Oh will be irrelevant, or she will have the opportunity to cross-examine Ms. Oh and get that information directly from her.

[63] I have already found the HRTO process to be irrelevant and find that the documentation requested about correspondence between HMK and the HRTO is also irrelevant to the jurisdiction motion.

[64] The summons to Mr. Parris is quashed.

Disposition

[65] The motions to quash the summonses are granted. The parties do not seek costs of the motion. No costs are ordered.

Brownstone J. Amended Oct 29, 2024 to Substitute Tribunal for Commission in Counsel line and paragraph 5